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ABSTRACT 
SPRAWL, EQUITY AND FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TIMES ACROSS 
THE U.S. 
Matin Katirai 
February 24, 2009 
This dissertation is an examination of fire department response times in 
eight major cities of the United States including Houston, TX, Charlotte, NC, St. 
Paul, MN, Portland, OR, Seattle, WA, Louisville, KY, San Francisco, CA and 
Miami, FL. This study investigates and analyzes fire protection as an urban 
service as measured by response times, first through proportional access by 
looking at socio-economic status (SES), and secondly through spatial access by 
examining several different aspects of urban sprawl. Response times were 
regressed as the main dependent variable with SES and urban sprawl variables 
in the quantitative portion of the study. Results indicated that response times did 
vary by the SES nature of the fire district and that sprawl did affected response 
times. The quantitative results were followed by a qualitative study which 
examined the quantitative results from 3 local fire chiefs. 
This dissertation is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter one gives an overview 
of the dissertation along with stating the hypothesis, and significance of this 
dissertation. Chapter two is an overview of the literature which focuses on urban 
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service provision, fire protection as an urban service, response times, the 
locations of fire stations, fire districts, urban sprawl, and the measurement of 
equity and sprawl. The literature is used as a guide in framing the study. Chapter 
3 is the methodology section which discusses the data and how the variables 
were selected. In chapter 3 there is also a description of the statistical models 
and how the models were derived. Chapter 4 is the results section and provides 
an analysis of the descriptive statistics, regression results, and an spatial 
analysis of data for four cities. The results section also includes the qualitative 
section which has interview data from 3 fire chiefs in Louisville-Jefferson County. 
In chapter 5 I discuss the results, make recommendations, and list possible 
limitations to this study and areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fire emergencies demand an immediate response by fire departments so 
that precious lives may be saved. Fire departments provide a critical public 
service to city residents. How those services are distributed in a city will have a 
tremendous impact upon how timely residents will receive a response. Robert 
Lineberry (1977) argued that services such as fire provision were not distributed 
in a discriminatory fashion, while others such as Rich (1982), and Duncombe 
(1991) believed that services were distributed in a manner that was unfavorable 
to people in lower socio-economic classes within a city. Others such as Drier, 
Mollenkompf and Swanstrom (2004) have made the argument that "place 
matters" and where one lives in an urban area will have a major impact upon the 
quality of life and the services that are received. Urban sprawl, the pervasive 
development pattern of the United States, is also a part of this place matter 
argument. The issue of service provision in sprawled metropolitan areas creates 
social justice and inequity concerns with those in declining inner cities receiving 
inadequate services. Sprawl creates inefficiencies in service provision and has 
negative externalities, such as congestion, which also impact public safety. 
In this dissertation I will investigate and analyze fire protection as an urban 
service, first through proportional access by looking at various socio economic 
factors, and secondly, through spatial access by examining several different 
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effects of urban sprawl. I believe where one lives in a city will have a significant 
impact on how a fire department responds to an emergency. The inspiration of 
this study comes from the response to Hurricane Katrina. The first goal was to 
investigate if there was any level of institutional discrimination within the fire 
rescue system, and second to examine the impact of the landscape and the 
characteristics associated with it on response. More specifically in this 
dissertation I will analyze the response times of fire departments as a measure of 
service provision at the fire district level by using spatial and socio-economic 
characteristics within eight major US cities including Louisville, Ky., Houston, Tx., 
San Francisco, Ca., Miami, Fl., Seattle, Wa., Portland, Or., Charlotte, N.C. and 
St. Paul, Mn. 
Two main research questions will be addressed in this dissertation. The 
first research question will examine if there is equity and proportional access to 
fire protective services. Socioeconomic characteristics will be used to determine 
if differences exist in response times at the fire district level. The next research 
question will examine access to services from a spatial perspective. Specifically 
the influence of urban sprawl on response times will be addressed. In order to 
investigate the influence of urban sprawl on response times many facets of urban 
sprawl will be considered, such as: density, mix of land uses, street configuration, 
dependence upon the automobile, commuting times and distance from the center 
of the city. Quantitative and qualitative analyses will be used in an examination of 
cities and their fire districts. 
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1.1 Hypothesis 
Several scholars have argued that people in lower socio-economic groups 
are marginalized when it comes to resource distribution and services provision, 
while others believed that this is not the case. I hypothesize that that there is 
discrimination when it comes to resource allotment, and that the poor will be 
underserved, especially with a service like fire provision. Where people live in a 
city will have a major determination on what sort of fire protection services they 
receive. I also hypothesize that sprawl will also have a major detrimental effect 
on a service such as fire provision by lengthening response times. 
1. Response times will vary by the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
people living in the fire district. 
a. This question will measure if there is equity and proportional access 
to fire services through response times. Factors to be examined 
include: race, poverty status, housing tenure, property values, 
property taxes, and household income. 
2. Fire districts that have a greater degree of urban sprawl will have longer 
response times when compared to fire districts that are less sprawled. 
a. This question will measure if there is access to fire services through 
response times from a spatial perspective. Sprawl for the purpose 
of this study will be identified by several factors including densities, 
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street access, segregated land uses, vehicle ownership, commute 
times and distance from the center of the city. 
1.2 Importance of Study 
This study is important because it examines the service equity of critical 
life and property saving services of fire fighters and their departments. This study 
scrutinizes how critical life-saving city services are distributed, either on a need-
and-actual-Ioss basis or a potential loss basis. If fire services are distributed on a 
need basis than theoretically the underprivileged should have better access to 
fire protection services and therefore quicker response times. It is critical that the 
underprivileged within inner cities have better access to fire protective services 
because fire follows poverty. If fire services are distributed based on potential 
loss, then areas with greater property values will have better access to fire 
protection services and quicker response times. This means that people in 
poorer areas will experience inequality in receiving fire protection services. If this 
is the case, then cities and fire departments need to change the methodology in 
which they decide where to place new fire stations so that the underprivileged 
would be better served. 
Sprawl has been the dominant force in shaping the American landscape 
for several decades. There are several different reasons why urban sprawl has 
become the predominant settlement pattern in American cities. Policies at the 
national level, such as the Interstate Highway Act, to local policies, such as 
zoning laws and fire codes, have been responsible for promoting low-density 
developments on the periphery of cities. Services cost more to provide in 
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sprawled areas, and some cities will attempt to minimize their costs by limiting 
services. Many have also argued that urban sprawl takes away resources from 
those living within inner cities. Cities that are sprawled will have to spread their 
resource geographically to be able to cover all their residents within a city. This 
study has great importance because it critically examines empirically fire 
protective services and sprawl. This study also could add further evidence that 
sprawl jeopardizes the quality of life of individuals who live in these types of 
developments because of slower response times for critical-life saving services. 
One of the many causes of sprawl has been state and local regulations that 
mandate low-density housing and wide streets to accommodate fire trucks and 
equipment. The low density housing and wide streets caused by these 
regulations are typical of urban sprawl and may have ultimately been 
counterproductive because they cause fire protective services to be spread thin 
across a city. Sprawl also will contribute to increased traffic and congestion due 
to the car-friendly nature of the development patterns; however, lower densities 
counteract congestion. This study will examine the relationship between fire 
protective services and urban sprawl and determine if slower response times are 
typical in sprawled areas, which should be considered as an additional cost of 
living in such an area. 
1.3 Contribution of this Study 
This study contributes to the existing knowledge base in several manners. 
First, I am using a rich data set with information from eight different cities across 
the country. Second, the unit of analysis that I am proposing to use in this study 
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is the fire district and has not been used in a national assessment of response 
times. My analysis contributes to the field of sprawl and service provision from 
the perspective of fire protection services, as measured in response times. This 
study also examines if there is proportional access to fire protective services for 
underprivileged groups. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
Chapter two will be a comprehensive examination of the literature in the 
field. Sections in literature review include: urban service provision, fire protection, 
response times, fire station locations, fire districts, fire codes, urban sprawl and 
the measurement of urban sprawl and equity. The literature will then be 
summarized and existing gaps in the research will be identified. Chapter three 
discusses the methodology of the study by providing a detailed description of the 
data, quantitative analysis used to test the hypothesis, description of dependent 
and independent variables, and qualitative analysis. Chapter four will list the 
results from the quantitative analysis, the qualitative case studies and a spatial 
analysis of maps. Chapter five will be an in-depth discussion of the findings along 
with policy recommendations for areas of future research and the conclusions 
from findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
L1TRATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Urban Service Provision 
City governments are charged with providing a safe environment for their 
citizens. Public safety, such as police, fire and emergency medical services 
(EMS), are key services needed within urban centers to ensure that everyday life 
and business can operate routinely. Urban service delivery is a hotly contested 
issue because it has a direct impact upon the population's wellbeing, especially 
services such as police and fire. One reason for this controversy in service 
provision as identified by the literature is due to how a city's resources are 
distributed (Lineberry, 1977). Service provision also has been contentious 
because it relates to discrimination in city policies that affect service provision 
(DeHoog, 1997). The significance of race as a factor in policy decisions in 
service distribution may have diminished, but racism has not disappeared when it 
comes to the allotment of scarce resources at the city level (Bullard 2000). Cities 
have limited budgets and where the funding is allocated makes a significant 
difference in the daily lives of individuals and this is especially true with a service 
such as fire protection. If there is racism and inequality in resource allotment 
pertaining to fire protection this will directly bring harm to those who were not 
provided with an adequate share of fire protective services. It is in a city's interest 
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to operate as efficiently as possible and this efficiency has a delicate balance 
between taxes and services (Peterson, 1981). In an effort to be efficient cities will 
attempt to provide the minimum with respect to service provision in order to find 
that balance between taxes and services that Peterson discusses, and many feel 
that it is the poor and underprivileged that suffer and not the wealthy especially 
when it comes to public safety. 
Lineberry (1978) identified several areas of major concerns with respect to 
the study of service distribution and urban public policy. These issues were 
about the size of the jurisdiction providing a service and how large should a 
service provision unit be so that responsiveness, equity, and efficiency are 
maximized (Lineberry, 1978). There are several reasons why this is important to 
this study, first, because fire services are distributed through fire districts which 
are special jurisdictions that have the sole responsibility of providing one 
particular service. Second, responsiveness, equity and efficiency are extremely 
relevant to fire protection. Responsiveness is important to fire protection because 
it is absolutely necessary to respond to fire emergencies as quickly as possible. 
Efficiency is critical because the services provided are so expensive and 
because fire protection is a capital intensive service (stations, vehicles, etc.). 
Equity is important because fire protection is a service that needs to be equitably 
distributed. 
Cities are separated into socia-economic and spatial groupings that are 
influenced by government policies, distribution of wealth, racial and economic 
discrimination, real estate practices, access to housing, the job market, zoning, 
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suburban incorporations, transportation networks, along with many other factors 
(Lineberry 1977; Dreier et aI., 2004). Many of these factors negatively affect the 
underprivileged, and because of this, people may have the perception that there 
is a lack of responsiveness, equity and efficiency when it comes to providing 
public safety. 
Equity is a term that has been mentioned several times, but before there is 
any further discussion about the term, there needs to be a description of what 
equity means. Equity has been described as a normative concept that is different 
from equality, which is an empirical term and can be tangibly verified (Chang, 
2002). Equity is normative in nature because there are judgmental and moral 
tones especially about the distribution of resources (Braveman and Gruskin, 
2003).Braveman and Gruskin (2003) assert that equality should be evaluated 
based on specified measurable outcomes that leave out the judgment factor. 
There has been a considerable amount of research within the field of health on 
the term of equity and access to health care that can readily be applied to public 
services, and especially a service such as fire protection. Equity within the health 
field has been associated with the distribution of resources, expenditures, 
utilization, and access to services (Waters, 2000). A lack of access to health 
resource within deprived communities has been identified as a primary source of 
poor health status and inequity (Pearce et. ai, 2007). With respect to fire 
protection a lack of access to resources would mean greater loss associated with 
fire, both a loss of life and property. All residents within a community should be 
regarded as equals to every other resident within the community, and should 
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have similar access to services, however, the issue is that people are not able to 
live equidistant from services and new facilities shQuld be built so that equal 
access is attained (Lucy et aI., 1977). People who Ilive the closest to a fire station 
will receive better service, with respect to response times, when compared to 
those who live further away. 
Measuring equality in service distribution is a challenging concept. The 
first reason why equality is a challenging notion to quantify is that there are 
questions of how equality should be, in fact, measured, and second, there is also 
a lack of clearness as to which group (s) should be focused on that are defined 
by race, income, gender, etc (Oliver, Healey, and l,.eGrand, 2002). Another 
reason as to why equality is a potentially difficult concept to measure is that the 
service needs from different regions within a city will vary considerably and by 
providing the exactly equal services to unequal consumers will result in severe 
inequalities (Rich, 1977). Equality and who gets what share of a city's services is 
extremely relevant to fire protection as certain groUlps will require the services 
more than other groups. In most cases inner cities have populations who are 
service dependent because of age, illness, and a lack of income (Wolch, 1979). 
The poor, elderly, and racial minorities who live in substandard housing in the 
inner cities are disproportionally affected by fires, and therefore depend on fire 
protective services more than other people (Lineb$rry 1977; Jennings 1999). 
Rich (1982) identified that service provision is not equal across an urban area 
and some citizens will receive more or better public services than others. Fire 
protection is one service that is likely to vary significantly across communities 
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with respect to income and taxes (Duncombe, 199 11). 
The literature has identified that certain groljJps and certain areas within 
cities will receive varying levels of fire services; some are better off while others 
are not. Cingranelli (1981) was able to identify that: African-American 
neighborhoods did receive lower levels of fire service than comparable white 
neighborhoods, and that fire expenditure was higher in areas with industrial and 
commercial activity. These areas with the higher levels of expenditure should in 
theory have better levels of services. Individuals who live in certain 
neighborhoods will receive advantages that come along from living in such 
settings, while others will live in areas that pose m~jor disadvantages because 
the quality of public services are inferior as there is a great variation in the fiscal 
capacity of poor and wealthy municipalities (Swan$trom et al. 2002; Dreier, et al. 
2004). There also will be variations of services that are supplied between one 
community and another community because of fiscal capacity, the cost of 
supplying the service, and the demand for the service (Peterson, 1981). Cities 
also face vulnerability from budget uncertainty as the economic environment can 
change quickly from year to year, which will influence how public services are 
demanded and provided (Dumcombe, 1991). In today's tough economic climate 
where cities are facing major budgetary problems and are trying to find ways to 
reduce their budgets this is especially the case. 
It is commonly believed by many that the underprivileged receive inferior 
quality of services in a discriminatory fashion. However, Lineberry (1977) was 
able to demonstrate that the urban "underclass th~ory", which states that 
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services will be distributed in a manner that is discriminatory against minorities 
and low-income people, is incorrect and that underprivileged do not generally 
receive the poorest public services. In New York City it was found that both 
wealthy and underprivileged income groups were receiving superior police and 
fire protective services, and that the middle class fared the worst (Sanger, 1982). 
This may be related to the fact that New York city redeployed its fire companies 
because of union demands for balanced workloads so high incident fire areas 
received more personnel and fire equipment(Viteritti, 1982}. Interestingly, this is a 
situation where the union plays a role in deciding where services should be 
provided rather the fire department self determinin9 that there was a greater 
need in those particular areas. 
Urban services are delivered in several different ways. Services can be 
delivered "through its own employees in house or in one of several alternative 
quasi-market mechanisms, such as contracting out, franchising, service 
shedding, volunteers, vouchers, coprovision, or coproduction" (DeHoog, 1997: 
7). In some instances public services will be contracted out to private firms to 
provide particular services. Cities seeking to lower their cost burden because of 
lower tax revenues and diminishing state and federal funding may seek to reduce 
their costs by privatizing fire services (Guardino, Haarmeyer, and Poole, 1993). 
Previously there was limited contracting of public safety such as police or fire 
suppression (ICMA, 1989). More recently however, there have been a greater 
number of communities that have opted to use privatized fire services especially 
in the south and west (Guardino, Haarmeyer, and Poole, 1993). Arizona is a 
12 
prime example of state where several of its communities utilize privatized fire 
protection services. 
The literature in this section has been key in indentifying that service 
provision will vary at the community level and this is extremely pertinent to fire 
protection as any variation in this particular service at the community level will 
have potentially harmful consequences. The services will vary because of 
several factors such as cost of providing the service, how the service is 
distributed, and the demand of that service that is affected by the population that 
utilizes that service. As service provision varies at the community level certain 
groups, such as the poor and racial minorities, may be negatively affected when 
it comes to resource allocation. However, the literature also has identified that 
this is not always the case and that the poor are not always worse off. 
2.2 Fire Protection 
Fire protection is a critical urban public service that cities provide. Fire 
protection is essential and ensures the safety and welfare of individuals who live 
and work in cities. Fire protection is an important urban public service because 
fires have the ability to wreak major havoc upon cities as witnessed in the major 
conflagration of Chicago in 1871 and the fire following the San Francisco 
earthquake of 1906 (PiaU, 1999). Fire departments have more responsibilities 
than just extinguishing fires, such as providing emergency medical assistance, 
conducting search-and-rescue operations and dealing with hazardous material 
accidents. Fire departments played major roles in search-and-rescue operations 
after the 9/11 aUacks and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 
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Unlike many other western nations where there is a strong role for the nation-
state to respond to emergencies, the United States is highly decentralized and 
the first line of responsibility for public protection lies with local government, and 
this usually falls to police and fire men and women (Drabek, 1985). Fire fighters 
also provide specialty services of swift-water rescue, along with urban search 
and rescue and are professionals who have had training in search-and-rescue 
techniques and will respond to emergency events (Dynes, 1970). Fire 
departments also playa role in the ensuring that development meets safety 
standards. The other, and main, role that fire departments provide is protection 
against fires. Fires exact a major social and economic toll upon cities (see Table 
1). Several thousand individuals die each year and billions of dollars of damage 
accrue. 
Table 1: Fire Loss in the U.S 
Direct Dollar Adjusted Dollar 
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Loss In Millions Loss* 
1998 1,755,000 4,035 23,100 $8,629,000,000 $10,976,410,000 
1999 1,823,000 3,570 21,875 $10,024,000,000 $12,475,370,000 
2000 1,708,000 4,045 22,350 $11,207,000,000 $13,494,090,000 
2001 1,734,500 3,745 20,300 $10,583,000,000 $12,390,180,000 
2002 1,687,500 3,380 18,425 $10,337,000,000 $11,913,810,000 
2003 1,584,500 3,925 18,125 $12,307,000,000 $13,868,250,000 
2004 1,550,500 3,900 17,875 $9,794,000,000 $10,750,170,000 
2005 1,602,000 3,675 17,925 $10,672,000,000 $11,330,020,000 
2006 1,642,500 3,245 16,400 $11,307,000,000 $11,629,050,000 
2007 1,557,500 3,430 17,675 $14,639,000,000 $14,639,000,000 .. 
Source: U.S. Fire Administration, 2008: U.S. National Fire Statistics. Adjusted to 2007 Dollars. 
Fire protection takes up a considerable portion of city budgets. Table 2 
displays the budgets for fire departments for 28 cities and the overall budgets. 
Spending ranges from a low of 10 percent to high of nearly 30 percent of overall 
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city budgets. Cities spend more on fire protection than on any other service, with 
the exception of policing and road construction (Lineberry, 1977). Large portions 
of fire expenditures go toward the salaries of fire fighters and equipment. 
Table 2: City Fire Expenditure 
%of 
2005 Total Fire Total 
City Name Population Expenditure City Budget Budget 
Franklin, IN 19,463 $3,467,127 $11,790,254 29.41% 
Davenport, IA 98,359 $11,069,000 $39,926,512 27.72% 
Mount Vernon, 14,375 $2,416,713 $8,749,563 27.62% 
Ashland, KY 21,981 $4,192,082 $18,070,826 23.20% 
Paducah, KY 26,307 $4,951,000 $24,331,520 20.35% 
Helena. MT 25,780 $2,441,000 $12,177,317 20.05% 
Montpelier, VT 8,035 $1,587,018 $7,921,736 20.03% 
Charlotte, NC 540,828 $70,328,127 $363,133,000 19.37% 
Houston, TX 2,016,585 $293,242,005 $1,561,544,400 18.78% 
Redlands, CA 63,591 $10,032,886 $55,521,115 18.07% 
Hattiesburg, MS 44,779 $5,776,985 $32,075,797 18.01% 
Tampa, FL 303,447 $50,428,886 $300,999,479 16.75% 
Elizabethtown. 22,542 $3,260,000 $19,698,463 16.55% 
Cheyenne, WY 53,011 $7,962,640 $48,431,616 16.44% 
Annapolis. MD 35,838 $8,339,580 $52,920,640 15.76% 
Berkeley, CA 102,743 $18,111,000 $115,114,006 15.73% 
Twin Falls, ID 34,469 $3,237,624 $21,202,362 15.27% 
Miami, FL 362,470 $76,487,399 $512,507,527 14.92% 
Mobile, AL 198,915 $24,162,331 $173,461,646 13.93% 
Charleston, SC 96,650 $13,676,485 $98,340,943 13.91% 
Palm Springs, CA 42,807 $6,831,000 $51,603,943 13.24% 
Portland, OR 64,249 $15,193,000 $117,437,236 12.94% 
Gatlinburg, TN 3,382 $2,305,353 $17,961,315 12.84% 
International Falls, 6,703 $530,808 $4,263,981 12.45% 
San Francisco, CA 719,077 $224,715,517 $1,967,808,000 11.42% 
Louisville, KY 265,000 $45,298,500 $437,232,800 10.36% 
Xenia,OH 24,164 $1,350,000 $13,719,604 9.84% 
Tacoma, WA 193,556 $34,901,000 $356,106,650 9.80% 
SOURCE: 2005 City Budgets, DPI Project. 
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Other major expenses for fire departments, regardless of size, include fire 
vehicles, such as engines or pumper trucks, and training (Compton and Granito, 
2002). As cities come under budgetary pressures they will seek to reduce staffing 
and will close stations to save money (Scawthron, O'Rourke and Blackburn, 
2006). Cost is major consideration in providing fire safety, and fire departments 
are encouraged to improve cost effectiveness which is a struggle to find the right 
balance between cost and an acceptable level of service provision 
(Puchovsky, 1996). As fire protection takes up a considerable portion of a city's 
budget, the key question should be: where will the staff reductions take place, 
and what stations will be closed? Is staffing reduced equally across the board, or 
are certain areas affected disproportionately by these decisions on where to 
provide fewer services? The ideal situation would be to reduce the services 
provided in areas that have ttle least need for the service and not areas that 
make considerable use of the service. 
Not all cities across the nation will be in similar financial situations; some 
are experiencing financial distress while others may be experiencing prosperity, 
so some fire departments may expand while others might experience declines in 
staffing that will affect the level of services that are provided. Decisions by cities 
to reduce funding in times of fiscal distress will often impact services such as fire 
protection and will most assuredly have an impact on providing an adequate 
response. In a local example of this, in 2008 the City of Louisville faced a $20 
million budget short-fall and Mayor Jerry Abramson closed one of the city's 
downtown fire stations to save $500,000 (Halladay, 2009). The result of the 
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station closure will be that those who lived in close proximity to the fire station will 
now have longer response times in waiting for fire services. 
The fire department provides a public good that helps maintain the 
preferred state of reducing fire loss for a community, and the benefits will be 
confined to the residents of that community (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961). 
Ostrom et al. (1961) assert that by viewing a public good that maintains the 
preferred state, such as the reduction a loss from fire, will allow for a degree of 
quantification and measurability criteria at the metropolitan level, which is 
important for this study because the goal is to take fire protection as a service 
and quantify the service and use this measurability criterion provided through 
response times to examine differences that exist at the metropolitan area. 
2.3 Response Time 
In this study, response times are the major dependent variable of service 
provision for the fire department. The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 
defines response time as "the time that begins when units are en route to the 
emergency incident and ends when units arrive at the scene (NFPA, 2004:24)." 
The NFPA is the major national authority on fires, electrical, and building safety 
in the United States. The NFPA was formed for the purpose of standardizing 
sprinkler systems in buildings in Northeast states at the end of the 19th Century 
(Kaplan, 2003). The NFPA standard for response time is four minutes for the 
arrival of the first engine company at a fire-suppression incident and or 8 minutes 
or less for the first full assignment at the incident. 
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The NFPA also requires that fire departments across the country to 
establish a 90 percent compliance with response time objectives and that an 
annual review of service delivery and response time objectives should take place 
for each geographic area. The Boston Globe in a national examination of 
response times was able to find that just 58 percent of fire departments in 2005 
were meeting national response time standards, and this figure had fallen from a 
high of 75 percent in 1986 (Dedman, 2005). A few fire departments across the 
country have adopted the NFPA standards, and many communities do not even 
keep track of response times (Dedman, 2005). Limits on response times are put 
into place so that a specified time period will not lapse before a response can 
occur to any fire (Toregas and Swain, 1971). Having a rapid response time is 
critical within urban areas as the close proximity of buildings and higher 
population densities may potentially lead to major fire losses (Ganito, 1986). 
The medical emergencies that fire departments respond to also require 
immediate attention as survival rates will most definitely be dependent upon swift 
medical attention by trained emergency professionals (Cote, 2003). In the United 
States, average response times for emergency medical services in 2002 were 
6.51 minutes for urban fatal crashes (Lambert and Meyer, 2006). Response 
times in a station's response area can be from 2 minutes up (Cote, 2003). A 
recent study of fire departments by the Boston Globe found that response times 
where growing longer especially within suburban areas of Boston and other 
major American cities as there has been major growth in these suburban areas 
but staffing had been reduced (Dedman, 2005). 
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Time is the most critical element when any emergency incident is 
reported, especially ones that deal with fire, as fire growth may expand at a rate 
of many times per volume and the time between fire ignition and fire suppression 
has a direct relationship with fire loss (Cote, 2003). Fires spread fast, and for fire 
departments to be minimally effective in suppressing a fire the first responding 
fire fighting vehicle must reach the scene within 10 minutes of the alarm (Ganito, 
1986). Any delay in the response could be the cause of loss of life or property. 
There are several factors that will have a considerable impact upon 
response times and should be taken into consideration when planning to reduce 
response time. One of the most important factors that affects response time is 
travel distance, which is the distance that the fire vehicle has to travel from the 
station to the location of the fire, and the total number of fire stations in an area 
(Halpern, 1979). Other critical factors that have been found to influence response 
times include sprinklered vs. nonsprinklered, commercial vs. residential, and 
multifamily vs. single-family residential (Cote, 2003). Many of these factors will be 
affected by a city's fire code requirements. 
Response time is an ideal indicator that can be used to gauge a level 
service provision that is provided by the fire department. Achieving a level of 
service equity with response times as an indicator would usually mean that all 
areas should have roughly similar responses and that resources would have to 
be disseminated on the basis of calls rather than population (Lucy et aI., 1977). 
Areas with higher needs should therefore be allocated more resources to reduce 
response times. However, if parity is sought out through population rather than 
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need, then equity cannot be achieved in an indicator such as mean fire loss 
(Lucy, 1981). 
There is a clear case of who has the highest need, and consequently 
quicker response time, for fire protection services. Jennings (1999) in his 
comprehensive literature review of socioeconomic indicators of fire incidence in 
residential areas identified poverty, owner occupation, sub-standard housing, 
population density, overcrowding, lack of supervision for children, drug and 
alcohol abuse, missing smoke alarms, poor heating, and immigrants, as 
characteristics of areas with high fire incidence. Areas with all these 
characteristics would have a greater need for fire protective services and quicker 
response times. It is more than likely that these areas are found within inner 
cities. It is also these demographic characteristics of the population that will affect 
the frequency of fire occurrences, which will have an impact upon response times 
(Ganito, 1986). Areas where different conditions exist, such as better insurance 
policies, improved heating, parental supervision of children, sprinkler systems in 
homes, will have less of need for fire protective services when compared to their 
inner city counter parts. 
There have been a very few studies that have critically examined 
response times of the fire department as a measure of service equity. One study 
by Gomersall (2002) of the Cincinnati Fire Department was able to demonstrate 
that the fire department responded equitably without regard to socioeconomic 
characteristics of the neighborhood. Gomersall (2002) also found that straight 
line distances were not an important factor in response times, but that the 
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number of corners that a fire truck had to turn was the major influence on 
response times. 
2.4 Fire Station Location 
Response times will be greatly affected by where a community decides to 
place fire stations. Fire stations are a part of the overall package of fire service 
provision as fire engines and fire fighters are dispatched from the fire station to 
respond to an emergency. According to the International City/County 
Management Association's (ICMA) (2002) Managing Fire and Rescue Services, 
basic deployment concept calls for fire stations to be located in such a way to 
create an orderly network of stations from which emergency services are 
delivered in a timely manner. Therefore, communities with higher population 
densities and heavy traffic should have a greater number of fire stations. 
Communities that also want to have narrower streets and want to reduce 
response times should have a greater number of fire stations so that they can 
meet the demand of their respective areas that they are responsible for (Ewing, 
Stevens and Brown, 2007). However, the selection of fire stations sites becomes 
complicated sometimes because of standards. The siting of fire stations has 
been highly influenced by the Insurance Services Offices (ISO) guidelines 
(ReVelle, 1991). These guidelines and standards demand that fire stations be 
placed in close proximity to highly insured and expensive public and private 
buildings because of potential for loss (Lucy, 1981). These standards are 
detrimental to the poor, racial minorities and those who live in substandard 
housing because response times will be higher for these groups and lower for 
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those such as businesses that are located close to a fire station. Both Cingranelli 
(1981) and Sanger (1982) were able to confirm that allocation of fire services 
favored areas with commercial activity. These standards are biased because 
they are based on potential loss, rather than actual loss. Areas that have higher 
actual loss and need should in have a greater number of facilities. 
Several aspects are considered by fire departments when deciding where 
to build a fire station, such as operating costs, practicality, public reaction, 
environmental consideration, design, support, and the most important aspect 
which is providing the best possible protection to the area (Rosenhan, 1986; 
Owen and Daskin, 1998; Compton and Granito, 2002). In the Fire Chiefs 
Handbook, Coleman (2003) indicates that response times are an important 
consideration for site selection of fire stations and that it is essential that any site 
meet response time criteria set out by the department or national standards. 
Excessive response times translate into increased risk from an emergency 
(Compton and Granito, 2002). Response time can be reduced by selecting fire 
station locations based on the amount of time that it takes to travel from station to 
incident scene (Cote, 2003). Both social and geographic characteristics of an 
area that are to be protected by a fire station are critical elements in the planning 
of where to build a fire-station, such as waterways, mountains, valleys, highways, 
one-way streets, and railroad crossings that may limit response routes and times 
(Rosenhan, 1986). In the NFPA's Fire Protection Handbook, Roshenhan (1986) 
identified that some areas in a community will be higher risk than other areas for 
fires because of the types of facilities that are located within those areas, such as 
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industrial, institutional, mercantile, and multifamily dwellings, and that it would be 
undesirable to locate a station within those areas. Areas that usually have 
multifamily dwellings are located within inner cities where the poor and minorities 
are located. If these areas that have multifamily dwellings are undesirable for fire 
stations, then these people are disadvantaged with regards to response time 
because they have the greater need for the service, and therefore stations 
should be placed in these areas. 
2.5 Fire Districts 
The fire district is the unit of analysis of this study. The fire district is a 
special unit of government that provides the specialized service of fire protection. 
A fire district is a special district or jurisdiction unit of government. These special 
districts perform local governmental functions within a specified geographical 
boundary with powers of taxation, issuing debt, and appropriating private land for 
public use (Burns, 1994). The fire district is an important concept for this study 
because fire protective services are distributed at fire-district level, and statistics, 
such as response times, are collected at the fire-district level. 
Cities in the United States are responsible for providing many services 
and take on a considerable portion of financial burden unlike many other Western 
nations. Services are primarily funded through property taxes, payroll taxes and 
other fees. The fire department is one of these services that receive its funding 
from the general budget of a city funded by local taxes. However, because of 
competition among cities within metropolitan areas, many municipalities will be 
hesitant to raise fees and taxes to provide better services because wealthier 
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citizens may leave and move to a lower-cost areas (Peterson 1981; Swanstrom 
et aI., 2002). Disparity in funding between different areas within a city will lead to 
varying levels of service provision. Some fire districts will have more man-power 
and better response times than other fire districts. It is this variation in the level of 
service provision in fire districts that makes them the ideal unit of analysis for 
measuring equality among the different inhabitants of the districts, and especially 
the groups identified in the literature such as the poor and minorities. Another 
primary justification for comparing various units of government, such as cities or 
special districts, is that all elected officials and decision makers are subject to 
similar groups of pressures and competing interests (Peterson, 1981). 
Many large cities across the United States are increasingly reliant on the 
use of special governmental districts to provide service and tax differentiation 
and to provide local citizens with an array of choices (Baer and Marando, 2001). 
In many instances individuals will seek out communities that best satisfy their 
preferences for those specific public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Each community or 
jurisdiction will be entitled to a level of spending that is directly proportional to the 
taxes that are paid (Boyne, Powel and Ashworth, 2001). An example of this 
would be a household that opts to live in an area with its own private police force 
as response times and service from smaller police departments tend to be faster 
when compared to a larger police force (Ostrom, 2000). Over the past 50 years, 
the majority of new governments have been special districts (Burns, 1994). Table 
3 illustrates the dramatic increase in special-district governments over that time. 
Table 3 also indicates that the population served per district has also decreased 
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by 35% of the past 50 years. This could possible indicate an improvement in 
services. In the last Census of governments there were a total of 5,743 fire 
protection districts, or 16,2 percent of the total number of special unit districts 
across the country. 
T bl 3 S 'I U 't f G a e - ipeCla nlSO overnmen t' th US In e .. 
# of Special District 
Year Governments Population Population/District 
1952 12,340 151,325,798 12,263 
1962 18,323 179,325,176 9,787 
1972 23,885 203,211,926 8,508 
1982 28,078 226,545,805 8,068 
1992 33,131 248,709,873 7,507 
2002 35,356 281,421,906 7,960 
. , . . . 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments DIvIsion. List of Governments 2002 Edition . 
2.6 Fire Codes 
Fire codes are safety standards that are established by various groups to 
protect buildings and individuals from fires. Fire codes are meant to impact the 
landscape by making it easier for fire departments to respond to emergencies 
that should help reduce response times. Fire codes also provide building 
standards to make them more likely to withstand fires. The NFPA is one 
organization that establishes fire codes that cities and states adopt. Fire codes 
have come about as a result of tragic events, such as the Chicago fire of 1871, 
the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, the 1903 Iroquois Theatre fire in 
Chicago, and the 1911 Triangles Shirtwaist Factory Fire in New York City 
(Kaplan, 2003). 
According to Duany, Plater-Zyber and Speck (2000) fire departments and 
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fire codes will have a considerable impact upon street layout and urban sprawl 
because of requirements needed for response. In order to reduce response times 
fire departments will have standards that require wider streets so that large fire 
trucks can maneuver (Duany et aI., 2000). The NFPA has several different 
guidelines and general requirements that impact street widths and the location of 
structures. For example, the NFPA (1993) has requirements that include: road 
width should be at least 24 feet wide, turns should have a minimum radius of 100 
feet, fire lanes should be at least 20 feet in width from the road edge to the 
structure, and structures with greater than 1000 square feet of floor area shall not 
be set back more than 50 feet from street and have at least 14 feet of clearance 
over the width of the street. 
These standards that dictate road widths and similar design elements, 
according to Ewing et al. (2007), are the biggest obstacle to having skinny streets 
as state and local fire codes will most likely follow these national standards. 
These road width standards which should allow for quicker access for the fire 
department contribute to urban sprawl and create problems, including an 
increase in major car accidents, a reduction in pedestrian-friendly areas, and 
encouraging people to drive faster, which will create traffic congestion and lead 
to an increase in response times for the fire department (Duany et aI., 2000). 
According to Saar (1996), another manner in which fire regulations and codes 
have contributed to sprawl is the limitation of the construction of multifamily 
dwellings. The limitation of development of multifamily dwellings began to 
happen as early as in the 1890's when cities, such as Philadelphia and Chicago, 
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began to use fire codes to prevent the construction of buildings more than four 
stories (Baar, 1996). 
2.7 Sprawl 
Urban sprawl should be an important topic of consideration for fire 
departments and emergency response because the location of stations and the 
ability of fire engines to navigate will be highly influenced by the pattern and 
layout of the landscape. Duany et al. (2000), Ewing et al. (2007), and Baar 
(1996) all indicated that fire codes have contributed to sprawl for various reasons 
such as street layout, the discouragement of multifamily dwellings and affects on 
traffic. Sprawl is also an important topic because it will also affect how services 
are distributed within a community. Sprawl has also been identified as creating 
fiscal disparities between communities which leads to inequality (Squires, 2002). 
No discussion of sprawl would be adequate without attempting to define the term. 
Within the body of literature there are no common definitions, and there have 
even been a few attempts to operationally define sprawl (Galster, Hanson, 
Ratcliffe, Coleman, and Freihage, 2001). One of the more robust definitions of 
sprawl was characterized by Galster et aL (2001: 5) where they define sprawl as 
"a pattern of land use in an urban area that exhibits low levels of some 
combination of eight distinct dimensions: density, continuity, concentration, 
compactness, centrality, nuclearity, diversity, and proximity". Their definition is 
more tangible that others because their eight dimensions of sprawl allow for it to 
be easily operationalized. 
Another useful definition of sprawl is provided by Burchell et al. (1998) in 
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the book, The Cost of Sprawl-Revisited. Burchell et al. (1998) characterize 
sprawl as low density, unlimited, noncontiguous growth and consumption of 
agricultural lands that creates a total reliance upon the automobile. Millions of 
Americans spend a considerable portion of their day commuting in their 
automobiles to work in downtown cores from suburban neighborhoods. 
Development, both residential and commercial, that usually takes place in a 
sprawled environment is highly segregated and land uses are not mixed 
(Burchell et ai, 2005). Sprawl has been fueled by the automobile, and our 
overabundant reliance on this mode of transportation (Burchell et aI., 2005). 
Automobiles are needed to travel between homes and commercial areas 
because of this highly segregated pattern of land use. 
Bruegmann (2005), in his work Sprawl, a Compact History concedes that 
sprawl is this infinitely complex term, which accurately defines an attitude rather 
than any particular condition. Never- the-less, Bruegmann (2005) defines sprawl 
as urban development that is scattered, without systematic public planning at 
low-densities. Sprawl is not a new occurrence but rather it is one that has been 
around for quite a long time, and the aspect of sprawl that is rather new (within 
past century), is that sprawl has become a mass phenomenon made available by 
improvements in modern technology such as the automobile (Bruegmann, 2005). 
Duany et al. (2000) in Suburban Nation describe sprawl as an outgrowth 
of modern problem solving and a system for living. Their definition for sprawl is 
slightly different than the other definitions mentioned above. In Suburban Nation 
sprawl is characterized by five different components that are strictly isolated from 
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one another and include: housing subdivision, shopping centers, office parks, 
civic institutions, and roadways. Roadways are the arteries that are essential in 
connecting the four disassociated components with one another and the 
automobile is the main choice of transportation for those roadways (Duany, et al. 
2000). The high reliance on single occupied automobile results in higher than 
normal traffic load, even in smaller sparsely populated areas, according to Duany 
et al (2000). 
Urban sprawl has been fueled by several factors that have highly 
contributed to the suburbanization of the country. The factors include a 
substantial gain in population, high rates of crime in central cities, racial 
composition of urban areas, technological advancements, availability of land, 
rising affluence, and consumer inclinations for low-density living (Nivola, 1999; 
Gordon and Richardson, 1997; Bruegmann, 2005). The largest contributor to 
urban sprawl, that has had more of a substantial impact than any other factor, is 
the impact of governmental policies. Most of these policies are federal in nature. 
Many experts in the field point to policies such as the Federal Interstate 
Highway and Defense act of 1956 that acted as catalysts to make the automobile 
and highways the primary route and mode of transportation in the United States 
today (Drier et ai, 2004; Savitch, 2000). The Federal Interstate Highway and 
Defense act was largely a national-security strategy that occurred during the 
Cold War and would help facilitate the decentralization of cities to minimize the 
damage from a nuclear strike. The Federal Interstate Highway and Defense Act 
was coupled with other policies such as the Highway Trust Fund. The Highway 
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Trust Fund is a self-propagating mechanism that provides a constant allocation 
of funding for road construction through the collection of taxes from gasoline 
(Nivola, 1999). The highway trust fund system was used to build approximately 
41,000 square miles of roadways, and levels of spending were in the vicinity of 
$20.5 billion in 1997 on an annual basis (Drier et ai, 2004). Funding in the United 
States for transportation is heavily biased in the favor of highway construction as 
roadways receive close to 84 percent of the total output of federal spending, and 
this is mainly due to its funding apparatus (Savitch, 2000). Others have disputed 
this argument, that funding is biased towards highway construction, and in fact 
claim that on a per passenger mile basis public transit is much more heavily 
funded (Gordon and Richardson, 1997). The argument of Gordon and 
Richardson is flawed, however, as they fail to consider additional costs of 
pollution, congestion, and parking that should be considered into the pricing of 
fuel as it is in Europe (Ewing, 1997). 
The US system of taxation also bears a great deal of responsibility for 
promoting urban sprawl. Levels of taxation on gasoline in the United States are 
the lowest in the developed world and prices in Europe are approximately three 
times as high (Ewing, 1997). The minimal tax rate helps explain the phenomena 
of American consumers driving larger automobiles and with more frequency than 
the Europeans and Japanese (Nivola, 1999). Sales taxes on automobiles are 
approximately 37 times higher in Denmark and 9 times as high in the 
Netherlands when compared to the United States (Nivola, 1999). This 
combination of low taxes on both fuel and the automobile encourages Americans 
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to drive without considering all subsidies that are provided. If individuals had to 
bear the full brunt of the costs they might opt to live in neighborhoods that were 
not so heavily reliant on the automobile. 
Not all the blame can be placed entirely upon national policies for creating 
urban sprawl. Policies at the city level also bear some of the responsibility for 
creating this phenomenon of sprawl. Cities are limited in the types of policies that 
they can pursue and in many instances in the United States, cities are placed in 
competition with one another for attracting business and, will opt for policy 
decisions that enhance the local economy and bring in greater tax revenue and 
increase property values through development (Peterson, 1981). Land 
developers, real estate interest, and local politicians will seek to enhance the 
value of land by attracting capital investment, tourism and other types of 
economic activates to regions (Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Making the land 
accessible via transportation is one way to add value to land, and it is this 
practice of making the land reachable by means of rapid transportation that has 
resulted in the pattern of sprawl that exemplifies most US cities (Gonzalez, 
2005). One other example of how local policies will exacerbate sprawl is that 
many cities will utilize zoning laws to mandate low density, high cost homes, at 
the periphery of cities. These types of developments will generate a significant 
amount of property taxes. 
There have been several commonalities in the aspects of sprawl that were 
defined by the literature. One of the most consistent terms that appeared was 
low density. "Density of a place refers to the quantity of people, households, or 
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employment distributed over a unit of area such as an acre, square kilometer, or 
square mile". (Frumkin, Frank, and Jackson, 2004: 6) In an area that is 
considered to be sprawled, densities will be low in population and the number 
housing units per square mile. Although it should be noted that the term low 
density is relative to the specific area, because what may be considered to be a 
low population density in Europe may considered to be a high density in America. 
Transportation patterns and automobile use were also synonymous with 
definitions of sprawl. Specifically, sprawled cities have a very high dependency 
on the automobile for a mode of transportation. This high dependency on the 
automobile in sprawled suburban areas has created a major externality, and 
perhaps the greatest complaint about sprawl, which is traffic congestion (Burchell 
et aI., 2005). Traffic congestion should be of great concern to emergency 
response. Congestion on the roadways will reduce the ability of a fire 
department to respond in a timely manner. 
Sprawl has a great impact on how resources are distributed in cities. 
Sprawled developments end up costing cities more in providing services. The 
cost of infrastructure will be more in sprawled developments because each yard 
of liner infrastructure, such as water or sewer, will serve fewer households 
(Burchell et aI., 2005). Other services, such protective ones like policing and fire, 
will have escalating costs as cities that have populations and economic activities 
spread apart across the region and in low density suburbs (Stephens and 
Wikstrom, 2000). The reasons for the high cost of protective services are similar 
to the reasons for the high cost of infrastructure; similar types of resources are 
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needed to provide safety to fewer households. Suburban sprawled developments 
have a high ratio of public to private expenditure which makes these areas 
difficult to pay for even at modest rates of taxation (Duany, et al. 2000). 
2.8 Measurement of Equality 
The measurement of equitable resources distribution is a difficult task. The 
health care field has been quite progressive in the measurement of access to 
health care resources, especially to underprivileged populations. This study can 
apply some of concepts that have been used in the analysis of access to health 
care resources for underprivileged populations. Need is an important concept in 
the measurement of access to health care resources. Need of a certain resource 
will be determined by the behavior, environment, and characteristics of the 
population such as age, gender, culture, and economic status (McLafferty, 2003). 
Equity within the healthcare sector has been calculated by using models 
that examine health status, distribution of resources, expenditures, utilization, 
and access (Waters, 2000). Expenditure and the distribution of resources 
(stations) are widely available information that fire departments keep track off, 
which will be very useful for this study. Access to health care services will vary 
due to the fact that the supply of where health care resources locate and where 
people live are not homogeneously distributed (Luo and Wang, 2003). Access to 
health care can be directly related to fire fighting services, as where people live 
and the location of fire stations may not be uniformly distributed. 
The use of GIS has been quite prevalent in the analysis of access to 
health care resources. Demonstrating a lack of access in health care can be 
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accomplished by overlaying areas of outcomes of health on political boundaries 
along with various socioeconomic factors (Phillips, Kinman, Schnitzer, Lindbloom 
and Ewingman, 2000). Bravemen and Gruskin (2003) identified this as 
measuring equality based on outcomes. In this study the outcome of health is 
the response time, because the longer the response time the more detrimental it 
is to the populations health, and the political boundary is the fire district, which 
can be accomplished through using multiple layers of information through a GIS. 
The literature has been helpful in identifying socio-economic factors that can be 
used to measure along with response times. Race was mentioned several times 
by the likes of Lineberry (1977), Jennings (1999), Cingranelli (1981), and Bullard 
(2000) as an important feature in service provision. This will be one of the factors 
that is measured along with response times. Other important socioeconomic 
factors identified in the literature that can be quantified include income, taxes, 
housing, and poverty by Duncombe (1991), Lineberry (1977), Oliver, Healy and 
Legrand (2002). 
2.9 Existing Gaps in Research Area 
The literature has shown that there will be a variation of services that are 
provided within cities and between cities. Bullard (2000), Peterson (1981), Rich 
(1977), Duncomb (1991), Drier et al (2004) each indicated that service 
distribution within cities is not likely to favor the poor, and service provision will 
vary based on the fiscal capacity of the city. Cingranelli (1981) identified that 
blacks received inferior fire service when compared to their white counterparts. 
Lineberry (1977) argued that the poor were not underserved when it comes to 
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service distribution within cities. Sanger (1982) was able to demonstrate that the 
underprivileged did not receive the poorest level of fire service in New York City. 
The question is who is actually right? Are the poor and underprivileged under-
served, or are they not? The literature indicates that socially disadvantaged 
groups, such as the poor, racial minorities, elderly, and single parents have the 
highest need for fire protection. These groups have the highest rates of actual 
loss. Reville (1991) indicated that the insurance industry has some pull as to 
where fire stations should be located. The insurance industry recommends that 
fire stations be built close to areas with higher valuation, and both Cingranelli 
(1981) and Sanger (1982) found this to be true. The standards by the ISO are 
based on potential loss rather than actually loss and this would indicate that fire 
services are not equitably distributed. The major literature within the fire-fighting 
field that discuss the placement of fire stations such as the ICMA's Managing 
Fire and Rescue Services, the NFPA's Fire Protection Handbook, and the Fire 
Chief's Handbook, all indicated that stations should be placed in a manner which 
reduces response times. However, in the Fire Chiefs Handbook it was also 
stated that some areas may be undesirable locations for placement of fire 
stations. Many of these undesirable locations, such as near industry or 
multifamily dwellings, are locations where the poor live. The question that arises 
is who has the greater need for these services? Is it the poor in the inner cities, 
or the wealthy who are well insured? 
We know that it is in a city's interest to maximize efficiency. Sprawl 
reduces a city's ability to be efficient because service costs remain the same for 
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fewer numbers of individuals. Sprawled developments are ideal for fire 
departments because they have wider streets and low-density development 
partly because of city, state and national fire codes. Do these requirements hurt 
the ability to fight fires in a timely manner because of the sprawl aspect and 
traffic congestion? It is in the city's interest to reduce its cost burden. Does this 
affect how services are provided, especially an important service like fire rescue 
as measured by response times? Many cities experience fiscal crisis and 
downturns in the economy and may opt to cut back fire services because it takes 
up a considerable portion of a city's budget. Will the poor be the first ones to lose 
a fire station or will it be in the suburbs? Very few studies have looked at 
response times of fire departments. Gomersoll's (2003) study was an individual 
case study of Cincinnati which attributed the response time of the fire department 
to the number of corners an emergency vehicle must take. Urban sprawl along 
with the distribution of fire stations was not considered in Gomersoll's analysis. 
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3.1 Data 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Response time data at the fire district level for the 2006 time period were 
retrieved from eight different fire departments across the United States. I was 
personally involved with the team that devised a method for the selection of cities 
developed for a National Science Foundation project entitled "Measuring Cross 
Community Disaster Preparedness." The first step in the city selection process 
was developing a disaster exposure model. The objective of this selection 
process was to allow cities to be identified based on two variables, hazard 
experience and population size. It was determined that only larger cities should 
be selected for this study, based on the availability of GIS data, and that larger 
cities were more likely to have fire districts. Another reason for opting to use 
larger cities over smaller ones was that large cities experience a heightened 
degree of social, economic and political fracturing especially in areas of income, 
race and political affiliation (Solecki 1999). 
In terms of hazard experience there is research that describes a "disaster 
subculture" (Wenger, 1978) in communities that have more and continuous 
experience with hazards. These communities are expected to have different 
perspectives on hazards than cities that experience hazards as well as a different 
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financial investment in preparedness activities. The hazard exposure was 
determined by the use of the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the 
United States (SHELDUS) managed by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research 
Institute at the University of South Carolina (Hazards & Vulnerability Research 
Institute, 2007). The hazard exposure of cities was ranked high, medium, or low, 
was based on the total of disasters in the last 20 years from the SHELUDUS 
database. The high, medium and low exposure rank was determined by using 
the natural breaks/jenks method in ESRI's ArcGIS 9.2 software package. The 
SHELDUS database was the best option to help identify the hazard experience 
for each city in the United States. SHELDUS was created from various 
governmental sources including the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the 
National Climatic Data Center (Cutter and Emrich, 2005). Prior to SHELDUS, the 
United States did not have any organized central inventory of disaster events and 
losses associated with disaster events (Cutter and Emrich, 2005). SHELDUS is a 
county-level hazard data set covering 18 different natural hazard events types 
that include thunderstorms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and tornados. Each 
hazard event in the database includes the beginning date, location (county and 
state), property losses, crop losses, injuries, and fatalities that affected each 
county. Based on the data available to define hazard experience an assumption 
was made that if the city is within the county that has experienced the event then 
the city has also and this was another reason that I opted to use larger cities as 
this is a valid assumption for the larger cities. 
The SHELDUS database was queried to identify hazard exposure at the 
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county level. Specifically, the database was queried to identify total number of all 
hazard events in the U.S. by county. This data was then divided into three 
categories by using the natural breaks/jenks methodology from ArcGIS to 
determine high, medium, low hazard exposure. Jenks or a natural break grouping 
determines the most adequate arrangement of values into classifications by 
comparing the sum of squared differences of values from the means of their 
classes (BioMedware, 2005). 
A city shapefile layer (a point file for every major populated place in the 
United States) in GIS was overlaid on top of the county hazard exposure layer. 
The first step was to break down the city layer into three different city shapefiles, 
one for cities with high exposure, one for cities with medium exposure and one 
for cities with low exposure. This was accomplished by using the select by 
location feature in ArcGIS. First counties with greater than or equal to 50 hazard 
events were selected for the highest hazard exposure category. Then the select-
by-location menu was chosen; features (cities) were selected from the city layer 
that had their centroid in the county hazard exposure layer using the selected 
features (highest exposure) from the county hazard exposure. This was then 
repeated for medium and low exposure cities. Cities were then selected to get 
varying degrees of hazard exposure (please see, Table 4). 
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Table 4 - City Size Classification and Hazard Exposure 
ICMA* City 
Population 
City Hazard Exposure Classification 
1,000,000 and 
Miami-Dade FL Medium Exposure over 
1,000,000 and 
Houston TX High Exposure over 
500,000 to 
San Francisco CA Low Exposure 1,000,000 
Lou isvi lie-Jefferson 500,000 to 
KY Low Exposure 1,000,000 
500,000 to 
Charlotte NC Medium Exposure 1,000,000 
500,000 to 
Seattle WA Medium Exposure 1,000,000 
500,000 to 
Portland OR Low Exposure 1,000,000 
250,000 to 
St Paul MN Low Exposure 499,999 
Source: DPI Project 
Fire departments provided data that included response times in minutes, 
fire district names, and a list of fire stations. Two GIS shapefile layers were also 
obtained from each fire department, which were used for analysis and included a 
polygon fire district layer and a fire station point layer. Shapefiles of census tract 
information were obtained from the Environmental Systems Research Institute 
(ESRI) GIS data set. Variables at the census tract level will be retrieved from the 
U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2000 and include: Household income, 
population, total number of housing units, racial composition of the population, 
housing values, real estate taxes, home ownership rates, single detached 
homes, population living in poverty, and commuting times. 
GIS was be used to aggregate the data from the census tract level to the 
fire-district level. A problem arises of what to do with census tracts that are within 
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two different fire districts. Weighted areal interpolation is a method that is 
commonly used within GIS to deal with the problem of alignment between units 
of measurement, in this case between census tracts and fire districts. 
Specifically, "areal interpolation is a family of processes by which counts 
aggregated to a set of zones are reassigned to a different set of zones that 
describes the same region," (Mennis, 2003:1). Fire district boundaries (source 
zone) were assigned to the corresponding census tract (intersection zone) as a 
function of the fire-district area contained within the territory of the intersection 
zone. This approach of weighted areal interpolation has an assumption that data 
are equally distributed within each region (Flowerdew and Green, 1992). The 
key rationale for using areal interpolation method is that is maintains the 
pycnophylactic property, meaning that people are not created or destroyed 
during the redistribution process of the data (Mennis, 2003). Values that are non-
population counts such as median household income, or median property value 
will be assigned to the centroid to the census tract. The centroid will be used to 
get an aggregate value for value-based variables, such as income, for each fire 
district and that values for census tracts that are within multiple fire districts can 
be only be used once. 
Several steps were required for the data processing component of this 
study so that the data could be used in SPSS for regression analysis. The 
following is how census data was taken and joined with GIS data and aggregated 
to the fire-district level for each city using GIS. The first step was to create a 
census tract shapefile layer for each city and this was accomplished by using 
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ESRI's main census tract shapefile layer for the entire country and using the clip 
geoprocessing tool, which cuts out one layer based on the shape of another 
layer. The fire district shapefile was used to clip the census tract layer for each 
city. Each city then had a corresponding census tract shapefile. These census 
tract shapefiles then needed to be projected in a specific geographic coordinate 
system, and a corresponding shape file was created and was called 
census_tract_projected. Projection of the shapefile was an important step 
because having a projection would allow for determination of an area for each 
census tract. Each census tract shapefile layer was then projected to the fire 
district shapefile that were in the state plane coordinate system. The next step 
was to calculate an area for each census tract and this was done by creating a 
field called "oldArea" and using the XTools extension in ArcGIS. Census data for 
each city was then exported (transfer of data from one program to another) from 
Microsoft Access into ArcGIS in a Dbase (DBF) table. The DBF table was then 
joined to the census tract shapefile layer table based on the Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) Codes which was common to both tables. This 
shapefile of the census tracts for each city along with the joined DBF table of 
census data was used to create a new shapefile layer using the export feature 
tool. The next step was to overlay the fire district shapefile layer over the census 
tract shapefile layer to associate a census tract with a corresponding fire district 
boundary. This was accomplished with the identify tool that was used to compute 
the geometric intersection of the fire district on the census tract layer for each 
city. A new shape file was then created after this step and was called 
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census_tract_identify. A new data field was created in the table and was called 
newArea. This field in the database was populated by using the XTools extension 
to calculate the area of each newly created polygon from the 
census_tractJdentify shapefile. A new field called areaPercent would have to be 
calculated which was determined by dividing the newArea field from the 
census_tract_identify shapefile and the oldArea field from the 
census_tract_projected shapefile. This field called areaPercent would give the 
total percentage of each census tract within each fire district. This field would be 
used for areal interpolation. A new field was created for each variable within the 
table and was called for example newPopulation, NewPopulationDensity, etc. 
The areaPercent field was multiplied by population field to create newPopulation, 
and this was done for every census variable. The final step for areal interpolation 
was to create one last shapefile, which would have one polygon for each fire 
district. This was done using the dissolve tool which aggregates polygons based 
on a common field, and in this case the census tracts were dissolved based the 
fire district they corresponded with. Each new polygon for the fire district has a 
statistical summary field for each of the census variables that are aggregated 
from each of the census tracts within each of the fire districts. 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis 
Average response time in seconds at the fire-district level is the 
dependent variable for the analysis. The unit of analysis is the fire district and 
there is a total 184 fire districts with response times for this study. In section 3.3 
there is an explanation of why variables were selected, using the literature as a 
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guide to identify the variables along with a description of each variable. The 
regression equations are specified below in section 3.4 where there is a 
description of how the models were derived. 
There were also control variables in each of the models that included 
population density, home density, area of the fire district, and per capita 
expenditure. The outcome of the linear regression models were beta coefficients 
for each independent variable which explains a possible unit change in the 
dependent variable. Another outcome was R2 which is a figure that explains how 
much variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. There is also 
a section of descriptive statistics that examines the number of observations, 
means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum value of the data set. 
There was also an analysis to examine if the data was normally distributed. This 
was accomplished with two statistics, skewness and kurtosis, which are 
descriptive statistics. A normal distribution would be indicated by skewness value 
of 0 and a kurtosis value of O. Skewness measures symmetry of the data-set and 
negative values indicate a left-skewed data, while positive numbers indicate 
right-skewed data. Kurtosis measures the peak of the data set and its 
distribution around the mean. Skewness and kurtosis are important indicators 
because if the majority of the data are not normally distributed then this will be a 
signal to use the logarithm of the values for all the variables in the model. 
Statistical analysis of the data was performed in SPSS and the data was 
maintained in a Microsoft Access Database. 
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3.3 Variable Selection and Description 
3.31 Selection of Equality and Sprawl Variables 
The urban service provision section has helped identify key socio-
economic factors for analysis and for the measurement of equality. Lineberry 
(1977) and Jennings (1999) identified that the poor and racial minorities living in 
substandard housing were disproportionally affected by fires. Oliver, Healey, and 
LeGrand (2002) identified groupings based on race and income when it comes to 
measuring equality in service provision. Sanger (1981) identified that the wealthy 
and poor received superior fire service. Duncomb (1991) pointed out that fire 
services would vary across a community based upon income and taxes. Based 
on these findings several key variables have been identified including race, 
poverty, income, housing, and taxes. These are variables that are readily 
available or can be easily derived and quantified from the census which then can 
be regressed with response times to determine if linear relationships exist. 
There have been several attempts by fellow researchers to quantify urban 
sprawl, and outcomes of urban sprawl. The purpose of this section is to identify 
some of the common variables or indicators that have been utilized. The first, 
and most common measure that was identified in the sprawl literature is 
residential density (see, Table 5). Galster, et al. (2001) describes density as the 
number of residential units per square mile. Ewing, Pendall and Chen (2002) in 
their analysiS of sprawl for Smart Growth America also identified residential and 
population density as an indicator for sprawl. Glaster et. al (2001) indentified 
mixed uses, which is the extent of which to two or more different land uses exist 
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within the same area. When land uses are not mixed they are segregated and 
the segregation of land uses was an indicator of sprawl that was identified by 
Ewing et al. (2002). They measured this through the percentage of the population 
that was within one mile of an elementary school and this is also related to 
Galster et aI's (2001) proximity indicator. Home type was also identified as a way 
of identifying urban sprawl and both Burchell et al. (2005) and Ewing et al. (2002) 
identified single family detached homes as a character of areas that are 
sprawled. 
Table 5 - Sprawl Indicators 
Sprawl Indicator Description Source Source 
Galster et al. Ewing et al. -
Residential (2001) - Wrestling Smart Growth 
Density Density Sprawl ... America 
% of residents 
with elementary Ewing et al. -
Segregated land school 1 mile Smari Growth 
uses away America 
Burchell et al. Ewing et al. -
Single detached (2005) - Sprawl Smari Growth 
Home type homes Costs America 
Ewing et al. -
Street Average Block Smart Growth 
Accessibility Size America 
Burchell et al. Ewing et al. -
Vehicle Vehicles per (2005) - Sprawl Smart Growth 
Ownership Households Costs America 
Burchell et al. Ewing et al. -
Census commute (2005) - Sprawl Smart Growth 
Commute Times time in minutes Costs America 
Galster et al. 
Distance from (2001) - Wrestling 
Centrality CBD Sprawl ... 
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Other sprawl related factors that were easily quantifiable were related to 
the automobile. Commuting times from home to work and vehicle ownership 
rates were both viewed as outcomes of urban sprawl by Burchell, et al. (2005) 
and Ewing et al. (2002). Street accessibility also was used as an indicator of 
urban sprawl. Sprawled areas were seen as having poor street accessibility, 
because of the average block size was considerably larger for areas that were 
sprawled compared to areas that were not sprawled (Ewing et aI., 2002). 
Congestion was also identified as being associated with sprawl by Burchell, et al 
(2005) and Ewing et al. (2002). 
GIS was used to calculate several of the sprawl indicators. The indicators 
derived from the use of GIS included the segregated land use variable, street 
accessibility, congestion, and centrality. The segregated land use measure was 
determined through the percentage of the population within one mile of an 
elementary school. ESRI has a shape-file layer of schools. This layer of schools 
was cross referenced with a list of elementary schools from each city. If the 
school was not on the ESRI school layer it was geocoded (a process of taking an 
address and assigning latitude and longitude coordinates so that file can be 
displayed in a GIS) and added to the file. Block groups were used for population 
and a one mile buffer was placed around the school to select all the block groups 
that fell within one mile of the school buffer. The street accessibility and 
congestion variables were calculated using the selected by location tool. Using 
the ESRI street shapefile layer all the streets within a fire district were selected. 
Then using the statistics tool this provided a mean length for a street segment 
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within a fire district and this tool also provided a summary field which summed all 
the street segments within the fire district to provide an overall street mile length 
to calculate a population per street mile. Finally GIS was used to determine the 
distance from each fire district to the CBD. A centroid for each census tract was 
created. The location of the CBD was then determined from Google Earth, and 
geocoded into the GIS. Then using an analysis tool in an extension of ArcView 
GIS, the length between each census tract centroid to the CBD was calculated. 
These values were then aggregated to the fire-district level to provide an average 
distance to the CBD. 
3.32 Descriptions of Variables 
This section describes each variable, how the variable is calculated, along with 
the source of the data. Table 5 provides a summary of this information for a 
straightforward reference. 
Dependent Variables in Analysis 
Average Response Time in Seconds for the Fire District. Unit of analysis: Fire 
District. Source: Various city fire departments. 
Independent Variables in Analysis 
Area 
Total area of the fire district divided by the number of stations within a fire district. 
Source: Various city fire departments; 
Per Capita Expenditure (Expend) 
This is the total funding for the fire department divided by the population that is 
served by the fire department. In most cases this was a group-level indicator. 
Louisville had different values for each of its fire districts. Source: Various city fire 
departments; Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 
100-Percent Data. 
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Population Density (PopDen) 
Total population of the fire district divided by total area of fire district., to give 
population per sq. mile. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary 
File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data. Fire District Data provided by Fire Departments 
in GIS shapefile format. 
Housing Density (HomeDen) 
Total number of homes in fire district divided by total area of fire district to give 
number of homes per sq. mile. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 
Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1 OO-Percent Data. Fire District Data provided by Fire 
Departments in GIS shapefile format. 
Nonwhite Population (Race) 
Percent of Total nonwhite population of fire district. Calculated by white 
population - 1. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 
1) 1 OO-Percent Data. 
Poverty 
Percent of Population living in poverty for the fire district which uses the Census 
Bureau and the federal government's official poverty definition. Population living 
in poverty divided by the total population. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 
2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data. 
Housing Ownership (HomeOwn) 
Percent of homes that are owner Occupied within fire district. Calculated as 
owner occupied homes divided by total homes in fire district. Source U.S. 
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data. 
Detached Homes (Home Type) (DetHse) 
Percent of homes that are single detached. Single detached homes divided by 
total number housing units within fire district. Source U.S. Census Bureau, 
Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data. 
Vehicles I Household (VehHH) 
Total number of vehicles divided by the total number of households. Source U.S. 
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data. 
Average Commute Time (AvgCTime) 
Total travel time in minutes to work. Calculate average travel time of commuters 
at tract level by taking the midpoint of the travel time category and multiplying by 
the total number of people for the category and then summing the total value of 
all minutes divided by total number of people for the tract to give an average 
travel time per person. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 
3 Sample Data. 
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Home Value (HomeVal) 
Aggregate value (dollars) for all owner-occupied housing units in structure 
divided by total number of owner-occupied housing units. Source U.S. Census 
Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data. 
Real Estate Taxes (ReaITax) 
Aggregate Real Estate Taxes: total amount of all real estate taxes on the entire 
property (land and buildings) payable in 1999 to all taxing jurisdictions, including 
special assessments, school taxes, county taxes divided by total number of 
owner-occupied housing units. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 
Summary File 3 Sample Data 
High-Income Households (Highlnc) 
Percent of household that earn above $75,000 per year (1999), divided by total 
number of households for the fire district. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 
Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data 
Population Per Street Mile (PopStMile) 
Total Population of fire district divided by the total length of all roadways within 
fire district. Data Source: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1 DO-Percent Data; 
ESRI Street Data file 
Street Segment Length (StreetSeg) 
Average street segment length in feet. Data Source ESRI Street Data file. 
Elementary School (ElmSch) 
Percentage of residents of the fire district that are within 1 mile of an elementary 
school. Source: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1 DO-Percent Data; ESRI; 
Distance from Central Business District (CBD) 
Distance of each census tract centroid to the central business district, 
aggregated to the fire district. Source of CBD location google map. ESRI. 
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Table 6 - Variable Summary Table 
Variable Description Equation Literature Source 
Area of fire district divided by # of fire 
Area stations 1 to 14 (Halpern, 1979) 
Expend Per capita expenditure 1 to 14 (Waters, 2000) 
(Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai, 
PopOen Population per sq. mile 1t07 2002) 
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings 
,1999); (Oliver, Healey, and 
NonWhite % of non white population 1 LeGrand, 2002) 
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings 
% of population living below poverty ,1999); (Oliver, Healey, and 
Poverty level 2 LeGrand, 2002);(Sanger, 1981) 
% of home owners that earn under (Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings 
HomeOwn $29,999 3 ,1999) 
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings 
HomeVal Average home value 4 ,1999) 
Average property taxes per home 
RealTax owner 5 (Ouncomb, 1991) 
(Sanger, 1981); (Oliver, Healey, 
and LeGrand, 2002) ; 
Highlncome % of households that earn $75,000+ 7 (Ouncomb, 1991) 
(Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai, 
HomeOen Total number of homes per sq. mile 8 to 14 2002) 
Average commute time to work in (Burchell et al,2005);(Ewing et ai, 
AvgCTime minutes 9,9a 2002) 
Vehicles divided by number of (Burchell et al,2005);(Ewing et ai, 
VehHseHold households 10,10a 2002) 
Population divided by total road mi. in (Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai, 
PopStreetMile district 11,11a 2002), (Burchell et ai, 2005) 
StreetSeg Average street segment length 12,12a (Ewing et ai, 2002) 
ElmSchool % of population within 1 mile of school 13,13a (Ewing et ai, 2002) 
Average distance of fire district to the 
CBO CBO 14,14a (Galster et ai, 2001) 
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3.4 Regression Equations and the Development of the Models 
The first seven equations looked for proportional access. These models 
were used to determine if a linear relationship existed between response times, 
and the nonwhite population, population living in poverty, home ownership, home 
values, real estate taxes, and high-income households that earn greater than 
$75,000. There also were control variables that included the population density, 
area of the fire district, and the per capita expenditure of the fire department. 
The next 12 equations were used to determine if linear relationship existed 
between response times and detached housing, vehicles/household, average 
commute time, population per street mile, street segment length, elementary 
school access and distance to the CBD. 
Several different permutations were attempted before the final models 
were derived. The first model that was examined was to regress response times 
with all the equity variables while controlling for various factors. There also was a 
similar model but with all the sprawl variables and response times along with the 
control variables. 
Response time = f(area, expend, popden, homeden, nonwhite, poverty, 
homeown, homevalue, realtax, Highlncome). 
Response time = f(area, expend, popden, homeden, detHse, AvgCTime, 
VehHseHold, PopStreetMile, StreetSeg, ElmSchool, CBD). 
However, the issue with these models that made them problematic was 
multicolinearity. Many of the variables are related to one another and by putting 
them all within one model distorts the results. It would be difficult to gauge the full 
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impact of each variable on the dependent variable because many of the 
variables are related to one another. A similar variation of each model also was 
examined but included a dummy variable for each city to get a more precise 
picture of how each variable affected the cities. 
Response time = f(area, expend, popden, homeden, nonwhite, poverty, 
homeown, homevalue, realtax, Highlncome, Charlotte, Houston, 
Louisville, Seattle, Portland, St. Paul, Miami). 
It was determined that it would be more effective if a new variable was created 
for each city, which contained a particular factor such as nonwhite. The variable 
was created by multiplying the dummy variable for a particular city and the 
socioeconomic variables, such as nonwhite or poverty, to create a new 
interaction variable, which was named using the city name followed by the 
variable that it was multiplied with, such as CharlotteNonwhite. This field was 
populated with only Charlotte's nonwhite values for each fire district, and every 
other fire district that was not in Charlotte would have a value of 0 for this data 
field. This was done for each city, except for st. Paul because st. Paul has just 
three fire districts. So every city dummy variable was multiplied by every indicator 
to create an indicator for each city which created an additional 42 different 
variables for the equity models and 42 different variables for the sprawl models. 
These 42 variables were then included into each model, however the results 
were too complicated having so many different independent variables. 
S3 
Response time = f(area, expend, popden, homeden, Nonwhitej , CharlottejNon 
whitej, HoustonNonwhitej, LouisvillejNonwhitej, PortlandjNon whitej, 
SanFranciscojNonwhitej, SeattleNonwhitej, MiamijNonwhitej PovertYj , 
CharlottepovertYj, HoustonjPovertYj, LouisviliePovertYi, Portlandi PovertYj, 
SanFranciscoPovertYj, SeattlejPovertYj, MiamipovertYj HomeOwnj, 
CharlottejHomeOwnj, HoustonjHomeOwnj, LouisvillejHomeOwnj, HomeValj 
CharlottejHomeValj, HoustonjHomeValj, LouisvillejHomeValj, PortlandjHomeValj, 
SanFranciscojHomeValj, SeattlejHomeValj, MiamijHomeVah PortlandjHomeOwnj, 
SanFranciscojHomeOwnj, SeattlejHomeOwni, MiamhHomeOwnj 
Highlncomej,CharlottejHighlncomej, HoustonjHighlncomej, LouisvillejHighlncomej, 
PortlandjHighlncomej, SanFranciscojHighlncomej, SeattlejHighlncomej, 
MiamijHighlncomej 
Other models were also examined including grouping similar variables together 
in a model, like nonwhite and poverty, or homeown and homeval along with the 
three control variables. Once again there were issues with multicolinearity as the 
variables were related. 
Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, Nonwhitej PovertYj) 
Response timej = f(Areai ,Expendj, PopDenj,HomeOwnj, HomeValj) 
It was determined that it would be most effective to examine each variable in 
a separate model on its own along with the control variables. Seven interaction 
variables, one for each city were also included for each of the cities, except for St 
Paul. The overall variable would be representative for St. Paul. Equation 1 
through 7 represents these models which look at the equality indicators. The 
sprawl models were also similar. There was only one difference as there are two 
models for each sprawl indicator. One model with the entire group variable not 
stratified by the city (no city-interaction variable), and the second model with the 
city-interaction variable. 
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Race Model 
1. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, Nonwhitej , CharlottejNon 
whitej, HoustonNonwhitej, LouisvillejNonwhitej, PortlandjNon whitej, 
SanFranciscojNonwhitej, SeattleNonwhitej, MiamiNonwhitej,) 
Poverty Model 
2. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, PovertYj, CharlottePovertYj, 
HoustonjPovertYj, LouisviliepovertYj, Portlandj PovertYj, 
San F ranciscojPovertYj, SeattlejPovertYj, M iam ijPovertYj) 
Housing Tenure Model 
3. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, HomeOwnj, 
CharlottejHomeOwnj, HoustonjHomeOwnj, LouisvillejHomeOwnj, 
PortlandjHomeOwnj, SanFranciscojHomeOwnj, SeattlejHomeOwnj, 
MiamijHomeOwnj) 
Home Value Model 
4. Response timej::: f(Areaj,Expend j, PopDenj, HomeVah CharlottejHomeVah, 
HoustonjHomeVah, LouisvillejHomeValj, PortlandjHomeVah, 
SanFranciscojHomeValj, SeattlejHomeValj, MiamijHomeVal; ) 
Property Tax Model 
5. Response timej::: f(Areaj,Expendj, PopDenj, RealTaxj, CharlottejRealTaxj, 
HoustonjRealTaxj, LouisvillejRealTaxj, PortlandjRealTaxj, 
SanFranciscojRealTaxj, SeattlejRealTaxj, MiamiHealTaxj) 
Income Model 
6. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, 
highlncomej,CharlottejHighlncomej, HoustonjHighlncomej, 
LouisvillejHighlncomej, PortlandjHighlncomej, SanFranciscojHighlncomej, 
SeattlejHighlncomej, MiamijHighlncomej) 
Home Density Model 
7. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Per Capita Expenditurej, HomeDenj, DetHsej) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, DetHsej 
CharlottejDetHsej, HoustonjDetHsej, LouisvillejDetHsej, 
PortlandjDetHsej, SanFranciscojDetHsej, SeattlejDetHsej, 
MiamijDetHsej) 
Commute Time Model 
8. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, AvgCTimej) 
a. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, AvgCTimej 
CharlotteAvgCTimej, HoustonjAvgCTimej, LouisvillejAvgCTimej, 
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PortlandjAvgCTimej, SanFranciscojAvgCTimej, SeattlejAvgCTimej, 
MiamijAvgCTimej) 
Vehicle Ownership Model 
9. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, VehHseHoldj) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, 
VehHseHoldj,CharlottejVehHseHold j, HoustonjVehHseHold j, 
LouisvilieNehHseHoldj, PortlandNehHseHoldj, 
SanFranciscojVehHseHoldj, SeattleNehHseHoldj, 
MiamhVehHseHoldj) 
Congestion Model 
10. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, PopStreetMilej) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, PopStreetMilej, 
CharlottepopStreetMilej, HoustonjPopStreetMilej, 
LouisvillejPopStreetMilej, PortlandjPopStreetMilej, 
SanFranciscojPopStreetMilej, SeattlejPopStreetMilej, 
M iam ipopStreetMi lej) 
Street Length Model 
11. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, StreetSegj) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, 
StreetSegj,CharlottejStreetSegj, HoustonjStreetSegj, 
LouisvillejStreetSegj, PortlandjStreetSegj, SanFranciscojStreetSegj, 
SeattlejStreetSegj, MiamijStreetSegj) 
Land Use Model 
12. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, ElmSchooh) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, ElmSchooh 
CharlottejElmSchool j, HoustonjElmSchool j, LouisvillejElmSchooh, 
PortlandjElmSchool j, SanFranciscojElmSchool j, SeattlejElmSchool j, 
MiamijElmSchool j) 
Distance to the CaD Model 
13. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, CBDj) 
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, HomeDenj, CBDj, 
CharlottejCBDj, HoustonjCBDj, LouisvillejCBDj, PortlandjCBDj, 
SanFranciscojCBDj, SeattlejCBDj, MiamijCBDj ) 
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3.5 Qualitative Analysis 
Following the quantitative analysis there was a case study of three 
different fire districts from Louisville (Jefferson County). These case studies were 
an in-depth investigation of several factors. First, there was a comprehensive 
examination of the fire departments. Aspects of the fire department that were 
analyzed include: management structure of the fire department, the Insurance 
Services Office rating for the fire department, fire department budget, personnel, 
vehicles, funding spent on training, location of new fire stations, shut down fire 
stations, and similar issues. The next aspect that was examined is a closer focus 
on the fire districts within with a complete assessment of the demographic profile 
and the characteristics of the landscape that make up each of the fire districts. 
Most importantly there was a comprehensive examination of the most salient 
variables from the quantitative analYSis for each of the fire departments to get a 
clearer picture of the why results turned out the way that they did. 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) process was followed. All the 
required documentation, such as a copy of the interview questions and informed 
consent were submitted to the IRB for approval before the interviews took place. 
The IRB classified this project as exempt. 
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3.51 Survey Questions for Qualitative Analysis 
1. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor on fire department 
response times? 
2. Do the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. 
have an impact on response times? 
3. Would you say that in certain cities the lower income areas are 
disadvantaged with respect to response times? 
4. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher-cost 
housing have better response times? 
5. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of 
property taxes have better response times? 
6. It was found in this study it that in certain cities that lower income 
areas were disadvantaged with respect to response times, however 
this was not the case for all cities as reverse was found to be true. 
Would you have any possible explanations for this? 
7. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with 
higher cost housing had better response times, however once again 
this was not the case for all cities as reverse was found to be true. 
Would you have any possible explanations for this? 
8. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes, 
the worse the response time. Would you have any possible 
explanations for this? 
9. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times 
for a fire district (increases response time)? 
1. Commuting Time 
2. Vehicle Ownership 
3. Population Density (Population per street mile) 
4. Length of the Block 
5. Diversity of land use 
6. Distance from the center of the city 
7. % of detached housing 
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10. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most 
correlated with longer response times, would you agree with this and why 
do you think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal 
with this? 
11. The length of the street block was found to be the (2nd most) correlated 
with longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you 
think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal with 
this? 
12. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated 
with longer response times, would you agree with this and why do 
you think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal 
with this? 
13. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department 
policies in any way? 
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4.1 Description of Cities 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Table 7 displays a breakdown of the total number of fire districts for each 
city and some other general information. Miami-Dade has data from two 
separate Fire departments (F. D.), the City of Miami FD. and Miami-Dade F.D., 
which is the rest of the county outside of the city limits of Miami. In total there 
were 63 fire districts, 14 for the city of Miami F.D., and 49 for Miami-Dade F.D. 
Total area served by both fire departments was approximately 838 square miles 
(35 square miles for the city of Miami, 802 square miles for the Miami-Dade 
department). The average size of a fire district was 2.5 square miles for the City 
of Miami FD., and 16 square miles for Miami-Dade FD. and 13 square miles for 
both F.D. combined. The minimum value for a size of a fire district was 0.60 
square miles, and the maximum was 127 square miles. In total, there were 63 
fire stations for both fire departments. The total population for the Miami-Dade 
area was 2.4 million people. The City of Miami accounts for 15 percent of the 
total population. The average population per fire district was roughly 30,000, with 
a minimum of 1,300 and a maximum of 70,000 (based on 2000 census figures). 
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Table 7 - Cities and Fire District Information 
Area Avg 
Fire Served Area / 
City 2000 Population Districts Stations Mi. Sq District 
Miami-Dade, 
FL 2,253,362 63 63 837.58 13.29 
Houston, TX 1,953,631 21 110 616.5 29.36 
776,733 
San Francisco, 
CA 10 42 43.18 4.32 
Louisville-
Jefferson 
County, KY 693,604 20 56 392.6 19.63 
Charlotte, NC 540,828 7 39 287.39 41.06 
Seattle, WA 563,374 32 36 82.55 2.58 
Portland, OR 529,121 28 30 154.12 5.5 
St Paul, MN 287,151 3 16 64.17 21.39 
There were a total of 21 fire districts in the City of Houston. The area 
served by the fire department is 616 square miles, the largest of any single fire 
department in this analysis. The mean size of a fire district within Houston was 
29 square miles, with a minimum size of 3 square miles and a maximum of 78 
square miles. Houston has a total of 110 fire stations, also the greatest number 
of fire stations for a city in this analysis. The total population served by Houston 
was approximately 2.07 million. The average population per fire district was close 
to 90,000 people, with a minimum of 4,800 and a maximum of 190,000. 
San Francisco had 10 fire districts, with a total area of 43 square miles. 
The average size of a fire district in San Francisco was approximately 4.3 square 
miles. The minimum size of a fire district was 1.8 square miles and the maximum 
was 9.3 square miles. There were a total of 42 fire stations in San Francisco. The 
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total population served by the San Francisco Fire department was roughly 
770,000 people. The average population per fire district was roughly 76,500 
people. The minimum was 22,000 and the maximum was 126,000 people. 
Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, had 20 different fire departments. 
Louisville-Jefferson County was unique because of the number of fire 
departments that it had. These fire departments include: Buechel, Camp Taylor, 
Dixie Suburban, Eastwood, Fairdale, Fern Creek, Harrods Creek, Highview, 
Jeffersontown, Lake Dreamland, Louisville, Lyndon, McMahan, Middletown, 
Okolona, Pleasure Ridge Park, Shively, St. Matthews, and Worthington. The 
total area that was served by all 20 fire departments was 390 square miles. The 
City of Louisville Fire Depart was responsible for the greatest area within 
Louisville-Jefferson County with 62 square miles. Pleasure Ridge Park and Fern 
Creek also had very large areas. Dixie Suburban had the smallest area with 1 
square miles in total. The average area for all the fire districts combined within 
Louisville-Jefferson County was close to 20 square miles per station. There were 
a total of 56 fire stations for the 20 fire departments. The Louisville fire 
department had 22 of the 56 fire stations. Total population served by all 20 fire 
departments was 690,000. The average population per fire district was roughly 
34,000. The Louisville Fire District accounted for nearly 250,000 people, which 
was the largest fire district. The Dixie Suburban Fire District was the smallest in 
size, and also had the smallest population that was served. 
Charlotte has one fire department with seven fire districts. The total area 
that the Charlotte F.D. serves is 290 square miles. The average area per fire 
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district is roughly 40 square miles, which is the largest average area for fire 
districts for all the cities. The minimum value of a fire district within Charlotte is 21 
square miles and the maximum is 61 square miles. Charlotte has a total of 39 fire 
stations. Total population served by the Charlotte F.D. is 540,000. The average 
population per fire district is 77,000, with a minimum of 42,500 and a maximum of 
126,000. 
Seattle had one main fire department with 32 fire districts. The total area 
served by the Seattle F.D. is roughly 83 square miles. Seattle has 36 fire stations 
in operation. The average size of a fire district within the jurisdiction of the Seattle 
F.D. is roughly 2.6 square miles, the smallest average size of fire districts in this 
study. The minimum value was 0.4 square miles, while the maximum was 4.5 
square miles. The total population that is served by the Seattle F.D. is 
approximately 560,000 people. The mean population served per fire district is 
close to 16,000 people. The minimum value for population for a fire district was 
roughly 3,100 people, while the maximum value was 41,000 people. 
Portland has 28 fire districts, with a total of 30 fire stations. The total area 
served by the Portland FD. is roughly 154 square miles. The average size of a 
fire district within Portland is 5.5 square miles. The smallest fire district in size 
was 1.6 square miles, while the largest was 18 square miles. Total population 
served by the Portland FD. is close to 530,000 people. The average population 
per fire district is 19,000 people. The minimum value for population for a fire 
district is 1,200 people and the maximum value was 37,000. 
St. Paul was the smallest city in the analysis, and also had the fewest 
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number of fire districts, at three. The St. Paul fire department has 16 fire stations 
to cover a total area of 64 square miles. The average area of a fire district in St. 
Paul was 21 square miles, and the smallest area of a fire district was 17 square 
miles, while the largest was 29 square miles. The total population that is served 
by the St. Paul F.D. is close to 290,000 people. The average population per fire 
district was close to 100,000 people, with a minimum of 87,000 and maximum of 
113,000 people. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
There were a total of 184 records for the entire data set. The dependent 
variable in the analysis was response time in seconds. The mean average 
response time for all fire districts was 337 seconds, with a median of 335 
seconds and a minimum of 182 seconds and a maximum of 820 seconds, refer 
to table 8. Seattle had the lowest average response time at 252 seconds, while 
Houston had the highest average response time at 408 seconds, refer to table 9. 
The standard deviation was 79 seconds. The response time variable was close 
to being normally distributed as indicated by a skewness of 0.10 and a Kurtosis 
of -0.85. 
The mean area per station was 7.72 miles, with a median of 4.35 miles. 
Miami-Dade had the highest average of miles per station with a value of 13.27, 
while San Francisco had the only 1.02 miles per station. There was great 
variability in the range of this data set as indicated by a low minimum of 0.39 and 
a high maximum of 127.4 miles per station. The standard deviation was 13.94 
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miles per station. Square miles per station were not normally distributed and 
were heavily skewed as indicated by a skewness of 5.88 and a kurtosis of 41.49. 
Per capita expenditure was a group-level indicator and had a mean of 
$213 per capita for all the fire districts, and a median of $219. Charlotte, 
Houston, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, and St. Paul all had one 
value per city for the per capita expenditure, as the total fire department budgets 
were not allocated according to the fire district. Louisville had a different budget 
for each of its fire districts. There was also one budget for the city of Miami, and a 
budget for the remainder of Dade County. San Francisco had the highest per 
capita expenditure at $313 per person, while Louisville-Jefferson County had a 
value of less than half of San Francisco at $122 per person. The minimum of the 
per capita expenditure was $44, which was from the Dixie suburban fire district in 
Louisville-Jefferson County. The maximum per capita expenditure was from San 
Francisco at $313 per person. The standard deviation was $55. Per capita 
expenditure was not normally distributed as it had a skewness of -0.74 and a 
kurtosis of 0.35. 
Population density had a mean of 5,743 people per square mile and a 
median of 4,328 people per square mile. The minimum was 197 people per 
square mile, while the maximum was 35,613 people per square mile. San 
Francisco had the highest average population density per fire district at 20,969 
people per square mile., while Louisville had the lowest at 1,933 people per 
square miles. The standard deviation was 5,804. Population density was not 
normally distributed as indicated by a skewness of 2.90 and a kurtosis of 10.32. 
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Similar to population density, home density also had a great range. The mean 
home density was 2,594 homes per square mile, with a median of 1,772 homes 
per square mile, with a minimum of 65 and a maximum of 21 ,444 homes per 
square mile. Both Louisville and Charlotte were tied for the lowest average home 
density per fire district at 857 homes per square miles, while San Francisco had 
the highest average home density at 10,454 homes per square mile. Home 
density was not normally distributed and had a skewness of 3.41 and kurtosis of 
14.43. The data was right-skewed and had very high peaks within the dataset. 
The mean for percentage of the population that was nonwhite was 33 
percent, with a median of 27 percent. The standard deviation was 22 percent for 
the entire dataset. The minimum of the dataset was close to 5 percent while the 
maximum was 92 percent. San Francisco had the highest mean per fire district of 
nonwhite people at 50 percent, while Houston was also very close at 49 percent. 
Louisville had the lowest proportion of nonwhite people per fire district at 19 
percent. The nonwhite data was not normally distributed, although it was not 
highly skewed either in any major direction with a skewness of 0.70 and a 
kurtosis of -0.65. 
There was a great variation in level of poverty. The mean rate for 
percentage of the population living in poverty for the entire data set was 15 
percent .The median was 13 percent, with a standard deviation of 9 percent. The 
minimum was a low of 2 percent, while the maximum was 55 percent. Houston 
and Miami had the highest average rates of poverty at roughly 19 percent. 
Louisville had the lowest rate of poverty at roughly 8 percent. The standard 
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deviation was 9.5. The data for poverty was not normally distributed as indicated 
by a skewness of 1.26 and a kurtosis of 1.84. 
The mean for home ownership rates for the entire data set was 55 
percent, while the median was 58 percent. The minimum value was 5 percent 
while the maximum value was 92 percent. Louisville had the highest average rate 
of home ownership, with close 68 percent of the city's population being home 
owners. San Francisco had the lowest average rate of home ownership with 33 
percent of population being home owners. The standard deviation was 18 
percent. The data for home ownership was close to being normally distributed. 
The skewness was -0.62 and the kurtosis was 0.02. 
The majority of homes were single detached as the mean for the entire 
dataset was 51 percent. The median value was 56 percent. The minimum was 1 
percent, while the maximum was 91 percent. San Francisco had the lowest mean 
for single detached homes at 18 percent. Miami also had an average of 46 
percent, which was lower than the overall average. Louisville had the highest 
average of single detached home at 71 percent, which was significantly higher 
than the average for the entire data set. The standard deviation was 23 percent. 
The data was not normally distributed, however, it was also not very skewed as it 
was only slighted left-skewed with a skewness of -0.64 and had a kurtosis of -
0.55. 
The mean number of vehicles per household was 1.48, while the median 
was 1.53 vehicles per household. The low of the data set was 0.46 cars per 
household. The high of the data set was 2.16 vehicles per household. Louisville 
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had the highest average of 1.7 vehicles per household. San Francisco had the 
lowest average of 1.1 vehicles per household, and was well below the mean for 
the entire dataset. The standard deviation was 0.32. The data was not normally 
distributed, and was left-skewed with a skewness of -1.01 and had a kurtosis of 
1.45. 
The average commute time for the all the cities within the data set was 
27.9 minutes. The median for the data set was 27.6 minutes. The minimum of the 
dataset was 19 minutes, while the maximum was 40 minutes. St. Paul had the 
lowest average for commute times of 22.6 minutes. Louisville also had a low 
average commute time of 23 minutes. San Francisco had the highest average 
commute time of 32 minutes, while Miami also had a high average commute time 
of 31 minutes. The standard deviation was 4.3. The data was close to being 
normally distributed, although it was slightly right-skewed and had a skewness of 
0.41, and a kurtosis of -0.33. 
The mean for home prices for the entire dataset was approximately 
$199,000, with a median of roughly $150,000. The standard deviation of the 
dataset was $129,000. The minimum home value was approximately $44,000, 
while the maximum was $790,000. Houston had the lowest average home prices 
at close to $114,000. San Francisco had the highest average home values at 
approximately $550,000. Seattle also had an average home value that was about 
$100,000 higher than the average for the entire data set at $295,000. The data 
was not normally distributed and was right-skewed. Average home value had a 
skewness of 1.78, and a kurtosis of 3.78. 
68 
The mean for property taxes for the entire data-set was approximately 1 
percent of total property value. The median was also roughly 1 percent. The 
standard deviation was 0.37%.The minimum property tax value for the eight 
cities was 0.01 percent. The maximum property tax value was 2.15 percent of 
total property value. San Francisco had the lowest average property tax rate for 
all the cities at 0.29 percent of property values. Portland had the highest average 
rate of property taxes at 1.53 percent. Houston also had a higher average rate of 
property taxes at 1.52 percent. The data was close to being normally distributed. 
The data was slightly left-skewed and had a skewness of -0.16 and a kurtosis of 
0.41. 
The mean for the percentage of high income households (that earn over 
$75,000 per year) was 23 percent. The median for the dataset was 20 percent. 
The standard deviation was 12 percent. The minimum for the data-set was 3 
percent, while the maximum was 68 percent. San Francisco had the highest 
mean for all the cities with close to 35 percent of all households earning greater 
than $75,000. St. Paul and Miami had the lowest mean for household earning 
above $75,000 at 19 percent. The data was right-skewed with a skewness of 
0.97, and a kurtosis of 0.92. 
The mean population per street mile was 320 people per mile of roadway. 
The median was 272 people per mile of roadway. The minimum value for 
population per street mile was 48, while the maximum value was 1437 people 
per mile. Louisville had the lowest average population per street mile at 209 
people per mile of roadway. Charlotte also had lower values at 210 people per 
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mile of road way. San Francisco had the highest average at 837 people per mile 
of road way. The standard deviation of the data set was 219. The data was not 
normally distributed, was right-skewed, and had a skewness of 2.57 and a 
kurtosis of 7.45. 
The average street segment length for all the cities was 446 feet. The 
median for street segment length was 417 feet. The minimum value of street 
segment length was 232 feet and the maximum value was 1193 feet. As 
expected, San Francisco had the lowest average of street segment length at 360 
feet. Portland and Seattle also had averages that were lower than the overall 
mean at 370 feet. Louisville had the highest average street segment length at 
557 feet. Houston also had high values, with an average at 520 feet. The 
standard deviation was 123. The data for street segment length was not normally 
distributed, was right-skewed and had a skewness of 2.22. The kurtosis was 
9.33. 
The mean for the population living within 1 mile of an elementary school 
for all the fire districts was 76 percent. The median was 97 percent. The 
minimum value was 0 percent, while the maximum was 100 percent of the 
population of the fire district living within 1 mile of an elementary school. 
Charlotte had the highest mean, with 99 percent of its population living within 1 
mile of an elementary school. San Francisco and Houston also had high 
percentages of their population living within 1 mile of an elementary school at 98 
percent and 96 percent. Miami had the lowest average rate with only 47 percent 
of its population living within 1 mile of an elementary school. The standard 
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deviation was 34 percent. The data was not normally distributed. The data was 
left-skewed and had a skewness of -1.14 and a kurtosis of -0.18. 
The mean distance from the Central Business District was 7.1 mile. The 
median was 5.7 mile. The minimum for the dataset was 0.04 mile, while the 
maximum was 27.5 mile. Both Miami and Louisville had the highest averages for 
distance from the CBD at 9.8 mile. Charlotte had the lowest average at 1.8 mile. 
The standard deviation was 5.16 mile. The data was not normally distributed. 
The data was right-skewed and had a skewness of 1.11 and a kurtosis of 1.25. 
Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics for Entire Data Set 
Variable N Mean Median St Dev Skew Kurt Min Max 
Response Time 
(Seconds) 185 337 335 73 0.10 -0.85 182 537 
Station Area 
(miles) 185 7.72 4.35 13.94 5.88 41.49 0.39 127.4 
Expenditure 185 $213 $219 $55 -0.74 0.35 $44 $313 
PopDen (pop/sq. 
mi.) 185 5,743 4,328 5,804 2.90 10.32 197 35,613 
HomeDen 
(homes/sq. mi.) 185 2,594 1,772 3,068 3.41 14.43 65 21,444 
% Non White 185 33% 27% 22% 0.70 -0.65 5% 92% 
% Poverty 185 15% 13% 9% 1.26 1.84 2% 55% 
% HomeOwn 185 55% 58% 18% -0.62 0.02 5% 92% 
% DetHse 185 51% 56% 23% -0.64 -0.55 1% 91% 
Veh/Hhold 185 1.48 1.53 0.32 -1.01 1.45 0.46 2.16 
AvgCTime 
(minutes) 185 27.90 27.56 4.30 0.41 -0.33 19.55 40.28 
Home Value ($) 185 $199,274 $153,214 $129,140 1.78 3.78 $43,746 $791,186 
% Property Tax 185 1.00% 1.06% 0.38% -0.16 0.41 0.01% 2.15% 
Highlncome (% 
households over 
$75,000) 185 23% 20% 12% 0.97 0.92 3% 68% 
Pop/ Street Mile 185 320 272 219 2.57 7.45 48 1,437 
StreetSeg (feet) 185 446 417 123 2.22 9.33 232 1,193 
ElemSchool 185 76% 97% 34% -1.14 -0.18 0% 100% 
CBD (Miles) 185 7.10 5.68 5.16 1.11 1.25 0.04 27.51 
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San 
Variable Charlotte Houston Louisville Portland Francisco Seattle st. Paul Miami 
Response 
Time 
(Seconds) 319 408 283 297 327 252 291 396 
Station Area 
(Sq. Miles) 8.25 6.54 6.92 5.5 1.02 2.51 4.22 13.27 
Expenditure $130 $151 $122 $236 $313 $219 $146 $244 
Population 77,300 92,339 34,218 19,004 76,421 16,249 101,394 29,652 
Households 30,812 34,019 14,176 8,025 32,496 7,504 39,641 10,077 
PopDen 
(Pop/Sq. Miles) 1,987 3,588 1,933 4,390 20,969 6,576 4,901 5,903 
HomeDen 
(Homes/Sq. 
Miles) 857 1,439 857 2,049 10,454 3,293 1,518 2,422 
% Non White 45% 49% 19% 21% 50% 32% 31% 34% 
% Poverty 12% 19% 8% 14% 13% 13% 15% 19% 
% HomeOwn 53% 45% 68% 53% 33% 47% 55% 53% 
% DetHse 57% 52% 71% 58% 18% 52% 51% 46% 
Veh/Hhold 1.59 1.49 1.73 1.49 1.07 1.42 1.41 1.51 
AvgCTime 
(Minutes) 26.00 29.00 23.00 24.00 32.00 25.83 22.58 31.31 
Home Value $173,824 $114,235 $147,365 $204,229 $548,907 $295,923 $129,013 $145,069 
% Property 
Tax 0.88% 1.52% 0.73% 1.53% 0.29% 0.69% 1.06% 1.17% 
High Income 
(% households 
over $75,000) 25% 20% 27% 20% 35% 27% 19% 19% 
Pop/ Street 
Mile (total 
population/ 
total street 
miles) 210 298 209 238 837 313 310 336 
StreetSeg 
(Feet) 501 520 557 370 360 370 438 469 
ElemSchool 99% 96% 80% 89% 98% 91% 78% 47% 
CBD (miles) 1.80 8.06 9.78 4.36 3.70 4.09 9.42 9.84 
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4.3 Regression Results 
Model 1, refer to Table 10, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of 
the nonwhite population, while controlling for area, expenditure, population 
density and the individual city nonwhite values. 
Table 10- Model 1 Results 
1 (Non White) 
R2 = 0.782 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.732 *** (0.142) 
Area 0.059 *** (0.016) 
Expend -0.086 (0.055) 
Pop Den -0.029 * (0.016) 
NonWhite -0.028 ** (0.013) 
Charlotte NW -0.004 (0.007) 
Houston NW 0.025 *** (0.006) -
Louisville NW -0.025 *** (0.007) 
Portland NW -0.006 (0.007) 
San Fran NW 0.025 *** (0.008) 
Seattle NW -0.018 ** (0.007) -
Miami NW 0.028 *** (0.007) 
Model 1 and all the models were log-log models. The R2 for the model 1 a was 
0.78, which indicates that 78 percent of the variation of response times was 
explained by this model. The signs of the coefficients were intuitively correct for 
the model, with some exceptions. The area variable was significant and had a 
positive sign in every socio-economic model, which was as expected. This 
indicates fire districts that are larger in area with fewer stations can expect to 
have longer response time. Population density in model 1 a was only significant at 
the 90 percent level; however the negative coefficient was not expected. Fire 
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districts with greater population density can expect to have shorter response 
times. The non-white variable, which is indicative of St. Paul, was found to be 
significant at the O.OS level. Fire districts that have a greater non-white population 
can expect to have shorter response times, overall. At the city level the Houston, 
San Francisco, and Miami nonwhite variable were found to be significant at the 
9S percent level or higher and had positive coefficients. This indicates that the 
higher the proportion of nonwhites in those particular cities, the longer the 
response times. Louisville, and Seattle also had coefficients that were significant 
at the 9S% level or higher but had negative coefficients. This indicates that the 
higher the proportion of nonwhites in those particular cities, the shorter the 
response times. Since Model 1 and all the models are log-log specification 
models, the coefficient can be interpreted as a direct percentage change in the 
dependent variable. The estimates represent elasticities. For the purpose of 
explanation, a 10 percent change in value will be used for the interpretation of 
the coefficients. A 10 percent increase in the area of a fire district will result in an 
increase in response times by 0.S9 percent, while holding all else constant, refer 
to table 10. A 10 percent increase in population density will reduce response 
times by 0.29 percent while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in 
the non-white population of the fire district will increase response time by 0.28 
percent, while holding all else constant. 
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Table 11 - Summary Table for Results of 10% Elasticities for Equity Models 
Model R2 Elasticity I Sig 
10% inc in nonwhite pop. will result in a 0.28% dec in RT (St. Paul) •• 
10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Houston will result in a 0.25% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Louisville will result in a 0.25% dec in RT ••• 1 0.782 
10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in San Fran will result in a 0.25% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Seattle will result in a 0.18% dec in RT •• 
10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Miami will result in a 0.28% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty will result in a 0.65% dec in RT (St. Paul) ••• 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Houston will result in a 0.65% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Louisville will result in a 0.33% dec in RT ••• 
2 0.796 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in San Fran will result in a 0.23% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Seattle will result in a 0.23% dec in RT *** 
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Miami will result in a 0.31% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in homeowners in Houston will result in a 1.89% dec in RT ••• 
10% inc in homeowners in Louisville will result in a 5.68% inc in RT ••• 
3 0.722 10% inc in homeowners in Portland will result in a 2.37% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in homeowners in Portland will result in a 2.85% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in homeowners in Miami wi!1 result in a 0.88% dec in RT • 
10% inc in the home value in Houston will result in a 0.13% dec in RT ••• 
10% inc in the home value in Louisville will result in a 0.21% inc in RT •• 
4 0.766 10% inc in the home value in San Fran will result in a 0.17% inc in RT •• 
10% inc in the home value in Seattle will result in a 0.01% dec in RT ** 
10% inc in the home value in Miami will result in a 0.20% inc in RT ••• 
10% inc in property taxes will result in a 0.66% inc in RT (St Paul) ••• 
10% inc in property taxes in Houston will result in a 0.43% inc in RT •• * 
S 0.779 
10% inc in property taxes in San Fran will result in a 0.58% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in property taxes in Miami will result in a 0.45% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in high income households will result in a 0.51% inc in RT (St. Paul) * 
10% inc in high income households in Houston will result in a 1.04% dec in RT *** 
10% inc in high income households in Louisville will result in a 1.14% inc in RT *** 
6 0.748 
10% inc in high income households in Portland will result in a 0.73% inc in RT ** 
10% inc in high income households in Seattle will result in a 1.67% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in high income households in Miami will result in a 0.79% dec in RT **. 
Inc· Increase, Dec· Decrease, RT • Response Time 
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A 10 percent increase in the nonwhite population of Houston will result in 
a 0.25 percent increase in response time, while holding all else constant, refer to 
table 11 for a summary table of elasticities. A 10 percent increase in the 
nonwhite population of Louisville will result in a 0.25 percent decrease in 
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the 
nonwhite population of San Francisco will result in a 0.25 percent increase in 
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the 
nonwhite population of Seattle will result in a 0.18 percent decrease in response 
time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the nonwhite 
population of Miami will result in a 0.28 percent increase in response time, while 
holding all else constant. 
Table 12 - Model 2 Results 
2 ~Poverty) 
R = 0.796 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.722 *** (0.139) 
Area 0.050 *** (0.016) 
Expend -0.100 * (0.055) 
Pop Den -0.025 * (0.015) 
Poverty -0.065 *** (0.016) 
Charlotte Pov -0.008 (0.007) -
Houston Pov 0.026 *** (0.006) 
Louisville Pov -0.033 *** (0.008) 
Portland Pov -0.006 (0.008) 
San Fran Pov 0.023 *** (0.008) 
Seattle Pov -0.023 *** (0.007) 
Miami Pov 0.031 *** (0.007) 
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Model 2, refer to Table 12, had similar results to Model 1 and displays the 
results of the linear regression analyses concerning the association between 
response time and proportion of the population living in poverty and the control 
variables. The R2 for the model 1 b was 0.80. The control variables had almost 
similar outcomes to Model 1. The only major difference was that the per capita 
expenditure was found to be significant at the 90 percent level. The expenditure 
variable had a negative coefficient, which was expected and indicates that the 
higher the level of per capita spending the lower the response time will be. The 
overall poverty variable was found to be significant at the 0.01 level and had a 
positive coefficient, which was intuitively correct. The positive sign on the 
coefficient indicates that the greater the proportion of the population living the 
poverty within a fire district, the shorter the response times will be. The city level 
poverty variables for Houston, Louisville, San Francisco, Seattle, and Miami were 
all found to be significant. Houston, San Francisco, and Miami all had positive 
coefficient signs, while Louisville and Seattle had negative coefficients. The 
positive coefficients indicate that the higher the percentage of the population 
living in poverty the longer the response time. The negative coefficient indicates 
the higher the percentage of population living in poverty the shorter the response 
time. A 10 percent increase in the area of a fire district will result in an increase 
in response times by 0.50 percent, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent 
increase in population density will result in a decrease in response times by 0.25 
percent, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population 
living in poverty, will result in a 0.65 percent decrease in response time, while 
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holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in 
poverty in Houston will result in a 0.26 percent increase in response time, while 
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in 
poverty in Louisville will result in a 0.26 percent decrease in response time, while 
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in 
poverty in San Francisco will result in a 0.23 percent increase in response time, 
while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in 
poverty in Seattle will result in a 0.23 percent decrease in response time, while 
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in poverty 
in Miami will result in a 0.31 percent increase in response time, while holding all 
else constant. 
Table 13 - Model 3 Results 
3 (OwnHse) 
R2 = 0.722 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.353 *** (0.122) 
Area/Station 0.083 *** (0.017) 
Expend 0.048 (0.050) 
Pop Den 0.007 (0.015) 
OwnHse 0.013 (0.041 ) 
Charlotte OH 0.184 * (0.096) 
Houston_OH -0.189 *** (0.056) 
Louisville OH 0.568 *** (0.022) 
Portland OH 0.237 *** (0.022) 
San Fran OH -0.008 (0.026) 
Seattle OH 0.285 *** (0.021 ) 
Miami OH -0.088 * (0.056) 
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Model 3, refer to Table 13, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of 
home owners, while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. This 
model had comparable results to the two preceding models. The R2 for the Model 
3 was 0.72, which was lower than the other two models. The area control 
variable was significant and positive. None of the other control variables were 
found to be significant. The overall home owner variable was not found to be 
significant. There were several individual city home owner variables that were 
found to be significant at the 95 percent or higher level including Houston, 
Louisville, Portland, and Seattle. Miami and Charlotte were significant at the 90 
percent level. Charlotte, Louisville, Portland, and Seattle had positive coefficients 
while Houston and Miami had negative coefficients. A positive coefficient 
indicates that the higher the rate of homeownership the greater the response 
time. A negative coefficient indicates that the higher the rate of homeownership 
the lower the response time. A 10 percent increase in home ownership rates in 
Charlotte will result in a 1.8 percent increase in response times, while holding all 
else constant. A 10 percent increase in home ownership rates in Houston will 
result in a 1.9 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else 
constant. A 10 percent increase in homeownership rates in Louisville will results 
in a 5.7 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 
percent increase in homeownership rates in Portland will results in a 2.4 percent 
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase 
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in home ownership rates in Miami will result in a 0.9% decrease in response 
times, while holding all else constant. 
Model 4, refer to table 14, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time and home values, 
while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. The R2 for the 
model was 0.77 which indicates that 77 percent of the variation of response 
times was explained by this model. The area control variable was significant and 
positive. None of the other control variables were found to be significant. 
Table 14 - Model 4 Results 
4 (HomeVal) 
R2= 0.766 
Variable p Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.655 *** (0.169) 
Area 0.071 *** (0.015) 
Expend -0.051 (0.058) 
Pop Den -0.019 (0.015) 
HomeVal -0.006 (0.023) 
Charlotte_HV -0.003 (0.006) 
Houston HV -0.013 *** (0.006) -
Louisville HV 0.021 ** (0.005) 
Portland HV -0.004 (0.005) 
San 
Francisco HV 0.017 ** (0.007) 
Seattle HV -0.001 ** (0.005) 
Miami HV 0.020 *** (0.005) 
The overall home value variable was not found to be significant. City home 
value variables that were found to be significant at the 95 percent level with a 
negative coefficient were Houston and Seattle, while Louisville, San Francisco 
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and Miami were significant but had positive coefficients. A negative coefficient 
indicates that the higher the home value, the lower the response time will be. The 
positive coefficient indicates that the higher home value the higher the response 
time. A 10 percent increase in the home value in Houston, would result in a 
decrease in response time by 0.13 percent, while holding all else constant. A 
10percent increase in the home values in Louisville would result in a 0.21 percent 
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase 
in home values in San Francisco would result in a 0.17 percent increase in 
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in home 
values in Miami would result in a 0.20 percent increase in response time, while 
holding all else constant. 
Table 15 - Model 5 Results 
5 (ReaITax) 
R2= 0.779 
Variable 13 Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.816 *** (0.169) 
Area/Station 0.04 ** (0.015) 
Expend -0.064 (0.058) 
Pop Den -0.029 ** (0.015) 
RealTax 0.066 *** (0.023) 
Charlotte Tax 0.006 (0.006) 
Houston Tax 0.043 *** (0.006) 
Louisville Tax -0.012 (0.005) 
Portland_Tax 0.003 (0.005) 
San Fran Tax 0.058 *** (0.007) 
Seattle _ T ax -0.009 (0.005) 
Miami Tax 0.045 *** (0.005) 
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ModelS, refer to Table 15, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time and property-tax 
rates, while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. The R2 for 
the model was 0.78 which signifies that 78 percent of the variation of response 
times was explained by this model. In this model the area control variable had a 
positive coefficient and was significant at the 95 percent level. The population 
density control variable was found to be significant and had a negative coefficient 
that signifies the higher the population density the lower the response time. The 
overall property tax variable was found to be significant at the 99 percent level 
and had a positive coefficient. The higher the rate of property taxes the greater 
the response time. Houston, San Francisco and Miami were all found to be 
significant at the 99 percent level, and had positive coefficients that indicate that 
the higher the rates of taxes the higher the response time. A 10 percent 
increase in the property tax rate in Houston would result in a 0.43 percent 
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase 
in property taxes in a San Francisco would result in a 0.58 percent increase in 
response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in property 
taxes in a Miami would result in a 0.45 percent increase in response times, while 
holding all else constant. 
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Table 16 - Model 6 Results 
6(Highlncome) 
R2= 0.748 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.526 *** (0.157) 
Area 0.080 *** (0.016) 
Expend -0.010 (0.062) 
PopOen 0.000 (0.015) 
Inc3 0.051 * (0.030) 
Charlotte_Highlncome 0.062 (0.042) 
Houston_Highlncome -0.104 *** (0.030) 
Louisville_Highlncome 0.110 *** (0.038) 
Portland_Highlncome 0.073 ** (0.031 ) 
San Fran_Highlncome -0.069 (0.056) 
Seattle_Highlncome 0.167 *** (0.032) 
Miami Highlncome -0.079 *** (0.029) 
Model 6, refer to Table 16, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of 
high income households while controlling for area, expenditure and population 
density. The R2 for the model was 0.75. The area control variable had a positive 
coefficient and was significant at the 95 percent level. None of the other control 
variables were found to be significant. The overall Highlncome variable was 
significant at the 90 percent level. The individual city Highlncome variables were 
found to be significant for Houston, Louisville, Portland, Seattle, and Miami. 
Houston and Miami had negative coefficients which indicate that the higher the 
proportion of households who earn over $75,000 the lower the response time. 
Louisville, Portland, and Seattle had positive coefficients which indicate that the 
higher the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 the higher the 
response time. For a 10 percent increase in the proportion of households who 
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earn over $75,000 in Houston you would expect a 1 percent decrease in 
response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the 
proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in Louisville you would expect a 
1.1 percent increase in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 
percent increase in the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in 
Portland you would expect a 0.73 percent increase in response time, while 
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the proportion of 
households who earn over $75,000 in Seattle you would expect a 1.7 percent 
increase in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent 
increase in the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in Miami you 
would expect a 0.8 percent decrease in response time, while holding all else 
constant. 
Model 7, refer to table 17, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and the proportion of detached housing as the main 
independent variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of 
the fire department, and home density. All these models were log-log models. 
The R2 for model 7 was 0.30. The area control variable was significant at the 99 
percent level and had a positive coefficient. The expenditure variable was a 
significant at the 95 percent level, and had a positive coefficient, which is not 
intuitively correct. 
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Table 17 - Model 7 Results 
7 ~DetHse) 
R = 0.304 
Std. 
Variable p Sig Err 
Constant 1.992 *** (0.126) 
Area 0.113 *** (0.032) 
Expend 0.153 ** (0.053) 
HomeDen 0.000 (0.028) 
DetHse 0.027 * (0.016) 
Table 18 - Model7a Results 
7a (DetHseCity) 
R2= 0.649 
Std. 
Variable 13 Sig Err 
Constant 2.441 *** (0.127) 
Area/Station 0.094 *** (0.020) 
Expend 0.026 (0.053) 
HomeDen -0.02 (0.017) 
DetHse -0.02 (0.037) 
Charlotte DH 0.159 (0.106) 
Houston DH -0.2 *** (0.056) 
Louisville DH 0.486 *** (0.123) 
Portland DH 0.147 *** (0.046) 
San Fran_DH -0.03 (0.041 ) 
Seattle DH 0.142 *** (0.040) 
Miami DH -0.08 ** (0.040) 
The positive coefficient for expenditure indicates that the higher the level 
of per capita spending, the greater the response time. The detached housing 
variable was only significant at the 90 percent level, and had a positive 
coefficient. For a 10 percent increase in the size of the area one could expect an 
increase of 1.1 percent in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 
10 percent increase in expenditure you would expect that response times to 
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increase by 1.5 percent while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase 
in proportion of detached housing you would expect a 0.3 percent increase in 
response times. 
Model 7a, refer to Table 18, is similar to model 7 the only difference is that 
model 7a also has the variables for each city's proportion of detached housing. 
The R2 for Model 7a was 0.65, which indicates that 65 percent of the variation in 
response times is explainable by this model. The area control variable was 
found to be significant with a positive coefficient, similar to Model 7. None of the 
other control variables were found to be significant. The overall detached housing 
variable was not significant at any level in this model. Detached housing 
variables for Houston and Miami were found to be significant at the 95 percent 
level or higher and both had negative coefficients. This indicates that the higher 
the level of detached housing, the lower the response time. Louisville, Portland 
and Seattle also were also significant, at the 99 percent level, and had positive 
coefficient. The positive coefficient indicates that the higher the level of detached 
housing the higher the response time. For a 10 percent increase in detached 
housing in Houston one would expect a 2 percent decrease in response time, 
while holding all else constant, refer to table 19 for a summary of elasticities for 
all the sprawl models. For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in 
Louisville, one would expect a 4.9 percent increase in response times, while 
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in 
Portland, one would expect a 1.5 percent increase in response times, while 
holding all else constant. 
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Table 19 - Summary Table for Results of 10% Elasticities for Sprawl Models 
Model R2 10% Elasticity I Sig 
7 0.304 10% inc in detached housing will result in a 0.27% inc in RT * 
10% inc in detached housing in Houston will result in a 2.00% dec in RT *** 
10% inc in detached housing in Louisville will result in a 4.86% inc in RT *** 
7a 0.649 10% inc in detached housing in Portland will result in a 1.47% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in detached housing in Seattle will result in a 1.42% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in detached housing in Miami will result in a 0.80% dec in RT ** 
8 0.486 10% inc in AvgCtime will result in a 7.5% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in AvgCtime in Houston will result in a 0.73% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in AvgCtime in Louisville will result in a 0.49% dec in RT ** 
8a 0.77 10% inc in AvgCtime in San Fran will result in a 0.66% inc in RT ** 
10% inc in AvgCtime in Seattle will result in a 0.42% dec in RT ** 
10% inc in AvgCtime in Miami will result in a 0.70% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in VehHH in Houston will result in a 8.94% inc in RT *** 
9a 0.609 10% inc in VehHH in San Fran will result in a 3.4% inc in RT * 
10% inc in VehHH in Miami will result in a 7.2% inc in RT *** 
10 0.35 10% inc in PopStMile will result in a 1.8% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in PopStMile in Houston will result in a 0.46% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in PopStMile inLouisville will result in a 0.46% dec in RT *** 
10a 0.774 10% inc in PopStMile in San Fran will result in a 0.43% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in PopStMile in Seattle will result in a 0.21% dec in RT * 
10% inc in popStMile in Miami will result in a 0.46% inc in RT *** 
11 OAOl 10% inc in streetSeg will result in a 0.81% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in streetSeg in Houston will result in a 0.38% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in streetSeg in Louisville will result in a 0.27% dec in RT ** 
11a 0.771 10% inc in streetSeg in San Fran will result in a 0.39% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in streetSeg in Seattle will result in a 0.22% dec in RT ** 
10% inc in streetSeg in Miami will result in a 0.39% inc in RT *** 
12 0.288 10% inc in ElmSchool will result in a 0.36% dec in RT ** 
13 0.325 10% inc in CDB will result in a 0.48% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in CBD in Houston will result in a 1.46% inc in RT *** 
13a 0.704 10% inc in CBD in San Fran will result in a 1.59% inc in RT *** 
10% inc in CBD in Miami will result in a 1.37% inc in RT *** 
Inc· Increase, Dec· Decrease, RT • Response Time 
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For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in Seattle, one would expect a 1.4 
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For 10 
percent increase in detached housing in Miami one would expect a 0.8 percent 
decrease in response time, while holding all else constant. 
Table 20 - Model 8 Results 
8(AvgCTime) 
R2 = 0.486 
Std. 
Variable ~ Sig Err 
Constant 1.429 *** (0.126) 
Area 0.084 *** (0.022) 
Expend -0.011 (0.043) 
HomeDen -0.007 (0.020) 
AvgCTime 0.750 *** (0.091 ) 
Model 8, refer to Table 20, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and average commute times as the main independent 
variable, while controlling for the area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire 
department and home density. The R2 for the model 8 was 0.49. The area 
control variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive 
coefficient. None of the other control variables were significant. The average 
commute time variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive 
coefficient. This indicates that the greater the average commute time, the longer 
the response time will be which is intuitively correct. For a 10 percent increase in 
average commute times, one would expect a 7.5 percent increase in response 
times. 
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Table 21 - Model Sa Results 
Sa (AvgCTimeCity) 
R2= 0.770 
Std. 
Variable ~ Sig Err 
Constant 2.642 *** (0.193) 
Area 0.057 *** (0.017) 
Expend -0.065 (0.057) 
HomeDen -0.029 ** (0.014) 
ComTime 0.033 (0.094) 
Charlotte CT -0.011 (0.022) 
Houston CT 0.073 *** (0.019) 
Louisville CT -0.049 ** (0.021) 
Portland CT -0.010 (0.020) 
San Fran CT 0.066 ** (0.026) 
Seattle CT -0.042 ** (0.020) 
Miami CT 0.070 *** (0.020) 
Model Sa added the individual city commute time variables to model 3a. 
The R2 for the model Sa was 0.77. The area control variable was significant at 
the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient. The home density control 
variable was significant at the 95 percent level, and had a negative coefficient. 
This indicates the higher the home density the lower the response time. The 
overall commute time variable in model Sa was not significant. The individual city 
commute time variables for Houston, Louisville, San Francisco, Seattle and 
Miami were found to be significant at the 95 percent level or higher. Houston, 
San Francisco and Miami had positive coefficients, while Louisville and Seattle 
had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent increase in commute times in 
Houston, one would expect an increase of 0.7 percent while holding all else 
constant. For a 10 percent increase in commute time in Louisville, one would 
expect a 0.5 decrease in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 
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percent increase in commute time in San Francisco, would expect a 0.7 percent 
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent 
increase in commute time in Seattle, one would expect a 0.5 decrease in 
response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in 
commute time in Miami, would expect a 0.7 percent increase in response times, 
while holding all else constant. 
Table 22 - Model 9 Results 
9~VehHH) 
R = 0.296 
Std. 
Variable J3 Sig Err 
Constant 2.060 *** (0.118) 
Area 0.141 *** (0.026) 
Expend 0.116 ** (0.047) 
HomeDen 0.027 (0.023) 
VehHH 0.053 (0.066) 
Model 9, refer to Table 22, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and the number of vehicles per household as the main 
independent variable, while controlling for the area of the fire district, expenditure 
of the fire department and home density. The R2 for the model 9 was 0.30. Both 
the Area and expenditure control variables were found to be significant at the 95 
percent level or higher and had positive coefficients, which were similar results to 
model 8. The vehicles per household variable was not found to be significant. 
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Table 23 - Model9a Results 
9a (VehHH) 
R2 = 0.609 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.355 *** (0.146) 
Area/Station 0.044 ** (0.022) 
Expend 0.034 (0.056) 
HomeDen 0.002 (0.018) 
VehHH -0.140 (0.152) 
Charlotte VHH 0.313 (0.198) 
Houston_ VHH 0.894 *** (0.177) 
Louisville VHH 0.085 (0.171) 
Portland VHH 0.213 (0.169) 
San Fran VHH 0.340 * (0.190) 
Seattle VHH 0.053 (0.163) 
Miami VHH 0.722 *** (0.166) 
Model 9a, refer to Table 23, added the individual city vehicles per 
household variables to the Model 9. The R2 for the Model 9a was 0.61. The area 
control variable was significant, and had a positive sign for the coefficient. 
Houston and Miami were both significant at the 99 percent level and had positive 
signs for their coefficients. San Francisco was significant at the 90 percent level, 
and also had a positive coefficient. For a 10 percent increase in the vehicles per 
household in Houston, one would expect a 8.9 percent increase in response 
times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the vehicles 
per household, one would expect a 3.4 percent increase in response times in 
San Francisco, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the 
vehicles per household in Miami, one would expect a 7.2 percent increase in 
response times, while holding all else constant. 
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Table 24 - Model 10 Results 
10(PopStMile) 
R2= 0.350 
Std. 
Variable ~ Sig Err 
Constant 1.884 *** (0.121) 
Area 0.133 *** (0.024) 
Expend 0.140 *** (0.045) 
HomeDen -0.067 ** (0.032) 
PopStMile 0.180 *** (0.045) 
Model 10 displays the results of the linear regression analyses concerning 
the association between response time as the main dependent variable and the 
population per street mile as the main independent variable, while controlling for 
area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire department, and home density. The 
R2 for the Model 10 was 0.35. The control variables for this model were all found 
to be significant. Both area and expenditure were significant at the 99 percent 
level and had positive coefficients. The home density variable was significant at 
the 95 percent level and had a negative coefficient that indicates the higher the 
home density the lower the response time. The population per street mile 
variable was also significant at the 99 percent level. For a 10 percent increase in 
the population per street mile one would expect a 1.8 percent decrease in 
response times, while holding all else constant. 
Model 10a, refer to Table 25, added the individual city population-per-
street-mile variables to the Model 10. The area and home density control 
variables were found to be significant and had similar outcomes to Model 10. 
Houston, San Francisco and the Miami population per street mile variables were 
all significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient which 
92 
indicates that the higher the population per street mile the longer the response 
time. 
Table 25 - Model10a Results 
10a (PopStMileCity) 
R2= 0.774 
Variable 13 Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.775 *** (0.157) 
Area 0.067 *** (0.016) 
Expend -0.083 (0.060) 
HomeDen -0.025 ** (0.021 ) 
PopStMile -0.027 (0.033) 
Charlotte PSM -0.008 (0.013) 
Houston PSM 0.046 *** (0.011) 
Louisville PSM -0.032 *** (0.012) 
Portland PSM -0.004 (0.011 ) 
San Fran PSM 0.043 *** (0.014) 
Seattle PSM -0.021 * (0.011 ) 
Miami PSM 0.046 *** (0.011 ) 
Louisville was significant at the 99 percent level, while Seattle was significant at 
the 90 percent level and both had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent 
increase in the population per street mile in Houston one would expect a 0.5 
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 
percent increase in the population per street mile in Louisville one would expect a 
0.3 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 
percent increase in the population per street mile in San Francisco one would 
expect a 0.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. 
For a 10 percent increase in the population per street mile in Seattle one would 
expect a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. 
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For a 10 percent increase in the population per street mile in Miami one would 
expect a 0.5 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. 
Table 26 - Model 11 Results 
11 (StreetSeg) 
R2 = 0.401 
Variable J3 Sig Std. Err 
Constant 0.552 * (0.289) 
Area 0.131 *** (0.023) 
Expend 0.165 *** (0.044) 
HomeDen 0.088 *** (0.024) 
StreetSeg 0.461 *** (0.081) 
Model 11, refer to Table 26, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and the length of the street segment as the main 
independent variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of 
the fire department, and home density. The R2 for the Model 11 was 0.40. The 
control variables for this model were all found to be significant at the 99 percent 
level and all had positive sign for their coefficients. This was a reverse pattern for 
the home density variable, which in Model 11 had a negative coefficient. The 
street segment variable was found to be significant at the 99 percent level and 
had a positive sign, which indicates that the longer the length of the street 
segments the longer the response time will be. For a 10 percent increase in the 
average street length one would expect response times to increase by 4.6 
percent while holding all else constant. In Model 11a, refer to table 27, the 
individual city street segments variables were added to Model 11. The R2 for the 
model 11 a was 0.77. The area control variable was significant at the 99 percent 
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level and had a positive sign for the coefficient. Similar too many of the previous 
models the street segment variables for Houston, San Francisco and Miami were 
all significant at the 99 percent level and had positive signs for the coefficients. 
Table 27 - Model11a Results 
11 a (StreetSegCity) 
R2 = 0.771 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.363 *** (0.157) 
Area 0.059 *** (0.016) 
Expend -0.065 (0.060) 
HomeDen -0.011 (0.021) 
StreetSeg 0.101 (0.033) 
Charlotte SS -0.006 (0.013) 
Houston SS 0.038 *** (0.011) 
Louisville SS -0.027 ** (0.012) 
Portland SS -0.003 (0.011) 
San Franc SS 0.039 *** (0.014) 
Seattle SS -0.022 ** (0.011) 
Miami SS 0.039 *** (0.011 ) 
This indicates that the greater the length of the street segment the longer the 
response time will be. Louisville and Seattle were both significant at the 95 
percent level and had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent increase in the 
average length of a street segment in Houston one would expect a 0.4 percent 
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent 
increase in the average length of a street segment in Louisville one would expect 
a 0.3 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 
10 percent increase in the average length of a street segment in San Francisco 
one would expect a 0.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else 
constant. For a 10 percent increase in the average length of a street segment in 
95 
Seattle one would expect a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while 
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the average length of a 
street segment in Miami one would expect a 0.4 percent increase in response 
times, while holding all else constant. 
Table 28 - Model 12 Results 
12 (ElmSch) 
R2= 0.288 
Variable p Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.124 *** (0.121) 
Area 0.152 *** (0.027) 
Expend 0.069 (0.050) 
HomeDen 0.039 (0.026) 
ElmSch -0.036 ** (0.018) 
Model 12, refer to Table 28, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and the proportion of the population that lives within one mile 
of an elementary school (Elmschool variable) as the main independent variable, 
while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire department, 
and home density. The R2 for the model 12 was 0.29. The area control variable 
was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient. The other 
control variables were not found to be significant. The Elmschool variable was 
significant at the 95 percent level and had a negative sign for the coefficient, 
which indicates that the higher the proportion of the population living within one 
mile of an elementary school the lower the response time will be. For a 10 
percent increase living within one mile of an elementary school one would expect 
a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. 
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Table 29 - Model 12a Results 
12a (ElmSchooICity) 
R2= 0.362 
Variable ~ Sig Std. Err 
Constant 2.172 *** (0.128) 
Area 0.138 *** (0.028) 
Expend 0.072 (0.049) 
HomeOen 0.025 (0.028) 
ElmSchool 0.044 (0.399) 
Charlotte ES 1.025 (3.491) 
Houston ES -0.524 (0.480) 
Louisville ES 0.049 (0.401 ) 
Portland ES -0.014 (0.405) 
San Fran ES -0.465 (0.922) 
Seattle ES 0.258 (0.410) 
Miami ES -0.096 (0.399) 
In Model 12a, refer to Table 29, the individual city Elmschool variables 
were added to Model 12. The R2 for the Model12a was 0.36. The area control 
variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the 
coefficient. None of the individual city level Elmschool variables were found to be 
significant. 
Table 30 - Model 13 Results 
13 (CBO) 
R2= 0.325 
Std. 
Variable [3 Sig Err 
Constant 2.056 *** (0.113) 
Area 0.134 *** (0.025) 
Expend 0.108 ** (0.046) 
HomeOen 0.028 (0.023) 
CBO 0.048 *** (0.017) 
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Model 13, refer to Table 30, displays the results of the linear regression 
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main 
dependent variable and the distance from the CBO as the main independent 
variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire 
department, and home density. The R2 for the model 13 was 0.32. Both the Area 
and expenditure control variables were found to be significant at the 95 percent 
level or higher and had positive coefficients. The CBO variable was significant at 
the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the coefficient which indicates the 
greater the distance from the CBO the longer the response time. For a 10 
percent increase in the distance from the CSO one could expect a 0.5 percent 
increase in response times while holding all else constant. 
Table 31 - Model13a Results 
13a(CSOcity) 
R2 = 0.704 
Std. 
Variable a Sig Err 
Constant 2.597 *** (0.128) 
Area 0.068 *** (0.028) 
Expend -0.054 (0.049) 
HomeOen -0.006 (0.028) 
CSO -0.041 (0.399) 
Charlotte_CBO 0.082 (3.491 ) 
Houston_CBO 0.146 *** (0.480) 
Louisville CSO -0.034 (0.401 ) 
Portland CBO 0.001 (0.405) 
San Fran CSO 0.159 *** (0.922) 
Seattle CBO -0.064 (0.410) 
Miami CBO 0.137 *** (0.399) 
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In Model 13a, refer to Table 31, the individual city CBO variables were 
added to model6a. The R2 for the model13a was 0.70. The area control variable 
was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the coefficient. 
The CBO variables for Houston, San Francisco and Miami were all significant at 
the 99 percent level and had positive signs for their coefficients. For a 10 percent 
increase in the distance from the CBO in Houston one would expect a 1.5 
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 
percent increase in the distance from the CBO in San Francisco one would 
expect a 1.6 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. 
For a 10 percent increase in the distance from the CBO in Miami one would 
expect a 1.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. 
4.3 Spatial Analysis 
Figure 1 (Appendix 1) displays a map of the percentage of the nonwhite 
population at the census tract level for Houston, Texas (and all of Harris County) 
along with fire district boundaries. The percentages are displayed through four 
categories using quartiles. The lowest percentages are represented by the yellow 
color, which is less than 20 percent nonwhite, while the highest percentages are 
represented by the dark red, which greater than 59.01 percent nonwhite. The 
thick black lines on the map represent the fire districts for the Houston Fire 
Oepartment. The CBO is represented by a red star on the map. The highest 
proportions of nonwhites in Houston are concentrated within the central portion of 
the city, surrounding the CBO. There are at least 40 census tracts in this area 
that are greater than 90 percent nonwhite population. More specifically, areas 
including the southwest, south central and north east of the CBO have the 
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highest concentrations of nonwhites. Areas of Houston that have higher 
concentrations of whites include the northeast, northwest, and eastern portions of 
the city. There is also a swath just west of the CBO that also has higher 
concentration of whites. 
Figure 2 displays a similar map of the percentage of the nonwhite 
population in Louisville, Kentucky. There is a similar coloring scheme to this map 
as the lowest percentages of nonwhites are represented by the yellow color, 
which is less than 6 percent nonwhite, while the highest percentages of 
nonwhites are represented by the dark red, which are greater than 35.01 percent 
nonwhite. Nonwhites are concentrated within two main areas in Louisville. The 
first area with the highest concentration of nonwhites is in north west Louisville. 
There are at least 35 census tracts within this area that fall within the last quartile 
with the highest proportion of nonwhites. There are 15 census tracts in this area 
that have at least a population of 90 percent nonwhite or greater. The CBO can 
also be found in this part of the city. The second area with higher concentrations 
of nonwhites can be found towards the center of Louisville-Jefferson County. 
There are six census tracts in this cluster of high proportion of nonwhites, which 
range from 40-90 percent nonwhite. The south-west and south-central edge of 
the county generally have the lowest percentage of nonwhites and highest 
concentration of whites. 
Figure 3 displays a map of the nonwhites in Seattle, Washington. The 
percentages are displayed through four categories using quartiles. The lowest 
percentages are represented by the yellow color, which is less than 13 percent 
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nonwhite, while the highest percentages are represented by the dark red, which 
are greater than 40.01 percent nonwhite. The thick black lines on the map 
represent the fire districts for the Seattle Fire Department. The highest 
concentrations of nonwhites are found within the southern portion of Seattle. 
There were at least 36 census tracts within this cluster in the last quartile in the 
south of Seattle that had as a minimum a 40 percent nonwhite population. The 
north and the west generally had lower concentrations of nonwhites, although in 
the far north of the city there were higher concentrations of nonwhites in the 3rd 
quartile between 20-40 percent nonwhite. 
Figure 4 displays a map of the proportion of nonwhites by census tract in 
Miami-Dade, Florida. This map has a similar color scheme to the other previous 
maps. The census tracts can fall within four categories that have been divided 
into quartiles. The yellow color represent the lowest proportion of nonwhites, 
which is below 10 percent, while the dark red color represent the census tracts 
with the highest proportion of nonwhites which is greater than 52.01 percent. 
Nonwhites are heavily concentrated in within northern Miami-Dade, directly north 
of the CBD. There are 70 census tracts in this area that have the highest 
concentration of nonwhites, and approximately 24 of those census tracts have 
greater than 90 percent nonwhites. The area just directly west of the CBD has 
the lowest concentrations of nonwhites. 
Figure 5 is a map that displays the proportion of people that are living in 
poverty at the census tract level in Houston, Texas. This map has a similar 
coloring scheme, as the previous maps. The data is broken down into 4 
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categories using the quartiles. The yellow represents the lowest quartile, which is 
less than or equal to 5 percent of the population living in poverty. The dark red is 
the highest category of a population living in poverty and represents at least 
23.01 percent or greater living in poverty. This map is very similar to nonwhite 
map, although there are some minor differences. Poverty is concentrated within 
the center of Houston, around the CBD, especially towards the east. The 
difference between the nonwhite map and the poverty map was that there were 
also high concentrations of nonwhite towards the southwest, and while there are 
high rates of poverty in the southwest of Houston, they are not as high as around 
the CBD, and towards the east of the CBD. There are several census tracts that 
have at least 40 percent of the population or greater living in poverty. 
Figure 6 displays rates of poverty in Louisville, Kentucky. The areas with 
the highest rates of poverty, exactly match those areas that have the highest 
concentrations of nonwhites within the city. The north west of the city has the 
largest cluster of a population living below the poverty line. At least 20 of 
Louisville 170 census tracts with the highest rates of poverty, greater than 30 
percent, are found within this area. In general the west of Louisville has higher 
rates of poverty when compared to the east. Rates of poverty were very low in 
the eastern portion of Louisville, when compared to the rest of the city. 
Figure 7 displays a map of the proportion of people that are living in 
poverty at the census tract level in Seattle. Overall the rates of poverty were 
lower in Seattle, when compared to Houston or Louisville. Seattle followed a 
similar pattern to the other two cities in that areas with high poverty coincided 
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with areas that had high proportions of nonwhites. Poverty was concentrated in 
the southern section of the city, south of the CBD. There were roughly 25 census 
tracts around the CBD that had the highest concentrations of poverty where 
between 15-50 percent of the population was living in poverty. Poverty was not 
confined to the southern portion of Seattle, as there were a few census tracts in 
the north of the city that fell in the group with the highest rates of poverty. 
Figure 8 displays rates of poverty in Miami-Dade, Florida. The areas with 
the highest rates of poverty, exactly match those areas that have the highest 
concentrations of nonwhites within the city. As nonwhites were heavily 
concentrated in within northern Miami, directly north of the CBD, so to were the 
highest rates of poverty within the city. Anywhere between 25-65 percent of the 
population in this area just north of the CBO was living below the poverty level. 
There were at least 60 census tracts in this high concentration area that fell 
within the highest rate of poverty category. There were also a few census tracts 
in the south that fell into the highest category of poverty. Directly south west of 
this area with the high rates of poverty was an area that had the lowest rates of 
poverty within the city. 
Figure 9 displays a map of the homeownership rates in Houston. The data 
was divided into four categories using quartiles. The lowest rates of home 
ownership were represented by yellow and included of rates of less than 33 
percent owner occupied. Dark red represented the category with the highest 
rates of homeownership, and greater than 74.01 percent owner occupied. The 
general pattern was the rates of homeownership were the lowest in the center of 
103 
the city. The further away from the center the higher the rates of ownership. This 
map had the reverse pattern of the other two previous maps for Houston. The 
highest rates of ownership were found within the north-east and north-west of the 
city. There were also other sporadic areas across the city with high rates of home 
ownership. 
Figure 10 is a map of homeownership rates in Louisville. The data was 
divided into four categories using quartiles, the lowest category being 
represented by yellow with rates of ownership less than 47 percent and the 
highest being represented by dark red with ownership rates of greater than 76.01 
percent. This map displays similar patterns to the homeownership map of 
Houston, and was somewhat the reverse of the other two previous maps of 
Louisville. The lowest rates of homeownership were around the CBD. The further 
away from the center of the city the higher the rates of home ownership. The 
highest rates of ownership were at the edges of the county. 
Figure 11 displays a map of homeownership rates in Seattle. The color 
scheme was similar to the other maps. The lowest rates of home ownership were 
represented by yellow and included of rates of less than 35 percent owner 
occupied. Dark red represented the category with the highest rates of 
homeownership, and greater than 67.01 percent owner occupied. Similar to all 
the other cities homeownership rates were lowest in the area surrounding the 
CBD. Rates of homeownership gradually increased the further away from the 
CBD. However, this pattern was not as distinct in Seattle, as it was in other 
locations. The largest cluster of the highest rates of homeownership was found in 
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the north eastern section of the city. In general the edge of the city had higher 
rates of home ownership compared to the central section of the city. Rates of 
homeownership were not as high in Seattle as they were in Houston and 
Louisville. 
Figure 12 displays a map of homeownership rates in Miami. Similar to the 
other maps, the lowest rates of home ownership were represented by yellow and 
included of rates of less that 31 percent owner occupied. Dark red represented 
the category with the highest rates of homeownership, and greater than 76.01 
percent owner occupied. Similar to all the other home ownership maps, rates of 
ownership were lowest surrounding the CBD, in north eastern section of Miami-
Dade in the city of Miami. Areas west and south west of the CBD had the highest 
rates of home ownership. Miami was similar to the other cities in general as the 
further the distance from the CBD the higher the rates of homeownership. 
The next series of maps where those of average home values. Figure 20 
displays a map of average home values by census tracts in Houston. Average 
home values were divided into four categories using quartiles. Yellow represents 
the lowest home values, with values of less than $26,000. The dark red 
represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with values of 
greater than $80,000. Home values were the lowest surrounding the CBD, 
especially around the central eastern sections of the city. Home values in this 
part of the city were very low, with an average below $20,000. The farther away 
from this part of the city the higher the home values, especially towards the edge 
of the city and county. Home values were generally higher in the northern 
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sections on Houston, towards the north-west and north east. One area that had 
the highest homes values of the city was towards the west of the CBD. This was 
the same swath of census tracts that had higher proportions of whites. The 
average home values in this area were around $250,000, however there were 
many homes that were well above this value and were in the range of $400,000 
to $800,000. 
Figure 13 displays a map of home values in Louisville. Yellow represents 
the lowest home values, with values of less than $40,000. The dark red 
represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with values of 
greater than $97,000. Louisville has a very distinct pattern. Home values were 
much higher in the eastern portion of the city when compared to the western 
portion of the city. The northeastern section of the city had the highest home 
values in the city, with prices ranging between $250,000 - $350,000. Similar to 
Houston, home values were the lowest surrounding the CBD. This area of the 
city in the northwest of Louisville had very low home values with the average 
being less than $23,000. 
Figure 14 displays a map of home values by census tract in Seattle. 
Yellow represents the lowest home values, with values of less than $88,000. The 
dark red represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with 
values of greater than $192,000. Home values in general were much higher in 
Seattle when compared to Houston or Louisville. Similar to the other two cities, 
home values were lowest surrounding the CBD. Homes values were around 
$40,000 on average. The northern and western section of Seattle had higher 
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home values and in fact the highest values where in the northwest where the 
average home price was between $300,000- $500,000. 
Figure 15 displays a home values in Miami. Yellow represents the lowest 
home values, with values of less than $36,000. The dark red represents the area 
with the highest home values in Houston with values of greater than $100,001. 
Similar to all the other cities, the lowest values in Miami were found around the 
CBD, or just directly north of the CBD. On average, homes were less than 
$20,000 in this area. The north-eastern section of the Miami had lower home 
values in general when compared to the rest of the city. The west and south-west 
of the CBD had the highest home values. Homes on average were around 
$250,000 in the south west section of Miami, and around $150,000 in the west. 
The highest home values were generally found in census tracts that were along 
the coast, just south west of the CBD and ranged in price between $400,000 and 
$800,000. 
Figure 16 displays a map of property tax rates in Houston. Tax rates were 
divided into four groups, using quartiles. Yellow represent the lowest tax rates, 
less the 1.3 percent. Dark red represents the highest tax rate, with values greater 
than 1.81 percent. The general pattern is that rates are the lowest towards the 
center of the city. The highest tax rates are out towards the suburbs outside of 
the central city. Directly around the CBD rates are about 0.8 percent of the 
property overall value on average. The census tracts with the lowest rates of 
property taxes were however not all concentrated together in one particular area 
of the city. The highest rates of taxation where in most cases on the edge of the 
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city or outside of the city limits found in Harris County. Rates were on average 
greater than 2 percent of overall property value on an annual basis. There were 
also a few areas within the city on the extreme edge in the north east and south 
east that did have rates higher rates, greater than 2 percent average. 
Figure 17 displays a map of property tax rates in Louisville. The coloring 
scheme was similar to the previous map, and divided up using quartiles. Yellow 
represent the lowest tax rate in Louisville with values less than 0.67 percent, 
while dark red represents the highest tax rates greater than 0.80 percent. 
Property tax rates in Louisville were much lower than in Houston. Louisville also 
displayed a different pattern than Houston. The major difference was that tax 
rates in Louisville were the lowest in the suburbs that were the farthest away 
from the CBD, although there were several census tracts in northwestern 
Louisville that did have low rates of property taxes. Rates were higher towards 
the center of the city. In fact, the highest rates, greater than 0.90 percent were all 
found within the boundaries of old Louisville. The eastern portion of the city in 
general did have some areas that had higher rates of property taxes. 
Figure 18 displays a map of property tax rate in Miami, Florida. The color 
scheme was similar to the previous map, and divided up using quartiles. Yellow 
represent the lowest tax rate in Miami with values less than 1 percent. Dark red 
represents the highest tax rates greater than 1.41 percent. Property tax rates in 
Miami were higher than in Louisville, but where lower than in Houston on 
average. Miami did not display any major patterns like the other two cities. Tax 
rates were low immediately surrounding the CBD. The northern section of Miami 
108 
tended to have the lower rates of property taxation. There was no area with a 
major concentration of the highest rates of taxation as the census tracts with the 
highest rates were spread throughout the city although they were away from the 
CBO. 
Figure 19 through 22 are maps of average commute times for Houston, 
Louisville, Seattle, and Miami. Average commute times were divided into four 
categories using quartiles. Yellow represents the lowest commute time, while 
dark red represents the highest category for commute times. Commute times 
were lowest in Louisville and highest in Miami. All four maps generally indicate 
similar patterns. Commuting times are commonly the lowest around the CBO and 
the center of each city. The further one gets from the center of the city towards 
the suburban locations of each city the higher the average commute time. There 
is an exception to this, however, and that is the areas with higher concentrations 
of nonwhites which are usually close in proximity to the CBO also have higher 
commute times. 
Figure 23 through 26 are maps of response times at the fire district level 
superimposed on the census tracts for Houston, Louisville, Seattle, and Miami. 
Response times were divided into 4 categories using quartiles. Yellow represents 
the lowest response time, while dark red represents the highest response times. 
Figure 31 displays a map of response times for Houston. Response times were 
the lowest around the CBO and just north and south of the CBO. The fire 
districts that were farther away from the center of the city had response times 
that were higher when compared to the center of the city. Generally speaking the 
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highest response times where in the fire districts that were at the edge of the city. 
Figure 27 displays a map of response times for Louisville and was somewhat 
similar to the map of Houston. The similarity was the lowest response times 
where in the center of the city around the eBO and the highest were towards the 
edge of the city. However, there were a few fire districts that were also out in the 
suburbs outside of old Louisville that also fell into the lowest category for 
response times. The highest response times in Louisville were found in the in the 
south-west and north east of the city. Figure 28 displays a map of response times 
in Seattle. Similar to both Houston and Louisville, the lowest response times 
were found in the center of the city. However, there were also a few fire districts 
that were not in the center of the city and fell within the lowest response time 
category as well. Generally the highest response times were out from the center 
of the city and small clusters of the fire districts with higher response times could 
be found in the north-east and south-west. Figure 34 displays a map of response 
times of Miami. Miami's map was very similar to Houston, and displayed very 
similar patterns. The lowest values for response times were found in the center of 
the city towards the eBO and the further away from the center of the city, 
generally speaking, the higher the response times. 
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4.5 Qualitative Results 
The qualitative research in this study is a further in-depth analysis of the 
most salient results of the quantitative portion. Three fire districts within 
Louisville-Jefferson County were examined in-depth. Furthermore, the qualitative 
research draws on the expertise of fire chiefs from several different fire 
departments within Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky to explain factors that 
influence response times. Specifically the intent of this portion of the research 
was to get the experience from fire chiefs who experience fire fighting in different 
types of urban environments and to get the perspective from an urban district fire 
chief, an urban suburban fire chief and a fire chief from a totally suburban fire 
district. The three fire departments and districts that were included for this portion 
of the study were Lyndon, Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek. 
The Lyndon fire protection district and Fire Department was the urban fire 
district. An attempt was made to interview fire personnel from the Louisville Metro 
Fire department for the urban fire district; however, the public information officer 
was away on sick leave. Lyndon was selected as an alternative. The 
urban/suburban mix fire district was the Jeffersontown fire protection district and 
fire department. The suburban fire district was Harrods Creek. Each fire district 
had different management structures, with some similarities. Lyndon had a Chief, 
followed by three battalion chiefs. 
Jeffersontown had a Chief followed by an assistant chief. Jeffersontown 
also had three chiefs for the different divisions in the department including fire 
prevention, training and maintenance. Harrods Creek had a chief followed by an 
assistant chief. Harrods creek also had three division chiefs. 
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Harrods 
Lyndon Jeffersontown Creek 
Response Time 3:28 5:03 5:45 
Stations 2.00 3.00 2.00 
Career Fire Fighter 27 48 35 
Volunteer Fire Fighter 15 5 25 
Budget $2,835,894 $4,725,791 $2,553,500 
Per Capita $94 $148 $167 
ISO 3 2 (3/9) 3 
Vehicles 5 6 6 
Runs 2,172 1,640 556 
Population 30,315 31,960 15,288 
Homes 14,028 12,980 6,187 
Area (Sq Mi) 10.13 25.25 20.09 
Pop Den (Pop / Sq Mi) 2,992 1,266 761 
Home Den (Homes / Sq Mi) 1,385 514 308 
Avg Income 
(Income/Household) $64,887 $61,881 $131,630 
Average Home Value $158,996 $141,649 $318,379 
Tax Rate $0.10/ $100 $0.10/$100 $0.10/ $100 
Source: Lyndon, Jefferson and Harrods Creek Fire Oepartments, 2009. 
Lyndon was the smallest fire districts of the three, with a total area of 10.1 
sq. mi., refer to Table 32. Jeffersontown was the largest fire district at 25 sq. mi., 
while Harrods Creek had an area of 20 sq. mi.. Lyndon had the shortest average 
response time at 3:28, while Harrods Creek had the greatest average response 
time at 5:45. 
Both the Lyndon and Harrods Creek Fire Oepartments have two fire 
stations, and Jeffersontown has three fire stations. Lyndon has a total of 27 
career fire-fighters, and 15 volunteer fire-fighters. Jeffersontown has a 48 career 
fire-fighters, and five volunteers. Harrods Creek has a 35 career and 25 volunteer 
fire fighters. Harrods Creek had the greatest proportion of volunteer fire fighters 
at 42 percent, while Jeffersontown had the lowest proportion of volunteer fire 
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fighters at 9 percent. Jeffersontown had a budget of $4.7 million, the highest of 
the 3. Lyndon had a budget of $2.8 million and Harrods Creek had a budget of 
$2.5 million. On a per capita basis for expenditure Harrods Creek had the highest 
dollar amount at $167 per individual in the fire district, while Jeffersontown was 
$148 and Lyndon was $94 per individual. Lyndon and Harrods Creek both had 
ISO ratings of 3, while Jeffersontown had multiple ratings. The actually city of 
Jeffersontown has a rating of 2, while outside of the city boundaries has a ISO 
rating of 3, and some parts of the fire district have an ISO rating of 9, which 
means that in those particular areas homes are at least 1000 feet away from a 
fire hydrant. Lyndon has five vehicles in total, while both Jeffersontown and 
Harrods Creek both have six vehicles. Lyndon had 2,172 runs in total and 2,007 
were non-fire runs. This includes medical, false alarms, Haz Mat, Other 
Hazardous Calls, and mutual-aid calls. There were about 105 fire calls in total for 
Lyndon. Jeffersontown had a total of 1,640 runs and Harrods Creek had a total of 
556 runs. 
Jeffersontown had the largest population at approximately 32,000 people 
while Lyndon had approximately 30,000 people. Harrods Creek had the smallest 
population at roughly 15,000 people. Lyndon had the highest population density 
at nearly 3,000 people per sq. mile. Jeffersontown had a much lower population 
density then Lyndon and was approximately 1,260 people per sq. mile. Harrods 
Creek had the lowest population density among the three, at around 760 people 
per sq. mile. Lyndon had the greatest number of homes, at around 14,000 while 
Jeffersontown had 13,000 homes and Harrods Creek had the fewest number of 
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homes at about 6,200. Similar to population density, home density was the 
highest in Lyndon at about 1,400 homes per sq. mile. Jeffersontown had a much 
lower home density at about 500 homes per sq. mil. and Harrods Creek had the 
lowest home density at approximately 300 homes per sq. mi.. Both average 
home values, and house hold income were the highest in Harrods Creek. Home 
values were around $320,000, while household income was about $130,000. 
Jeffersontown had both the lowest average home values and household income. 
Home values were around $140,000 and household income was about $62,000. 
The first question asked of the Fire Chiefs was "What is the most 
influencing factor-(s) on fire department response times?" The Lyndon fire chief 
believed that man power, was the most important factor in determining response 
time, especially the number of staff in quarters and manning an apparatus. Other 
factors that the Lyndon fire chief thought were important were infrastructure, 
mainly the road system, and unknown factors such as rail crossings, weather, 
downed trees and power lines, flooding, and construction. According to the 
Jeffersontown fire chief, time of day was a major factor that influences response 
time because of traffic conditions, and whether or not the fire fighters were awake 
(because of 24-hour shifts). The Jeffersontown fire chief also thought that other 
important factors were the environmental aspects of the district such as the 
topography and geography of the area, and weather conditions. The Harrods 
Creek fire chief said that resources and man power where the most significant 
factors that influence response times; however, other factors such as geography, 
the placement of stations, and traffic conditions were also important factors to 
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consider. There were several common responses among the three fire chiefs on 
the factors that influenced response times, mainly staffing, traffic conditions and 
geography. There were no surprises with the fire chief's responses as they were 
areas that were covered during the literature review. 
Question 2 asked if "the allocation of resources such as personnel, 
vehicles, stations, etc. has an impact on response times". The response of the 
Lyndon Fire Chief was that the allocation of resource has the greatest impact on 
response times. The positioning of resources is critical, and strategic planning is 
of utmost importance especially for future growth. Deciding how equipment 
should be manned and where they should be placed is important. The level of 
staffing is not necessarily that important, but how many staff are in quarters and 
on duty is very important. If the department relies more heavily on volunteer staff 
rather than full-time staff then response times will suffer. The Jeffersontown Fire 
Chief also believed that the allocation of resources was equally important in 
determining of response times. Resources should be distributed based on two 
factors, demographics and whoever has the greatest need. The Harrods Creek 
fire chief also believed that the allocation of resource was one of most influencing 
factors of response times. The problem is that sometimes when new growth at 
the edge of the district occurs, new developments are far away from the current 
stations, and fire departments do not have the resource to build a new station 
around the new growth and response times will be affected. The distribution of 
resources was important to all three fire chiefs in determining response times. 
There were also a few other important factors that were identified such as 
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response times suffering at new housing developments and that resources 
should be distributed based on demographics and need. It was important that 
this chief mentioned that resources should be distributed based on need and 
demographics and not solely based on a population, as this would lead to 
disparities. 
Question 3 was "Would you say that in certain cities that lower-income 
areas are disadvantaged with respect to response times?" The answers to this 
question by all three fire chiefs were unanimous, and it was of no surprise. All 
three believed that lower SES areas should not be disadvantaged with response 
times, and in fact, lower-income areas should actually have better response 
times. The Lyndon Fire Chief believed that lower income areas within inner cities 
have full time staff, and the infrastructure hasn't changed and therefore stations 
are in place and manned. However, the Lyndon chief believed that economic 
factors could very likely affect this. Stations could be closed down in an 
economically depressed area, and this would most certainly affect response 
times as they would have to be served by another station or district. The Lyndon 
fire chief pointed out this was currently going on in the Louisville Metro Fire 
District, a station was recently lost because of the city's bad economic situation. 
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that although fire follows poverty, that 
response times should not be worse off in lower-income areas. Resources are 
distributed on who needs and therefore people in higher poverty areas should 
have more resources so they shouldn't be disadvantaged with regards to 
response times. The Harrods Creek fire chief also had a similar opinion that 
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resources are distributed based on demand and that lower income areas should 
not be disadvantaged. Lower income areas have a greater demand for services 
so more resource will be placed in those areas and should consequently have 
better response times. If low income areas were disadvantaged, I don't believe 
that these chiefs would actually admit this because this question has serious 
implications for equity and it is such a sensitive subject. 
Question 4 was the opposite of question 3 and was "Would you say that in 
certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have better response 
times". Similar to the answers to the previous question, the responses were 
unanimous, and because in the previous question all three indicated that 
resources are distributed based on need, that wealthier areas should in fact have 
greater response times. The Lyndon Fire Chief didn't think that areas with higher 
cost housing should have better response times, but they should actually have 
worse off response times because big homes are on bigger parcels of land, and 
the homes are spread farther apart and stations are also spread farther apart so 
fire trucks should actually take a longer time in getting to the wealthier homes. 
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief also did not believe that areas with wealthier 
homes would have better response times. If it were the case that the wealthier 
area had better response time than it might have something to do with the 
funding levels. This was an interesting qualifying statement that was made that if 
wealthier areas did have better response times that it was strictly related to 
higher levels of funding. The lower socio-economic status area might have lower 
levels of funding than a wealthier area and might have to rely on volunteers 
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which would increase response times. The fire chief from Harrods Creek also did 
not think that areas with higher cost housing should not have better response 
times. However, the Harrods Creek Fire Chief made the same qualifying 
statement that the Jeffersontown chief said, that if response times in wealthier 
areas were better than it would most certainly have to do with levels of funding. 
Certain areas may have better funding so they can afford more staffing, better 
equipment and could as a result have better response times. The Harrods Creek 
fire chief also thought that if an area that had the wealthier homes were in was a 
smaller independent fire department then perhaps they could have better 
response times. The Harrods Creek fire chief thought that smaller fire 
departments were more efficient especially when it comes to management and 
can readily make changes more easily than a larger fire department when a 
problem is found like response times and address the issue. 
Question 5 examines the fire chief's opinions on rates of property taxation 
and its affect on response times. The question was "Would you say that in certain 
cities with higher rates of property taxes would fire departments have better 
response times". There seems to be some level of consensus about this question 
between the three chiefs. The Lyndon fire chief believed if there were high rates 
of taxation then a department would be able to afford having full time staff, rather 
than relying upon volunteers and also having better equipment and stations 
which would lead to better response times. The Jeffersontown Department Chief 
also believed that a higher rate of taxation would lead to better response times, if 
there were greater funding which would be used for more resources. However, 
118 
total funding depends on the population density of the fire district. The greater the 
density of the fire district the greater the amount of funding that is available. The 
Harrods Creek fire chief also believed that a higher rate of property taxation 
would lead to better response times because of more staffing. Louisville-
Jefferson County Suburban fire districts have a rate of $0.10 per $100 of real 
property (home and vehicle). The Harrods Creek fire chief pointed out that other 
areas such as Indianapolis have property tax rates of $0.24 - $0.38 per $100 of 
real property and Cincinnati has a rate of $0.17 per $100. The suburban fire 
protection districts in Louisville have to do with less funding, when compared to 
other similar cities. After several questions it is very apparent that funding is of 
utmost importance. This question was related to funding and in the previous 
questions issue of funding arose and the point was made very clear that higher 
levels of funding for an area would lead to better response time and this could be 
the potential reason for why higher SES areas could potentially have better 
response times .. 
The next three questions were about the specific results from the equity 
portion of the quantitative analysis. Question 6 asked why "in certain cities lower-
income areas were disadvantaged with respect to response times ...... Would you 
have any possible explanations for this?" All three fire chiefs were somewhat 
surprised with these results, and did not think that it would be possible for lower 
SES areas to be disadvantaged with response times. The Lyndon fire chief 
thought that in certain areas, especially that were economically challenged, may 
have closed down fire stations as a measure of cost-cutting and this would most 
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likely affect response times. The Lyndon Chief believes that in economically 
difficult times local governments resort to shutting down stations and 
consolidating them which will result in response times going up. 
The Lyndon chief also mentioned that a proposition in California closed 
several fire stations which may have impacted response times in that state. Other 
factors that will influence response times include a change in the infrastructure, 
plant closures and urban development that results in traffic change. The 
Jeffersontown Fire Chief believed that areas with higher density and in poverty 
have a greater need for resources, because fire follows poverty. These areas 
should have more resources according to the Jeffersontown Fire Chief, however 
If stations are busy responding to calls fire engines from other locations may 
have to be brought in, which will increase response times. The Harrods Creek 
fire department found the result to be surprising and counterintuitive because 
low- income areas should have a higher volume of calls, and therefore more 
resources which should lead to better response times. The explanations that 
were provided in my opinion were not sufficient and give the impression of an 
excuse. If the reason why some lower SES areas are disadvantaged with 
response times is because of funding and resources this would indicate that fire 
provision is not distributed based on need. Areas that have the highest need 
should not have station closures as this would jeopardize people within those 
areas. 
Question 7 was similar to question 6 and asked for explanations of why "in 
certain cities would fire districts with higher cost housing have better response 
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times". The response to this question was somewhat similar to the previous 
question and the fire chiefs were again surprised by the results. Similar rational 
as the previous question was used by two of the chiefs, who said wealthier areas 
could potentially have greater funding which would allow for the acquisition of 
greater resource and staffing which would all lead to lower response times. 
The Lyndon Fire Chief said that he could only speak of his experience 
from his fire district, and didn't know why in those cities results would end up the 
way that they did. In Louisville-Jefferson County more affluent areas are served 
by independent fire departments rather than one big fire department and funding 
that is raised for fire is only spent on fire which is more efficient, where in other 
cities that might not be the case and fire departments might have to fight for 
funding from a city's general fund. The Lyndon Fire Chief also believed that 
some wealthier areas would also have greater funding which would lead to more 
staffing and resources which would lead to lower response times. The 
Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that areas with more density, usually lower income 
areas, will have more demand for services so greater demand could put a strain 
on services which would increase response times. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief 
believed that there could be some political reasons for areas with higher-cost 
housing having better response times. Perhaps there could be some people with 
political power living in areas where services are improved because a certain 
politician lives in that area. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief gave the example of a 
fire district in Jefferson County where they brought in an ambulance because of a 
city councilor who had experienced a heart attack. The ambulance was kept in 
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the district for several years, however, the cost was too great to keep it there. 
The Harrods Creek Fire Chief gave the example of his district that has very 
expensive housing; however they lack the population density to support having 
additional resources so they don't have better response times when compared to 
other areas with lower cost housing. 
Question 8 examined why it was found that "the higher the rate of property 
taxes, the worse the response time?" All three Chiefs gave explanations, some of 
which were related to one another as to why some areas would have higher rates 
of taxes, but worse off response times. Mainly that poor areas may not be able to 
achieve similar levels of fudging with the same tax rate when compared with an 
affluent district or area. The Lyndon fire chief thought that the area with the 
higher rates of taxation could be in an economically depressed area, which is a 
plausible explanation. These impoverished areas would need higher rates of 
taxation to get similar response times or staffing levels as other areas that were 
not economically depressed. The Lyndon fire chief gave the example of the Black 
Mud Fire Protection District in Jefferson County. He said that this was an indigent 
fire district and several years ago they were collecting taxes at a rate of $0.10 per 
$100 of real property, while Lyndon was collecting taxes at the rate of $0.06 per 
$100 of real property. The district was eventually absorbed by another fire district 
because they were unable to provide adequate services to their residents. 
The Lyndon Fire Chief also mentioned that the urban tax rate in Louisville 
was higher than the suburban tax rate and that the urban response time was 
most likely not the fastest. In fact, Lyndon has the fastest average response time 
122 
in the Louisville-Jefferson County at 3:28, while Louisville Metro has an average 
response time of 3:45. Districts outside of the Louisville urban service district 
have more money and can afford more stations and have smaller service areas. 
The Lyndon fire chief also said that "smaller fire departments do everything the 
same as large departments, but do it with fewer people which means lower costs. 
Unions don't like that, and Louisville has a good union." The Harrods Creek Fire 
chief also mentioned the Louisville fire fighters union. He said that Louisville 
annexed the Oxmoor area but did not provide additional resources to this area. 
No new stations were built out in the Oxmoor area by the Louisville Urban Fire 
department. The union contract also prohibited any suburban fire departments 
from responding to an urban district and so he felt as if this was taxation without 
representation. He thought that this would increase response times in that 
particular area, and they also would have the higher tax rates of the urban 
service district, which are around $0.22 to $0.25 per $100 of real property. 
Similar to the Lyndon Fire Chief, the Harrods Creek Fire Chief also 
believed that poor areas would have to compensate for not being able to collect 
enough tax revenue from their residents so higher tax rates would be required. 
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief believed that question about taxing rates and 
response times has to do with how the fire departments and districts are funded. 
He said that the Jeffersontown Fire Protection District has its own taxing authority 
for the fire department and that the funds only come from Jeffersontown, while 
Louisville funds the fire department from the general fund and funds come from 
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all of Jefferson County. He also mentioned that Louisville has different taxing 
sources that go into the general fund pool, such as the employment tax. 
The next series of questions deal with the spatial and sprawl component 
of the study. The questions asked each of the fire chiefs what they believed had 
the biggest impact in slowing down their response times from the following seven 
options including: commuting times, vehicle ownership, population density, length 
of the block, divert of land use, distance from the center of the city, and 
proportion of detached housing. Each of the fire chiefs gave a different answer 
on which affected his fire district the most and this depended on where each of 
the fire stations was located within the county such as urban, urban/suburban, 
and completely suburban. It makes sense that each different area would be 
faced with different challenges that are brought on by urban sprawl, and that not 
each area would have a similar problem. The Lyndon Fire Chief selected 
commuting time as having the largest impact on response times in his district. He 
said that almost every factor is planned for except for traffic conditions and that 
traffic patterns and the time of day have a huge impact on response times. The 
Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that distance from the center of the city had the 
largest impact on response times in his district. He said that there was a 
considerable amount of new development at the edge of his fire district and no 
new fire stations had been built around the new developments at the edge of the 
county and district. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief said that they were most 
affected by population density, or a lack of it. The Chief said that the low density 
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within the fire district limits the departments funding, which affects staffing and 
resources and impacts response times. 
Question 10 examines the role of commuting and the impact of traffic on 
response times for each of the fire districts and asks the chiefs for suggestions 
on how to deal with issue. Two of chiefs, one from the urban and the other from 
the urban/suburban mix fire districts thought that traffic was a major impediment 
to their department in responding to an emergency. Lyndon was greatly affected 
by traffic and commuting. The Lyndon Chief said that all the suburban fire 
districts came together and implemented a policy of having the closest station 
respond to a fire, regardless of the fire district and political boundary. Their GIS 
dispatching system would take into account time of day and other factors before 
dispatching a certain department to a fire. However, the union for the Louisville 
Fire department prevents other districts from responding to fires within the 
Louisville fire district unless a certain level of alarm is hit or they call and ask for 
assistance. According to the Lyndon fire chief, one of the main reasons for this 
program being implemented was because of traffic congestion in certain fire 
districts which made it very difficult to respond to fires especially around 
rush-hour times. Fire chiefs will usually ask developers for multiple access points 
into developments and industrial parks, however the developers will argue that 
building additional roads will cost too much. 
The Jeffersontown fire district also has a problem with traffic and 
responding to emergencies at certain times of the day. The Jeffersontown chief 
gave an example of the industrial park within his district that has 30,000 people 
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working in it. The chief said that this industrial park only has one way in and one 
way out, and when an emergency occurs at rush-hour time when people are 
either leaving or coming to work it creates a major problem for the fire 
department in responding to an emergency. A major problem is not the amount 
of congestion, but the congestion outpacing the ability of the infrastructure to 
handle increased traffic. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief agreed that traffic 
conditions and commuting was a problem for responding to emergencies, 
however, because Harrods Creek was so sparsely populated that traffic was not 
a major concern for his district. The Harrods Creek Chief suggested that having 
more stations spread out around the district and staff would help reduce 
problems associated with traffic conditions. 
Question 11 examined the length of street blocks and their impact on 
response times. Two of the three chiefs had problems with this issue of their fire 
department being affected by street connectivity. The Lyndon fire chief said that 
Lyndon was not really affected by the length of street blocks (street segment) 
because they were based on a grid system and that there was good street 
connectivity within Lyndon. This would be expected in any major urban area as 
having smaller street blocks and great access. According to the Lyndon Fire 
Chief connectivity is very important for fire departments as fire fighters need 
multiple access points to get to specific locations for quick response. This was 
also an important point for the Jeffersontown fire chief as connectivity is a major 
problem. Short blocks are easy to navigate but large ones are not, and 
sometimes fire fighters get lost responding to an emergency, and if the block is 
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very large then the fire trucks will have to take a greater amount of time to get 
around the block again to respond to the emergency. This is an important point 
that the Jeffersontown Chief conceded, that on occasion fire fighters do get lost 
and make mistakes which can potentially contributed to greater response times, 
which the shape of the landscape will affect. The Harrods Creek Fire district was 
also affected by block length. The chief said that the homes in this Harrods Creek 
fire district are spaced far apart on long winding roads and long driveways 
sometimes with gates and trees that doesn't allow for the passage of fire vehicles 
that makes it very difficult to get to some emergenCies quickly 
The last question of the survey asked if response times ever affected 
policies of fire departments or cities in any way. All three fire chiefs said yes to 
this question, that response times will affect policies and cities. The Lyndon Fire 
Chief said that response times will tell you when another station is needed, or 
when more resources are needed. The Lyndon fire chief pointed to the example 
of the policy to share resources between the suburban fire departments 
regardless of political boundary as a prime example of how response times affect 
fire department policies. The Jeffersontown fire chief said that response times will 
tell you where resources need to be assigned and whether or not a new station 
needs to built or a station needs to be expanded and renovated. The 
Jeffersontown Chief also said that sometimes fire department policies are 
influenced not by wanting better protection and reducing response times, but by 
keeping insurance rates down for businesses. The city and the economic 
development people will approach fire departments and tell them that they need 
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to build a fire station in close proximity to a new commercial development. 
Developments need to be within 5 mi. of a fire station to get good ISO ratings. 
The city and the developers tell the fire department that without the good ISO 
ratings, businesses will not come to the new developments. So instead of placing 
the station where it is truly needed, stations will be placed in locations that will 
lower insurance rates for businesses. This is a common practice of the 
development community and the fire department. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief 
gave an example of how response times affected policy. He said that in an 
adjacent fire district an influential person had died and the fire department had no 
ambulance at the time. Due to the death of this prominent individual an 
ambulance was placed in this fire district. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief believed 
that response times will influence how resources are distributed and 
administered within a fire district. 
In summation this section was significant that all the chiefs believed that 
resources were disseminated on need and not potential loss. None of the chiefs 
believed that the lower SES areas should be disadvantaged with response times. 
When the results of the study were revealed to the chiefs that in certain cities the 
lower SES areas were disadvantaged and conversely the wealthy were 
advantaged, they were all surprised. Levels of funding were used as the main 
rationale by the chiefs to explain why these possible consequences could have 
come about. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Discussion 
Equality 
"All Americans, white or black, rich or poor, are entitled to equal 
protection" (Bullard, 2002:7). Based on the findings within this study, this does 
not seem to be the case as poor minorities are worse off than their wealthier 
white counterparts depending on what city they live in and what part of the city 
they come from. These findings partly confirm the hypotheses, while some of the 
other findings may create more questions. The first major finding is that response 
times did vary by the socio-economic status (SES) of the people in the fire 
district. Outcome of the analyses signified that the results varied by the city and 
within the cities themselves. These findings would confirm and be in line with 
findings of Duncombe (1991), Rich (1982), Peterson (1981) and Drier et al. 
(2004) which indicated that services do vary across and between communities 
and that service provision is not equal. Several of the statistical models 
confirmed the hypothesis that response times did vary by the SES of the fire 
district, and more specifically, that the poor and minority populations were worse 
off with respect to response times, while the wealthy were better off in some 
cities. Based on these results fire protection resources are not distributed based 
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on need, contrary to what the fire chiefs said in the qualitative section, but rather 
on potential loss, which is inequitable. If the main reason for this discrepancy is 
because of funding, as identified as one of the potential reasons by the fire 
chiefs, then shouldn't areas with greater need have greater funding? 
The first model to indicate that response times did vary by the SES of the 
fire districts population was the nonwhite model. Nonwhites were disadvantaged 
with respect to response times when area, expenditure, and population density 
were controlled for in Houston, San Francisco and Miami. The opposite was true 
for nonwhites in Louisville, Seattle and St. Paul. The second model to indicate 
that response times did vary by SES was the model that examined people living 
in poverty. Those living below the poverty level in Houston, Miami and San 
Francisco were worse off than people who were not living in poverty with respect 
to response times, which is inequitable. 
These findings are consistent with a study that was conducted by 
Southwick and Butler (1985) which found that poverty and higher density was 
consistently linked with fire loss in larger cities. Houston is most likely affected 
by poverty, while San Francisco by density. Once again, the reverse was true for 
people living in poverty in Louisville, Seattle and St. Paul as response times were 
more favorable in the areas with higher poverty when compared to areas that 
had fewer people who were not living in poverty. The housing tenure model also 
indicated that response times varied by the SES of its population. Areas with 
greater concentration of home-owners in Houston and Seattle had more 
favorable response times when compared to areas in those cities with fewer 
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home owners. Areas with higher concentrations of homeowners are usually white 
and are able to organize and mobilize when concerns arise at the neighborhood 
level and home owners can demand that action be taken, such as lobbying for 
greater fire protection (Bullard, 2000). Areas with higher concentrations of home 
owners in Louisville, San Francisco, and Miami had worse response times when 
compared to areas with lower concentrations of homeowners. 
The home value model was able to demonstrate that response times 
varied by the average price of a home within a fire district. Fire districts with 
higher home values in Houston and Seattle had more favorable response times 
when compared to fire districts with lower home values. The opposite was true 
for Louisville, San Francisco and Miami as areas with higher home values had 
response times that were not favorable. Fire districts with higher rates of property 
taxation were worse off for response times in Houston, San Francisco and Miami. 
The statistical model which looked at high income households and response 
times also signified that results varied by the SES and were inequitable as 
households that earned greater than $75,000 in Houston and Miami where better 
off with respect to response times. The reverse was true in Louisville, Portland 
and Seattle and households who earned more than $75,000 where worse off for 
response times. 
The results indicate that people in lower SES groups have poorer 
response times (when controlling for several factors) in some cities and better off 
in others. People in lower SES groups were worse off in cities like Houston, San 
Francisco and Miami, but they were better off in cities like Louisville and Seattle. 
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There are possible explanations of why people of lower SES where worse off in 
certain cities like Houston, Miami, and San Francisco while they fared better in 
cities like Louisville or Seattle. One of the more obvious explanation is size of the 
cities that were compared as Houston, Miami and San Francisco where much 
larger than Louisville or Seattle. Houston is the fourth largest city in the country. 
Related to this is the proportion of minorities and people living in poverty are 
much higher in cities like Houston and Miami when compared to Louisville and 
Seattle. Approximately 50 percent of the population in both Miami and Houston 
were nonwhite and close to 19 percent of population was living below the poverty 
level. The proportion of nonwhites was much lower in Louisville with 19 percent 
of the population being nonwhite, and 32 percent for Seattle. The levels of 
poverty were also much lower in both Seattle and Louisville, with 8 percent of the 
population living in poverty in Louisville and 13 percent of the population in 
Seattle was living in Poverty. San Francisco also had higher proportion of 
nonwhites, however, the level of poverty was much lower than Houston and 
Miami. 
Based on the maps it is evident that nonwhites and people living below the 
poverty level were concentrated in Houston, Louisville, Seattle, and Miami. 
Powell (2002) explains that when poverty and the social problems that are 
associated with poverty are concentrated within inner cities that the problems are 
isolated on the "minority" side of the city boundary, and that suburban whites are 
spared from having to share the fiscal and social burdens associated with the 
problems of the inner city. Drier et al. (2004) have identified many social and 
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economic disparities between inner cities and suburbs. Houston is one city that 
demonstrates many of these disparities that these authors discuss. Houston is a 
city that has pursued a policy of low taxes and low public services (Savitich and 
Kantor 2002). The existence of neighborhoods with unique service needs, such 
as greater fire protection, creates the potential for inequitable service delivery 
(Rich, 1978). Inner city neighborhoods are unique and require greater fire 
protection services. This is one reason why minorities fared worst in Houston. 
During the interview in the qualitative section one of the chiefs said that it was 
most likely that the low-income areas faced station closings as possible rationale 
of why minorities experienced worse conditions with respect to response times in 
cities such as Houston and Miami. If this was the case that a lower SES area 
with greater need for services experienced a station closures, then this would be 
a clear example of inequality. With some further investigation it was found that 
the Houston Fire Department closed three fire stations within the last decade. 
Two of the three fire stations were located within the fire district with the CBD that 
was among the lowest for housing values within Houston and had the highest 
proportion of minorities and people living in poverty. Stations closures could also 
related to declining populations within an area, and because these closures 
occurred in the downtown section of Houston it is plausible that the area 
experienced a declining population. Louisville also has recently shut down a 
station within its urban fire district close to south-west Louisville near the CBD. 
All the fire chiefs said that response times would go up as a result because crews 
have to come from farther distances to respond to an emergency. According to 
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the Louisville daily paper, The Courier-Journal, by shutting down the station the 
city will save approximately $500,000 and will reassign 12 fire-fighters. 
High-income households were better off in Houston and Miami which is 
inequitable because it means these groups do have the same level of need as 
low income groups. High income households were worse off in Louisville, 
Portland and Seattle. Lower-income fire districts utilize fire services more than 
affluent areas. If there is a greater need for fire services in these districts than fire 
crews stationed in the lower-income areas and their services will be will be used 
more often and crews might have to sent in from other areas to compensate for 
the greater volume of work. However, according to all three fire chiefs in 
Louisville-Jefferson County resources are disseminated based on need, so, in 
fact, these lower-income areas should have greater resources and poor people 
should have shorter response times, but this is not what is actually occurring in 
Houston in Miami which indicates inequality in these cities. It seems as if 
resources were distributed based on need in Louisville and to a lesser extent in 
Seattle as areas with lower SES had better response times. In every model 
people in the lower socio-economic status groups fared better with respect to 
response times in Louisville when compared to people in the higher socio 
economic groups. The same was generally true for Seattle, except for in the 
model with home values, which demonstrated that the higher the costs of 
housing within the fire district the lower the response time. This would seem to be 
in line with Lineberry's findings (1977) that the poor are not worse off, at least in 
Louisville. These findings from Louisville and Seattle would confirm what the fire 
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chiefs said in the qualitative interviews, that resources are distributed on need 
because people in the lower socioeconomic status groups did better with 
response times as a measure of service. However one fact that contradicts this 
finding is that during the qualitative interviews it came out that the economic 
development people in Louisville put pressure upon the fire departments to build 
fire stations near new commercial developments for the purpose of achieving 
lower insurance rates. If new fire stations are not placed in these locations then 
the fire chiefs are warned that businesses will not locate in these developments. 
If this is the case that resources and services are not always distributed based on 
need but rather on potential loss. This would confirm the findings and results 
from previous studies of Lucy (1981), Cingranelli (1981), and Sanger (1982). 
Sprawl 
The second major finding of this dissertation is that urban sprawl does 
affect response times and that it does endanger people. However the findings 
depend on the city. Sprawl factors increased response times which put people's 
lives at risk in Houston, Miami and San Francisco, which were in line with my 
hypothesis. However, San Francisco is not considered a sprawled city and is 
actually a very dense and compact city and the linear relationships could be as a 
result of the high density of the city. Sprawl did not seem to hinder fire response 
in Louisville and Seattle, and in fact, the opposite may have occurred which is 
counter intuitive. The sprawl factors that had the greatest influence on response 
times were commuting times, population per street mile, the length of the street 
segment and the number of vehicles per household. Other sprawl factors also 
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affected response times to a lesser degree. In the qualitative section it was 
identified that fire districts, depending on where they are located will be impacted 
by sprawl factors in different ways. For example traffic and congestion was the 
biggest problem for the Lyndon (urban) fire district, which is an applicable finding 
to San Francisco's results. However, Lyndon did not have problems with 
connectivity as there street system is based on a grid and they have smaller 
street block, which would also apply to San Francisco. 
Areas with detached housing had higher response times in general, 
however when cities where examined on an individual basis the results were 
surprising. In both Houston and Miami the higher the proportion of detached 
housing, the lower the response time which would indicate that inner city areas 
with fewer single family detached homes have longer response times. This is the 
goal of fire codes that discourage multifamily dwellings in favor of single 
detached homes that fire response will be able to maneuver more efficiently in 
areas with less density. The findings from this model for Houston and Miami are 
in line with the other findings from the equity models as areas that are usually far 
away from the inner city have a higher proportion of detached housing and in 
Houston these results are favorable towards those who live in detached housing. 
In Louisville, Portland and Seattle the higher the proportion of detached housing 
the higher the response time. These findings are not favorable towards people 
who live in detached housing. 
The impact of commuting times, congestion and automobile ownership on 
response times in Houston, Miami and San Francisco was no surprise and are 
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very clear. These factors were all identified as problems by the fire chiefs within 
the qualitative analysis. These factors are dangerous to peoples lives, because 
they increase response times. Commuting times in Houston, San Francisco and 
Miami negatively affected response times, while the opposite was true for 
Louisville and Seattle which was somewhat unexpected. Vehicle ownership in 
both Houston and Miami also negatively affected response times. Population per 
street mile, a proxy measure for congestion, negatively affected response times 
in Houston, San Francisco and Miami. The opposite was true for Louisville and 
Seattle and the higher the population per street mile the lower the response 
times. 
The worsening traffic conditions within the suburbs have been as a result 
of a rapid increase in population, vehicle ownership, and vehicle usage within 
these sprawled areas (Burchell et aI., 2005) Traffic conditions have a major 
impact on how fire departments respond to emergencies. Fire departments 
respond to traffic accidents, and if there are a considerable amount of accidents 
this will prevent the fire department from responding to fire emergencies in a 
decent time, which puts people's lives in jeopardy. Traffic of an entire community 
may solely rely on a single road and this may entirely be the case in suburban 
regions and as a result may be congested for a great portions of the day, and if 
an accident occurs, the entire road system is baSically useless until the problem 
is cleared (Duany et al.,2000). Sprawl has also made traffic conditions worse 
because of the combination of longer trips, and a higher proportion of people 
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using private automobiles results in greater miles driven on the roadways 
(Burchell et aI., 2005). 
The fire chiefs in the qualitative analysis stressed that traffic had a major 
impact on response. During certain times of the day responding to emergencies 
becomes increasingly difficult because of grid lock on the roadways. This is 
especially the case in Houston, where response times where greatly affected by 
commuting and congestion. Houston is city that is known for sprawl and has a 
combination of low-density living and an absence of mass transportation system 
which has brought traffic congestion to the point of suffocation (Savitch and 
Kantor, 2002).Louisville was one of the smaller cities in this study, and although 
in the regression results it does not seem to be affected by commuting, it still 
faces problems with traffic congestion as pointed out during the qualitative 
section. Based on a study that was conducted by the Brookings Institute (2002) 
on Louisville, the percentage of the congested lane miles in the region increased 
from 36 percent to 55 percent between 1990 and 2000. This rise in congestion 
according to the study poses a serious threat to the quality of life. 
Based on the findings from the spatial analysis, commuting times where 
still the highest in the suburban regions on each 4 cities that were examined, and 
the lowest towards the center of the city. The traditional pattern of commuting 
has been that people from the suburban neighborhoods commute to the CBD to 
their place of employment. Although many jobs are still located within the CBD, 
some people may no longer work in the downtown core, as many places of 
employment have scattered throughout the metropolitan area. Suburban areas 
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are home to many new office parks and small downtowns that located at major 
intersections at the edges of cities (Jargowsky, 2002). People may now travel 
from one suburban location where they live to another suburban location where 
their place of employment is located. According to Jargowsky (2002) when 
companies decide to locate within suburban regions, this creates a spatial 
mismatch, and people located within the urban core, especially the 
underprivileged are unable for various reasons to get to those particular jobs. 
This could also be another reason for the lower commuting within the downtown 
core. 
There were some interesting results from the length of the street segment, 
proportion of the population within 1 mile of an elementary school and the 
distance from the CBD. The length of the street segment was a proxy measure 
for the size of the block. The results demonstrated that the length of the street 
segment affected response times. In the general model for the length of the 
street segment the longer the length of the street segment the longer the 
response times. The results with the individual cities are more interesting as 
findings indicate that the longer the length of the street segment in Houston, San 
Francisco and Miami the longer the response time, while the opposite is true for 
Louisville and Seattle the longer the length of the street segment the lower the 
response time. The general model for land use was measured through a proxy 
variable which measured the percentage of the population living within 1 mile of 
an elementary school. The results indicate that the higher the proportion of the 
population living within 1 mile of an elementary school the lower the response 
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time. However the model which includes the cities was unable to find any 
relationships. 
There were some positive associations with the distance of the fire district 
from the CBD and response times that indicated that the farther away the fire 
district was from the CBD, the higher the response time. In model which stratified 
that data by cities it was found that in Houston, San Francisco, and Miami the 
further the distance from the CBD the higher the response time. In the qualitative 
section the Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that distance from the center of the city 
was a big problem for his fire district. A considerable amount of new development 
had occurred at the fringes of the Jeffersontown district and these new 
developments were very far from the existing fire stations that were located 
within the older areas of the district, and no new stations had been built to 
accommodate this development so response times at these suburban locations 
had suffered. Sprawled developments challenge public safety because the long 
distances and single-entry subdivisions make it difficult to provide adequate 
services with reasonable response times (Duany et aI., 2000). These new 
development at the fringes of cities such as Houston or Miami might not have fire 
hydrants in close proximity so tanker trucks need to be used to provide water 
supply for fighting a fire which will take additional time for the vehicle to arrive on 
scene. In the qualitative section it was identified that some locations in the 
Jeffersontown Fire District are located at the fringe of the county and have an 
ISO rating of 9, which indicates that homes are at least 1,000 feet away from a 
fire hydrant and this could be why in Houston and Miami the farther away from 
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the CBD, the higher the response times, Water supply and fire hydrants should 
not be a problem in San Francisco as the city has established a wide network of 
cisterns, pump stations, and a pipe network to provide water for fire department 
as the city learned a tough lesson from the 1906 earth quake as the main 
problem was a lack of water to fight the fire that resulted after the earth quake 
(Scawthorn, Yamada, and Lemura, 2007), 
Are Sprawl and Equity Related? 
The findings regarding the sprawl factors were expected, that sprawl 
would at least in some cities endanger people because of its effects on 
lengthening response times, However, these findings seem somewhat 
contradictory at a first glance as one might expect that if sprawl would negatively 
affect response times, then areas that have higher concentrations of people in 
lower socio-economic classes, who are usually concentrated within the inner 
cities should have better response times, yet the opposite was true in Houston, 
Miami and San Francisco, Some might say, so what why does it matter that that 
people who live in sprawled areas have longer fire department response times, 
that these people can "afford" to have longer response times, 
However, based on the results from the analysis of this study, I argue that 
not only are people who are living in sprawled areas affected by greater 
response times, but people who are living in the inner cities are also affected by 
this, Communities that are sprawled have spread their resources too thin and 
both groups of people who live in the inner cities and people who live in sprawled 
developments are negatively affected when it comes to service provision, Drier, 
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et al (2004) identify when people try to maximize their personal well-being by 
living in sprawled suburban developments their choices create social costs that 
affect everybody, even the wealthy. Duanay et al. (2000) discuss a study of 
suburban Milwaukee where the residents pay $5,000 in property taxes, but 
services cost the city more than $10,000 on an annual basis. Sprawled 
developments usually require greater funding for fire protection because the 
costs for providing equipment increases as new homes that require protection 
are in outlying areas that do not have adequate water supply so fire departments 
may have to spend $200,000 for tankers that provide water in remote locations 
(Livingston, Ridlington, and Baker, 2003). Livingston et al. (2003) were able to 
demonstrate that a community of 50,000 developed at one home per 1.6 acres 
would need approximately eight fire stations to provide adequate services, for a 
total cost of $12 million, however by developing more compactly the same 
population could be served by 4 or 5 stations for a total cost of about $6-7.5 
million. Cities need to make up the balance of this cost discrepancy somewhere. 
What ends up happening is that all residents end up paying for the services of 
those who live in suburban areas, or municipalities will provide fewer public 
services (Burchell et aI., 2005). Those who suffer the greatest from a lack of fire 
protection are not those who live in wealthy neighborhoods, but are the poor who 
live in the inner cities. The fire chief from the completely suburban fire district in 
Louisville explained that in his district there were no fires within the past 18 
months for which to respond. 
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A study conducted by Savitch, Collins, Sanders and Markham (1993) 
found that central cities and their surrounding suburbs and regions were highly 
interdependent. Furthermore Savitch et al. (1993) were able to demonstrate with 
strong statistical correlations that suburbs benefit when their core cities are 
viable. This was a study that examined economic prosperity; however, I believe 
that it could also be applied to the example from this study. Generally speaking, 
the results indicated that when the lower socio-economic groups concentrated 
within inner cities fared worse, so did the suburban areas of those cities primarily 
in Houston and Miami. When the reverse occurred and the lower socioeconomic 
groups did not fare worse in Louisville and Seattle, the suburban areas also did a 
better job at providing better fire protection to the outlying areas. 
Fire-fighters in Louisville Jefferson County get training from different 
sources than fire fighters who are trained at one unified fire department. The 
urban fire district is trained in one location and the fire fighters from the suburban 
fire district are trained at another location. Perhaps by splitting up the training, 
fire-fighters are able to focus on the needs of their particular location. Fire 
fighters for example from a fire department in Houston or Miami who work in an 
inner-city fire district might be relocated to a suburban fire district and take along 
with them the training and mentality that is prevalent within that district. 
Another explanation for the results of why sprawl did not negatively affect 
response in Louisville is the structure of fire districts and departments. Results 
indicate that sprawl did not impede the ability of fire departments to respond to 
emergencies within Louisville-Jefferson County. The results of the Louisville 
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were very different from the Houston and Miami. Seattle also had somewhat 
similar results to Louisville. The fire department system in Louisville is very 
different from the other cities. Each fire district within Louisville-Jefferson County 
has its own department, and is a separate jurisdictional entity, compared to 
Houston and Seattle which have one unified fire department and Miami which 
has a fire department for the city and another fire department for the rest of the 
county. The suburban fire departments in Jefferson County have set up a 
mutual-aid agreement that will allow during certain times of the day when traffic 
conditions are unfavorable for the nearest fire department to respond to an 
emergency regardless of the district that the emergency is located in. It appears 
as if this policy has been beneficial to suburban residents of Jefferson County as 
they are not negatively affected by sprawl. 
The results may also have something to do with the fire districts being 
independent in Louisville and being a special unit of government. Burns (1994) 
identified that these special district governments, which provide services such as 
fire provision, build exclusionary walls against lower SES groups to protect 
themselves from the taxes and problems of older cities and this would be very 
relevant to the findings for Louisville. As lower income areas within in the inner 
cities have a greater number of fires, fire protective services are utilized more 
often and therefore cost more. In the qualitative section it was identified that 
suburban residents in Jefferson County have a tax rate of $0.10 per $100 of real 
property, while the residents of urban fire district have a rate that is at least twice 
that of the suburban rate. These individuals who live in these independent fire 
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districts have their tax dollars only going to their district and the funds are strictly 
used for fire-fighting within their district. By having these independent fire districts 
wealthier people are isolating themselves from the costs of those who live in the 
urban fire district and make greater use of fire services. 
Based on the qualitative and quantitative research of this study, smaller 
fire departments (in Louisville) are more effective and efficient then one very 
large fire department. This is consistent with other findings that have found small 
and medium sized police departments perform more effectively than larger police 
departments and they are more cost efficient (Ostrom, 2000). Hirsch (1964) and 
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) also have found that services are not 
always best delivered through a one major governmental source, but through 
different governments that vary in scale and geography. This was the case for 
the fire departments in the Louisville-Jefferson County. For example, per capita 
funding for the Lyndon Fire District was $94, $148 for the Jeffersontown fire 
district and $167 for the Harrods Creek Fire District. Per capita funding in 
Houston was higher than Lyndon and Jeffersontown at $151; however, Houston 
was much lower than the other major cities. Per capita funding for Miami City 
was $211 and $253 for Miami-Dade and $313 per capita for San Francisco. Both 
Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek fire departments are fire districts that are of a 
suburban nature and therefore per capita costs are higher because similar 
services have to be provided to fewer number of residents. 
It was found in Houston, Miami and San Francisco that the higher the rate 
of property taxes, the higher the response time. One would expect the opposite 
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to occur, if greater revenue meant improved service, however, this wasn't the 
case. The fire chiefs said that greater resources and funding should reduce 
response times, however, based on the findings from this analysis this wasn't the 
case. The expenditure control variables were significant (at 95 percent or higher) 
in several models. The coefficient in every case was positive, which indicates the 
higher the per capita spending the higher the response time. At first glance this 
seems counter intuitive, however if we examine the per capita spending levels of 
Lyndon, Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek Fire Districts, the spending level 
increase per capita and response times go up. However, this is in line with my 
hypothesis that sprawled areas cost more in services and have worse response 
times. However, higher spending doesn't necessarily mean inefficient services; it 
could be that as demand for the service increase, such as fire protection, that 
governments purchase mores services, and expenditures increase (Peterson, 
1981). Residents are choosing are bundle of goods and services, in this case fire 
protection, and they have different per capita costs than the urban areas because 
of less demand for the uses of the fire protection services. 
Sprawl did not seem to affect response times in Seattle. The structure of 
the Seattle Fire Department was different from Louisville, but was similar to 
Houston's. One possible explanation for sprawl not having a major impact on 
Seattle is that Seattle is not a city that has a considerable amount of sprawl. 
According to study that was conducted by Smart Growth America, Seattle ranked 
44th out of 83 metro areas that were ranked for sprawl. Furthermore Seattle was 
ranked 63rd out of 83 for accessibility of street network. Seattle had an average 
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street segment length of 370 feet, the second lowest average in this study just 
behind San Francisco. Houston was ranked 32nd overall in the sprawl index and 
36th for accessibility of its street network. The closer the sprawl index score is to 
1, the greater the degree of sprawl. 
Based on the interviews, the fire unions have strong control over how and 
where resources are deployed. Although there is not a considerable amount of 
empirical evidence from this study, the fire chiefs from the interviews said that a 
strong union in the Louisville Metro Fire Department prevented a mutual aid 
agreement, which would allow for the suburban fire departments to respond to an 
emergency within the Louisville urban fire district. These findings are in line with 
Viteritti's (1982) findings of the New York firefighters union which had strong 
control over where resources where placed so that there would be greater 
presence of fire fighters in high demand areas. Although in the New York case 
the union was not detrimental to fire response, the actions of the Louisville 
firefighters seems to be counterproductive for fire protection to the residents of 
the urban fire district. By preventing an agreement of this nature, the Louisville 
Fire Department potentially could raise costs because there would be greater 
demand for work for its employees where they could possibly be awarded 
overtime pay. A study by Marlow and Orzechowski (1996) found that unions 
adversely impact productivity and raise the costs of providing services through 
the public sector. 
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5. 2 Recommendations 
One of the first recommendations that I would make based on the findings 
of this study are to promote smaller, independent fire departments. These 
smaller fire departments have demonstrated more effective ability to respond 
quickly to a call than one large unified fire department for an entire city. I am 
however not advocating for exclusionary districts that are able to isolate 
themselves from the cost associated with providing services to the inner cities. 
Perhaps there needs to be a way to share funding at regional level. The structure 
of the Louisville-Jefferson County fire services is an example of how other cities 
could model their fire protective services. In addition, Louisville-Jefferson County 
leads by example and by having a mutual-aid agreement that allows a nearest 
fire station to respond to an emergency during certain times of the day, such as 
rush hour, which will allow for speedier response times. Another recommendation 
I would make is to prevent the union from having control that would prohibit a 
mutual-aid agreement from allowing another fire district to respond to an 
emergency if that district and department can respond to the emergency faster. 
Developers should not have the ability to put pressure on fire departments 
to build new fire stations for commercial areas on the fringes of cities so that 
lower insurance rates could be possible for commercial interests. This takes 
away resource from where they are needed, in areas of the inner-city where the 
services are utilized the most because cities have limited funding. Efforts should 
be made by city planners, fire departments, and developers to create new 
developments that are not automobile dependent with smaller street blocks and 
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smaller road segments. By reducing congestion on the road ways and providing 
public transportation options this will help in reducing response times because 
there will be fewer people driving. Lambert and Meyer (2006) also made a useful 
policy suggestion in their study on sprawl and EMS response times that city and 
county governments should create impact fees for new developments for the cost 
of extending fire, police and emergency services to these outlying areas. If 
developers do not want to pay these additional costs of developing in these 
outlying areas then greater efforts need to be made to develop within existing city 
areas that need infill. Related to Lambert and Meyer's (2006) suggestion that 
developers should pay additional costs, Oeyle and Smith (2000) have argued 
that property owners who face additional costs, such as hazardous conditions, 
should pay the additional costs of emergency services based on their relative 
risk, which would provide a disincentive to new sprawled developments. If both 
developers and consumers are hit with higher cots associated with the risk of 
living in sprawled areas than people may reconsider their choices on where to 
live. 
Previous studies have shown that fire follows poverty, and in this study it 
was demonstrated that people in poverty in Houston and Miami have worse off 
response times when controlling for several factors. Efforts have to be continually 
made to reduce levels of poverty so that the number of fires and the demand for 
fire services will eventually be reduced. Additionally the quality of housing should 
be improved within inner cities with protective measures such as sprinklers. Fire 
departments, in cities such as Houston or Miami that have higher proportions of 
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minorities and people who live in poverty should make greater efforts to 
reexamine response times and SES factors so that areas that have the highest 
need receive the greatest protection and not the reverse. What the suburban fire 
chief from Harrods Creek said during the qualitative section was very striking; 
that there had been no fire within his district within the past 18 months and it 
would be great if this could be said about an inner-city fire district. 
5. 3 Conclusions 
Results from this dissertation indicate that fire protective services do vary 
within a city and between cities. There was inequality in Houston and Miami and 
to a lesser extent in San Francisco as lower socio-economic groups fared poorly 
with respect to fire service as measured by response times, while in other cities 
such as in Louisville and Seattle this was not the case and resources have been 
distributed based on need and not potential loss. Similarly, sprawl factors 
negatively affected response times in the same cities that were inequitable, 
mainly Houston and Miami, while in Louisville and Seattle response times were 
not affected by sprawl in a negative manner. The intent of this study was to 
demonstrate if any correlations existed between response times, socio economic 
status and urban sprawl and the findings indicated that these correlations did 
exist. It was never the objective of this dissertation to prove causation but merely 
to investigate how sprawl impacted fire service provision and if certain groups 
within a city have equitable access to fire protective resources. Eight cities 
including Charlotte, North Carolina, Houston, Texas., Louisville, Kentcuky, 
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Portland, Oregon., Seattle, Washington, St. Paul, Minnesota, San Francisco, 
California., and Miami, Florida where included in this study. Based on these 
findings I would claim that people in lower SES have equitable access to fire 
protective services in cities like Louisville and Seattle and that fire protection 
services are distributed on need, while in Houston and Miami lower SES people 
do not have equitable access to resources. One major limitation is that there 
were only these eight cities within the study, which makes it very difficult to have 
external validity and apply these results to other cities. In reality cities are these 
dynamic places that have multiple dimensions and components that impact a 
service like fire provision as measured through average response times. This 
study only examined a few of these factors. I believe that there are some issues 
with selection bias and the cities in this study as this was not a true random 
sample. The problem was the data could be collected from the city if the city was 
willing to share both its fire department and GIS data, and this did not always 
happen. The dependent variable in this analysis was response time, which is an 
average and averages also have problems associated with them. 
I believe that the results do confirm my hypothesis that response times 
did vary by socioeconomic status of the inhabitants of the fire district. People in 
lower socio-economic status groups were negatively affected by longer 
responses times in Houston and Miami and to a lesser extent in San Francisco. 
It was also found that the wealthy were better off in other cities, such as Houston, 
as they have lower response times and this ultimately translates to fire services 
being distributed based on a potential for loss rather than actually loss which is 
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inequitable. People in lower socioeconomic status groups in Louisville and 
Seattle were better off with respect to response times. My hypothesis was correct 
for Houston and Miami as sprawl factors negatively impacted response times and 
jeopardize people's lives in these cities. Sprawl however did not negatively 
impact response times in Louisville and Seattle. 
Three fire chiefs, one from an urban fire district, one from an 
urban/suburban mix and one from a suburban fire district also were interviewed 
for this study. Some good insight was gained from these interviews. All of the fire 
chiefs believed that resources where distributed on need for services and that the 
lower-income groups should have been better served with lower response times, 
and were surprised when this wasn't the case in all the cities. All the chiefs also 
believed that sprawl had a major impact on response times and that different 
aspects of sprawl affected each district differently depending on where they were 
located within the city. Other important findings from the qualitative section were 
about the mutual aid agreement between the Louisville suburban fire districts, the 
impact of union's and developers on fire services. 
Further study is needed on this topic with both more empirical and 
qualitative evidence. It would be beneficial to have data from other fire 
departments that were structured in a similar fashion to the Louisville-Jefferson 
County Fire District, with an independent fire department with its own taxing 
authority for each district. It would also be valuable for future research to observe 
response time data for multiple years to examine the influence of different 
political administrations and fire protection. Although the recommendation was 
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made that cities should have several smaller independent fire departments it is 
completely possible that the results for Louisville ended up the way they did 
because of other unforeseen spurious reasons. It also would be beneficial to 
interview all the fire chiefs from each city. This way insight from each region 
could be gained and the qualitative results of each city could be discussed with 
that city's fire chief. Conduction the analysis at a smaller scale of geography, 
such as at the census tract level, would provide further insight into this topic as 
more variation occurs at the census tract level. It would be beneficial as a part of 
that analysis to examine the characteristics and features of each census tract 
that a fire station is located in. Having cities of different sizes also makes it very 
difficult to compare one to another, as a cities vary in size, sprawl, composition 
and many other areas. Each city is unique in its own manner which makes it very 
difficult to compare, and it would be beneficial if similar cities could be examined 
for a study of this nature in the future. 
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Figure 9 
Nonwhite Population in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 10 
Nonwhite Population in Seattle, WA 
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Figure 11 
Nonwhite Population in Miami-Dade, FL 
) 
fJ 
Miami Fire District Boundries 
0>10.00% 
010.01% -18.00% 
_ 18.01 - 52.00% __ -=:;::J_-==-__ IC::== ___ Miles _ 
o 2.5 5 10 15 20 <52.01% 
Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
164 
Figure 12 
Population Living in Poverty in Houston, TX 
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Figure 13 
Population living in Poverty in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 14 
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Population Living in Poverty in Seattle, WA 
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Figure 15 
Population Living in Poverty in Miami-Dade, FL 
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Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
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Figure 16 
Home Ownership Rates in Houston, TX 
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Figure 17 
Home Ownership Rates in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 18 
Home Ownership Rates in Seattle, WA 
CJ Fire District Boundary 
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Data from 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
171 
Figure 19 
Home Ownership Rates in Miami-Dade, FL 
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Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
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c:J Fire District Boundries 
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Figure 20 
Average Home Values in Houston, TX 
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Figure 21 
Average Home Values in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 22 
Average Home Values in Seattle, WA 
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Figure 23 
Average Home Values in Miami-Dade, FL 
__ IC:l_-==-_-====-__ Miles 
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Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
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Figure 24 
Tax Rate in Houston, TX 
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Figure 25 
Tax Rate in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 26 
Tax Rate in Miami-Dade, FL 
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Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
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Figure 27 
Commute Times in Houston, TX 
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Figure 28 
Commute Times in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 29 
Commute Times in Seattle, WA 
c::J Fire District Boundary 
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Figure 30 
Commute Times in Miami-Dade, FL 
Data from the 2000 Census. Red star indicates CBD. 
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c::J Fire Districts 
Commute Time (Min) 
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Figure 31 
Response Times in Houston, TX 
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Figure 32 
Response Times in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY 
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Figure 33 
Response Times in Seattle, WA 
D Fire District Boundary 
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Figure 34 
Response Times in Miami-Dade, FL 
Data from the 2000 Census. Red indicates CBD. 
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I::l Fire Districts 
Response Times (Seconds) 
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Appendix 2 - Interviews 
Fire Department: Lyndon 
Position: Battalion Chief Stich 
14. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor on fire department response times? 
Staffing in quarters or on apparatus so response can be imitated. Infrastructure, road 
system what are the barriers, rail crossings, weather ~ trees, flooding, power lines 
down. Unknown factors such as traffic accidents, construction that unaware oft some 
route blockage. 
15. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact 
on response times? 
Yes, # 1 impact is positioning of resources. Strategic planning is important on where to 
place stations for future growth. Where stations should be placed. How should the 
equipment be manned. Not staffing numbers necessarily but staffing in quarters 
makes big difference from having volunteer staff big delay in getting volunteers to 
scene to fight fire. 
16. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with 
respect to response times? 
No don't think so. Lower income areas in inner city areas have full time staft 
infrastructure hasn't changed. Stations are in placed and staffed. Don't see a lot of 
change in area street wise. But there can be economic factors that affect this. The 
closing down of station. So area that loses a station will have to be served by another 
district or station, but wont be as quickly as previously. 
17. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have 
better response times? 
188 
NOI typically areas with higher cost housing shouldnlt have better response times. 
Will be longer response times. 3:35 Lyndon area response time. Get bigger parcels of 
landl homes spread out further apartl stations further apart. Takes trucks longer time 
to get there. Response time is drawn by need. Where ever has most need will have 
most resources similar to police protectionl not based on having equality on response 
times. 
18. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes 
have better response times? 
Yesl they are able to afford full time staffingl rather than having volunteers. Areas 
with more money have better stationsl better equipment. Economically depressed 
areas could have stuff that is not the greatest. 
19. It was found in this study it that in certain cities that lower income areas were 
disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all 
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you have any possible explanations for 
this? 
Not knowing about the citYI they have gone through stations that have closed. Those 
poor areas were served by more stationsl but as a means for cost cutting they shut 
down the stations in the poor areas. In California proposition 44 came in and saw a 
flurry of station closers. In economic hard times governments will shut down stations 
and consolidate. Response times will go up. Other things ~ change in infrastructurel 
plant closuresl urban development that results in change in traffic flows and roadsl 
some type of service change. In older cities fire stations where only designed for horse 
and buggy. Sa had to be much closer for communication. IF fire people would run to 
fire station (prior to telephone) and notify of fire. 
20. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with higher cost housing 
had better response times, however once again this was not the case for all cities as 
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any possible explanations for this? 
Could be because of smaller service district? Are all areas served by the same fire 
department? District within fire department. Have Louisville fire department in urban 
189 
area and more affluent areas are served independent fire district and departments. 
More efficient because of taxing, from the comes from the fire district and is only 
spent on /ire. So money collected from Lyndon stays in Lyndon and is spent on fire 
$0.10 per 100. Every penny is spent on fire. Don't have other agencies fighting for 
dollars. Can position stations closer together have smaller area. In more affluent areas 
would receive higher funding have better staffing. Metro govt no control over us. 
21. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes, the worse the 
response time. Would you have any possible explanations for this? 
If area getting $0.12 per $100 rather maybe because the area is economically 
depressed. In order to get the same response time or staffing would need higher rate 
of tax to get a similar results. Black mud fire district economically depressed area. 
Revenues were dwindling. Wanted to share resources, with rest of county however, 
they were absorbed. They were getting $0.10 per $100 while Lyndon was getting 
$0.06 per $100 because they were economically depressed. The urban tax rate in 
Louisville is higher than the suburban tax rate. Urban response time is probably not 
the fastest. Other districts outside of urban area have more money so can afford more 
stations and have smaller service areas. In smaller fire departments we do everything 
the same as the large department but do it with fewer people. Unions don't like that. 
Louisville has good union. 
22. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district 
(increases response time)? 
8. Commuting Time *** Traffic Patterns have biggest impact. 
9. Vehicle Ownership 
10. Population Density (Population per street mile) 
11. Length of the Block 
12. Diversity of land use 
13. Distance from the center of the city? 
14. % of detached housing 
Have planned for other factors, its not unknown. We know what to expect. Can't avoid 
traffic and commuting. We are affected the most by traffic, for example at the busiest 
intersection at 5:00 in the afternoon we will be impacted for sure. 
23. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most correlated with 
longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be 
the case? What would you recommend to deal with this? 
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What we have done is implemented closest station response regardless of the fire 
district and political boundaries that the fire is in. When we have an incident in our 
district I however if its closest to Harrods creek they may be the ones to respond. Or if 
there is some issue with traffic and we cant get to the fire, then another department 
will responds. Cad dispatching system accounts for certain situation which will 
account for that. We have dropped the kingdom barriers. However, Louisville still has 
the barriers and the Union prevents other districts from responding. So we don't go 
into the urban service district until a certain level alarm is hit or they call us. 
24. The length of the street block was found to be the (2nd most) correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
That will have some effect, doesn't really affect us in Lyndon because we are on a grid 
system. One factor for those areas that are affected by it is on where resources are 
placed. A lot of times fire stations are placed in central areas. Have to be prepared to 
move from that central area. It may no longer be central point in district. Middletown 
did that a few years ago when the changed there headquarter location. Didn't do for 
economic reasons, but because old location was no longer at central point of district 
service wise. Lyndon in 60's located second station across railroad track on Westport 
road so that they would have equipment on both sides of the railroad. Picked location 
that was central. Need multiple access points into developments for connectivity. 
However developers will argue with chiefs saying why do you need another road here, 
it cost too much. Developers do not want to emergency services. Want to develop land 
than pass it off to somebody else than it becomes problem of the city if there are 
problems with access. 
25. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
Greater density in urban areas and more vehicles on the road more congestion. In 
rural areas won't have traffic levels, however roads aren't as good. We run into (not 
amount of congestion) but congestion outpacing infrastructure. So as area grows 
faster than road allow this creates a major problem. 
26. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way? 
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Yes, will affect another station is needed or dispatched to an incident. We came up 
with policy to share resource to reduce response times regardless of political 
boundaries. Staffing on equipment. 
• We have been downgrading emergency response. What was emergency 2 
years ago is not today. Traffic accidents, heart attacks. Definitions change of 
emergency. You risk a lot to save a lot and 'vice versa. Should be looked at all 
data. Trick to fool public is response time of first arriving unit ~ fire chief 
arrives at scene to scope out area, then trucks get there. Public wants to know 
when does unit get there, so response time of apparatus and command 
officer. 
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Fire Department: Jeffersontown 
Position Fire Chief Jack Reckner 
27. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor Qln fire department response times? 
Time of day of the incident ie rush hour, are the fir~ fighters asleep, awake because of 
24 hour shift. Environmental factors ~ weather. IrlPustrial park and traffic conditions 
high traffic area with lots of congestion. Topograpihy of area, geography. 
28. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact 
on response times? 
Yes, resources need to be deployed based on demographics. Will have a large impact 
on response times. 
29. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with 
respect to response times? 
No, even though fire follows poverty. Resources are based and distributed on who 
needs them the most and people in areas that are higher poverty should have more 
resources so shouldn't be disadvantaged with resp(mse times. 
30. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have 
better response times? 
Would say no, but could be because of funding maybe. Tax revenues higher in east 
end, lower in west end. Lower SES areas could have all volunteer fire fighters. 
31. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes 
have better response times? 
Maybe if that means greater funding and leads to more resources and better 
resources. Depends on density of population. 
32. It was found in this study it that in certain cities tha~ lower income areas were 
disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all 
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you h~ve any possible explanations for 
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this? Louisville used block development grand fun~s to by fire trucks. Depends on how 
resources were allocated. Poverty is a big factors. tau can over allocate. Areas with 
more density can have more fires, fire is attracted to poverty. If trucks and stations are 
busy responding to fire, trucks from other districts /.viii respond which will increase 
response times. 
33. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fir~ district's with higher cost housing 
had better response times, however once again thisi was not the case for all cities as 
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any ~ossible explanations for this? 
The more density an area has the more fires it will have. Lower SES areas have more 
demand for services so greater demand could put s~rain on services. 
34. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of, property taxes, the worse the 
response time. Would you have any possible explanl3tions for this? 
Depends on taxing authority, does funding come frpm general fund or does fire district 
have taxing power. Jeffersontown only gets mone~ from Jefferson town. Louisville 
gets money from all county in general fund. Also tax from employment. Urban service 
area different than suburban areas. 
35. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district 
(increases response time)? 
15. Commuting Time 
16. Vehicle Ownership 
17. Population Density (Population per stre~t mile) 
18. Length of the Block 
19. Diversity of land use 
20. Distance from the center of the city? *~* 
21. % of detached housing 
Distance form CBD most important for Jefferson To!wn. The areas on the edge of the 
district have much worse response times, because lire stations are so far away. 
36. Commuting times within the fire district where fou~d to be the most correlated with 
longer response times, would you agree with this a~d why do you think this would be 
the case? What would you recommend to deal with!this? 
Yes. Traffic is really bad. We have industrial park ~ith 30,000 people working there. 
Only 1 way in and 1 way out. Commuting burden h~ge. ISO ratings have nothing to do 
with good protection, no correlation. No greater tHan 5 miles rule. TO KEEP 
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INSURANCE RATING DOWN. Rules made from 191~ from horse and buggy time. 
Economic development people need fire stations tq get good ISO ratings, or 
development will not come. With a station close b~ people will get good ratings with 
lower rates of insurance. 
37. The length of the street block was found to be the (~nd most) correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
Yes, fire trucks need to get to location ASAP, howefer difficult with problems with 
connectivity. Short blocks easy to get around, long "Iocks not. If got lost have to go all 
the way around takes a lot of time. 
Adequacy of fire protection ordinance. 
38. Population density and congestion were found to b~ the correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why tlo you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
Not surprising, more demand more pull for resourcrs. Residential sprinklers will reduce 
the need. 
39. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way? 
Yes have weakness will try to shift policy by assignlrg resource to different areas. 
Renovate stations or build new ones. Jeffersontowb had station in industrial park, 
however no longer needed it so closed it down. 
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Fire Department Harrods Creek Fire Department 
Position Chief Aponte 
40. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor Ciln fire department response times? 
Resources, where resources are placed, where stat~ons are placed, man power, money, 
geography, speed ie average speed is about 25mpl1 because of all stops, lights, traffic, 
weather, 
Availability of man power, money all tied together~ geography. Avg speed 24 mph. 
Geography where station is placed. 
41. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact 
on response times? 
Yes one of the biggest factors for influence, hope that your station is in the best 
location. But sometimes you have a station in a district and all new homes and 
development in that district are very lar away Ironi station, which is bad lor response 
times. 
20sq miles for 2 station don't have resource to addinew stations, hope we have best 
locations. 
42. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with 
respect to response times? 
No the opposite is true. Poor areas have greater d~mand lor services so more 
resources will be placed in those areas so should h~ve better response times. 
Seem to be based on run volume. Lower SES areas ihave greater demand so more 
demand. Suburban areas more run volume will be ~igher and will have more 
resources. Should be better response. 
43. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have 
better response times? 
196 
Similar to previous question, however certain area$ may have better funding so they 
can afford more staffing and better equipment so ~hey could possibly have better 
times. Also smaller /ire departments are more effic~ent, easy to make changes when 
needed and problems are found. Depends upon th~ region. Old city of Louisville the 
opposite should be true. Areas with more volume s1Jould be have better response time. 
Certain areas with greater tax and assets more fun~ing should have better times. 
Some affluent areas have better fire department. 71he larger the department the 
decrease inability to have good management to ha,ve control in issues and pass down 
change. Consider merging but thought they would be less likely to responds. Small 
city mayors were worried about losing communication. 
44. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes 
have better response times? 
You would think so if it resulted in greater funding you could have more staffing. 
Current tax rate $0.10 per $100 of real property value (home, vehicle). Indianapolis 7 
$0.24-$0.38 per $100. Areas with lower taxing rate~ usually have to rely on volunteers. 
It tokes volunteers several minutes to response to calls, if the district is very large then 
response times go up. In some instances Cities willi annex areas to gain funding, but 
they will not add services. Ie Oxmoor. 
Would be better with greater taxing. Other areas have higher revenues. Cincinatti 0.17 
per $100 of real property. Can better staff with more funding. Some areas staffed 
Mon-Fri. In evening volunteers, weekend volunteef'5. Takes while for people to come 
in. Had they had the money would have full time staff which is big difference. 
45. It was found in this study it that in certain cities tha~ lower income areas were 
disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all 
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you h~ve any possible explanations for 
this? You wouldn't think this should be the case. 
Surprising and counterintuitive. Typically low income areas should have more volume 
better response times. 
46. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with higher cost housing 
had better response times, however once again this! was not the case for all cities as 
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any ~ossible explanations for this? 
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Could be some political explanations. 
Is there political reasons? Don't have enough dens~ty, wealthy housing however, not 
enough of it to get good funding levels. 9 th in income, but expensive housing. But 
density doesn't support having additional resources. Don't have population density to 
support better services. 
47. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes, the worse the 
response time. Would you have any possible explanations for this? 
Very expensive homes in hard to reach areas. Long.narrow windy roads, isolated. 
Bridges. Tax rate is same. Louisville urban service district general fund about 0.22-0.25 
per $100. 
Stations are placed in certain areas, however new growth occurs away from station. 
Poor areas might not be able to raise enough mon¢y, so need higher rates to 
compensate. 
48. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district 
(increases response time)? 
22. Commuting Time 
23. Vehicle Ownership 
26. Diversity of land use 
27. Distance from the center of the city? 
I 
49. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most correlated with 
longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be 
the case? What would you recommend to deal with this? 
Yes would agree with these. Traffic not an issue fot' suburban area. Finding the most 
efficient route. Add more infrastructure. 
50. The length of the street block was found to be the (2nd most) correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
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Would agree with this. How would deal with this? Less expensive to have more staff 
rather than to build roads. Have developers talk with fire people. Louisville annexed 
areas of Oxmoor but did not provide additional resources. So when send fire trucks to 
Oxmoor trucks go through 2 different fire protectiQn districts to get there. Union 
contracts prevent suburban districts to response to urban district. Taxation without 
representation. Take tax money but don't provide Qdditional services. Still like that. So 
increase response time. 
51. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated with longer 
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case? 
What would you recommend to deal with this? 
Yes, not really applicable to suburban area. But just add more resources. 
52. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way? 
Yes, policies for response. Response affects the type and number of apparatus that 
are sent. Water supplies in isolated areas no hydrants. Tankers need ta come in. Roads 
more narrow, don't hove weight capacity need smaller trucks. Affected by narrow 
roads. Some areas get in to because of private brid'ges, gates that block trucks. Have 
problems with big tree canopies. Trees grow up and out trucks get damaged. 
Ambulance put in location in area with political pressure. Influential person died so 
ambulance placed in location for 6-7 area. If money is not there will do best with what 
you have. 
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Appendix 3 -IRB Documentation 
Flor IRS Approval Stamp 
Subject Informed Consent Document 
Equity, Sprawl and Fire Department Response Times Across the U.S. 
Investigator(s) name & address: David M. Simpson, Matin Katirai. 426 West 
Bloom St. Louisville, KY 40208. 
Site(s) where study is to be conducted: Fire StatioMs in Jefferson County 
Kentucky. 
Phone number for subjects to call for questions: 502-852-4735 
Introduction and Background Information 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted 
by David M Simpson, PhD and Matin Katirai, MPH, Student .The study is 
sponsored by the University of Louisville, Department of Urban and Public 
Affairs. The study will take place at Fire station in Jefferson County Kentucky. 
Approximately 3 subjects will be invited to participate. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors that influence fire department 
response times and offer possible explanations for most significant factors of this study. 
It is a follow up to the quantitative findings of the study. 
Procedures 
In this study, you will be asked to identify factors that influence response times and 
offer possible explanations for most significant factors that were found in this study 
through a survey. The surveys will be conducted in per$on. You may decline any 
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question that makes you uncomfortable. The survey should take less than fifteen 
minutes to complete. 
Potential Risks 
There are no foreseeable risks, although there may be unforeseen risks. 
Benefits 
The possible benefits of this study include improved understanding of factors that 
influence response times. The information collected may not benefit you directly. 
The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. 
Compensation 
You will not be compensated for your time, inconvenience, or expenses for your 
participation in this study 
Confidentiality 
Your identity as a subject in this study and the information you provide may be 
released and published only if you agree that the information may be made 
public. Data collected in this project will be kept in the principal investigator's 
computer under passwords secured protection 
Voluntary Participation 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If 
you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide 
not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any 
benefits for which you may qualify. 
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Research Subject's Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the study or the study staff, you 
have three options. 
You may contact the principal investigator at 502-852-4735. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions, 
concerns or complaints, you may call the Human Subjects Protection 
Program Office (HSPPO) (502) 852-5188. You may discuss any 
questions about your rights as a subject, in secret, with a member of the 
Institutional Review Soard (IRS) or the HSPPO staff. The IRS is an 
independent committee composed of members of the University 
community, staff of the institutions, as we" as lay members of the 
community not connected with these institutions. The IRS has reviewed 
this study. 
If you want to speak to a person outside the University, you may call 1-
877-852-1167. You wi" be given the chance to talk about any questions, 
concerns or complaints in secret. This is a 24 hour hot line answered by 
people who do not work at the University of Louisvi"e. 
This paper tells you what wi" happen during the study if you choose to take part. 
Your signature means that this study has been discussed with you, that your 
questions have been answered, and that you wi" take part in the study. This 
informed consent document is not a contract. You are not giving up any legal 
rights by signing this informed consent document. You wi" be given a signed 
copy of this paper to keep for your records. 
Signature of Subject/Legal Representative 
Signature of Person Explaining the Consent Form 
(if other than the Investigator) 
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